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Foreword
I will not attempt here a review of Rudy’s full career and corpus. The chapters to
follow accomplish that goal well. Rather, I offer a preface to his career, from my
experience as his assistant professor colleague at Yale during the 2 years from 1964
to 1966, in the hope that experience may shed light on his later development. We
were then beneficiaries of Karl Deutsch’s pioneering NSF grant to produce and
analyze cross-national political and social data. Dick Merritt and Hayward Alker
were also involved. But by 1964 I had my own NSF grant, and Rudy brought his
own NSF grant to Yale to establish his Dimensionality of Nations project. With
Karl, Dick, Hayward, and Rudy no longer on this earth, I feel a bit like Ishmael
citing Job 1:13 to begin his Epilogue to Moby Dick: ‘I only am escaped alone to tell
thee.’
All of us were number crunchers to one degree or another, and Yale was an Ivy
League university with no assured tenure track. So it was clear that the Political
Science Department would be unable, or unwilling, to tenure more than one or two
of us. The situation was objectively very competitive, yet we all maintained good
relations with one another. Rudy was particularly co-operative, and was eager to
share his knowledge of factor analysis—a fine colleague. Yet he was, as he admits
in his biography, something of a loner, and all the other three were Yale PhDs of
approximately the same vintage. We were also well known to most members of the
Department, which was mostly advantageous. I was probably his best friend in the
Department, and I have good memories of the times Cynthia and I had dinner with
Rudy and his wife Grace. One time, shortly after we had moved into our new house,
they brought a potted holly tree, and we planted it next to the house. It is now a tree
reaching above the roofline, and I often think of them when I care for it.
If Rudy had any hope of staying at Yale, he was not very strategic about it. The
Department sponsored lunches for all faculty at Mory’s—a quintessential old boy
hangout. The rest of us often attended, but Rudy quickly determined that the
conversation was not worth his time, and quit going. Rudy was there long enough
to get into a conversation with a new senior comparativist who immediately
established himself as a mover and shaker. He had an up-from-the-streets back-
ground, and ethnically was part of an honor culture. He inquired about Rudy’s work
v
with increasing skepticism, especially about fancy statistical analysis. Rudy tried
his best, but with little success. Finally he said, within hearing distance of others,
‘You just don’t understand factor analysis.’ I watched the senior member’s face,
and knew that his honor had been challenged. Rudy had moved him from a position
of relative neutrality to determined opposition. Rudy had weak social skills, and
was quite open about it. In 1966 the Department tried to promote Hayward but he
was a free spirit and went to MIT instead, and Dick went to the University of
Illinois. Yale promoted me to associate professor. This settled most of the com-
petition questions, but it did not mean Rudy could expect our Department to
promote him. About the same time he was offered a professorship at the University
of Hawaii, where he had done his BA. He loved Hawaii, and was very pleased to go
back. And he never left. So I think that pull was greater than Yale’s likely push.
I read, and still read, some science fiction, but Rudy was an avid fan. He quickly
told me about his favorite, Isaac Asimov’s Foundation Trilogy published in 1951,
1952, and 1953. Hari Seldon, the protagonist, chiefly of the first volume, is a
mathematician and creator of the science of psychohistory. Seldon gathered the best
minds to predict future macrohistory—the big patterns, not the details of time and
space for particular events and personalities. It was nonetheless a practical science
devoted to saving the universe from chaos and war. Seldon was a model scientist,
a genius, and Rudy’s fictional hero. A reader of Rudy’s work can readily see the
similarities. Don’t, however, picture Rudy as arrogant or too egotistic. He had great
integrity, ceasing teaching because he couldn’t hear his students well enough. But
he was a highly intelligent man with great imagination and breadth of academic and
artistic talents. And he knew that. He also had great drive, evident in the enormous
volume of published work requiring extensive research, analysis, and
entrepreneurship. He was doing his part to save the world from war and chaos.
His work largely wears well. Death by Government detailed the human horrors
of absolute states. He deserves credit for finding elements of what became known as
the Democratic Peace, and bits of the Kantian Peace (his libertarian belief in free
domestic and international markets). But I don’t think he fully comprehended what
he had found, as his political ideal was not simply democracy as later characterized
by institutions on a Polity scale. He used the adjective libertarian to indicate a small
and tightly restrained government, favoring individual liberty and free enterprise.1
I think that led to his depiction of the Soviet Union as an implacable enemy to be
restrained only by the threat and use of military force. The irony is that he didn’t
understand the policy implications of his extremely hawkish views. He did not
consider all the real policy implications of following his controversial policy,
notably the effect of sustained confrontation in producing what Harold Lasswell
back in 1941 called ‘The Garrison State’. A garrison state means a militarized state
1A libertarian friend, whom I considered an ally in opposing the Vietnam War and other foreign
entanglements, characterized his own position simply as ‘Get the government off my back, and out
of my crotch’.
vi Foreword
and society—not a libertarian country. We see elements of a garrison state now in a
militarized culture, a military-industrial complex, and great governmental power to
intensely monitor individuals’ activity. Rudy missed this one …
Bruce Russett
Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
Bruce Russett b. 1935, Ph.D. in political science (Yale, 1961) is Dean Acheson
research professor of political science at Yale University and former chair of the
Department of Political Science. He served as President of the Peace Science
Society (International) in 1977–79 and the International Studies Association in
1983–84. His most recent book is Hegemony and Democracy (Norton, 2011).
Harvey Starr has edited a biography, Bruce M Russett: Pioneer in the Scientific and
Normative Study of War, Peace, and Policy (Springer, 2015).
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Chapter 1
R.J. Rummel—A Multi-faceted Scholar
Nils Petter Gleditsch
Rudolph J. Rummel always published just as R.J. Rummel but was well known in
the profession as Rudy.1 He was a man of many talents, and to some of his readers
he may also have seemed to present many different faces. He came from a broken
home, yet became a devoted husband and father. He had an extensive academic
publication record, but he also wrote six novels. He was an academic loner, but
acquired a wide following, which has continued to expand after he withdrew from
the academic scene and promises to continue to grow even after his death. He
interacted with many leading scholars in international relations, but developed
troubled relations with several. He started out as a socialist but became a libertarian
or, as he himself eventually phrased it, a freedomist. He became a pioneer among
liberal international relations scholars in his pursuit of the democratic peace, but he
joined the neoconservative wing of the realists in his work on the nuclear arms race
in the mid-1970s and in his support for the Iraq War in 2003. His work on
democide was embraced by liberals and realists alike, but also harshly criticized by
writers of varying backgrounds.
Nils Petter Gleditsch, b. 1942, Research professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), and
Professor emeritus of political science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology
(NTNU), former editor (1983–2010) of Journal of Peace Research. Former President of the
International Studies Association (2008–09); Email: nilspg@prio.org.
1Most of the chapters in this book originated in a roundtable at the 56th Convention of the
International Studies Association (ISA), New Orleans, LA, 18–21 February 2015. I am particu-
larly grateful to Doug Bond for his assistance in setting up the roundtable and his encouragement
and help throughout the book project. Valuable comments were received from the authors of the
following chapters as well as from Scott Gates, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Warren R. Phillips,
Bruce Russett, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Dina Zinnes. Finally, I acknowledge the financial support
of the Research Council of Norway and the Gløbius Fund for supporting my work on the intro-
duction and the editing and open-access publication of the volume.
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SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice 37,
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1
The main aim of this book is to review his work and to assess the development of
his views over the span of his career. At the same time, several contributors relate his
academic and political views to his personal life story. The authors of this volume
share the view that despite what quibbles or even quarrels they might have with some
of his writings, Rummel stands as a very significant contributor to the empirical and
theoretical study of human conflict. At the same time, he was an intensely political
person who has influenced the moral compass of many scholars in the profession.
1.1 A Rummel Timeline
On two occasions, Rummel (1976b, 1989) has provided autobiographical accounts.
The story of his checkered childhood and youth emerges here, as well as in his
daughter’s recollections (Chap. 2) and Doug Bond’s interview with him (Chap. 3).
Here, he also talks at length about his shifting research interests and his increasing
unease with socialist ideology. I will attempt a very broad periodization of
Rummel’s professional work.
From the start of his education, Rummel embraced mathematics—apparently, a
youthful interest in science fiction influenced this choice. Indeed, his first academic
work was heavily mathematical, with empirical studies of conflict and a major
textbook on factor analysis (Rummel, 1970). But, as Richard Chadwick explains
(Chap. 5), for Rummel factor analysis was not just a methodological tool but also a
key part of a theoretical framework that came to be known as social field theory.
While many other scholars adopted and elaborated empirical findings that emerged
from these projects, in particular those relating to the relationship between internal
and external conflict, few others attributed the same theoretical importance to factor
analysis. Nevertheless, Rummel’s reputation as a quantitative scholar of note grew
rapidly in the scholarly community and in policy circles. He received extensive
funding from the US Department of Defense, through the Advanced Research
Projects Agency (ARPA),2 which funded a number of conflict research projects in
the 1960s and 1970s. Rummel’s projects, in particular the large Dimensionality of
Nations (DON) Project, also involved substantial data collection, and the data were
used by a wide range of scholars.
A second phase of Rummel’s work started when, according to his own recol-
lections (Rummel, 1989: 314) he took a step back from data collection and
hypothesis-testing to look at the broader theoretical preconditions and implications
of his work. He started what he has called an ‘intensive and extensive liberal
self-education’ in philosophy, history, and the social sciences. This eventually led to
the massive oeuvre collectively titled Understanding Conflict and War, published in
2From 1972 (and again in 1996) renamed the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA), cf. http://www.darpa.mil. The vast majority of ARPA-supported projects were tech-
nical and weapons-oriented. ARPA is probably best known for its development of the ARPANET,
which eventually became the Internet.
2 N.P. Gleditsch
five volumes between 1975 and 1981. The series title was apparently proposed by
Sage, but in retrospect Rummel regretted agreeing to this series title, since it only
really fit vol. 4 (War, Power, Peace, 1979). As James Lee Ray argues (Chap. 8), it is
in many ways an overlooked classic. Rummel himself, while not expecting it to be a
hit, was unprepared for its being so widely ignored. The sales were poor. Only a few
years later, an article in Journal of Conflict Resolution (Rummel, 1983a) was to
change the landscape dramatically. This article, along with a two-part article by
Doyle (1983), launched the democratic peace on the mainstream agendas of peace
research and international relations. A number of other scholars joined in, notably
Bruce Russett and Zeev Maoz.3 Rummel once again became a household name.
A few years later, the debate was extended to a broader liberal peace, involving the
Kantian triangle of democracy, economic interdependence, and international orga-
nization. This line of investigation was initiated by Oneal, Oneal, Maoz & Russett
(1996) and is primarily associated with Bruce Russett and John Oneal, in a series of
frequently-cited articles and a book (Russett & Oneal, 2001). Rummel (1976a) had
expressed skepticism about the peacebuilding effects of trade and international
organizations (cf. Chap. 6). He did not enter the new debate about the liberal peace,
which started after he had retired from the university and stopped publishing articles
in academic journals. His 1983 article on the democratic peace—and indeed, in his
four subsequent articles indexed by Web of Science between 1984 and 1986—
referred to libertarianism rather than democracy. The same is true of Understanding
Conflict and War. Libertarian was defined along two dimensions, political (where, of
course, democracy featured prominently) and economic. In his articles on libertari-
anism and international violence, the term democratic peace does not occur at all.
Kaneohe, Oahu, Hawaii, where Rummel lived most of the time in Hawaii and Kaneohe Bay where
he now rests. Photo from personal photo collection of his family
3See, in particular, Maoz & Russett (1993) and Russett (1993).
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In his later work, however, even as the attention of the field moved to broader aspects
of the liberal peace, Rummel focused on democracy. On his website,4 democratic
peace is one of the main headlines. In some ways, his work can be seen as a precursor
of the more recent discussion of the capitalist peace (cf. Weede in Chap. 7, Gartzke,
2007). But as far as I have been able to ascertain, Rummel himself never used the term
capitalist peace, and his work was sometimes critical of unbridled capitalism or
liberalism.5 From 2009, his blog was labelled freedomist rather than libertarian. And
his two final books were called The Blue Book of Freedom (2007) and Freedom’s
Principles (2008).
Although Rummel’s work on the democratic peace focused mainly on the
interstate democratic peace, he also eventually concluded that ‘democracies are
most internally peaceful’, that ‘democracies don’t murder their citizens’,6 and that
democratic freedom promotes wealth and prosperity and prevents famines.7 It was
the latter point that was going to lead Rummel into a new phase of his work and
another major series of books on what he came to call democide, a concept that was
deliberately chosen to be wider than genocide and politicide. Separate volumes
examined the Soviet Union (1990), China (1991), and Nazi Germany (1992), before
he summed it all up in Death by Government (1994) and Statistics of Democide
(1997). In Power Kills (1997), he tied together his work on democracy and the
various kinds of human conflict. The subtitle of this book was Democracy as a
Method of Nonviolence. It underscored Rummel’s long-standing commitment to a
less violent world, even though as Erica Chenoweth points out (Chap. 11) he never
commented directly on non-violent action as a substitute for insurgency and war.
Rummel playing tennis. Photo from personal photo collection of his family
4See at. https://www.hawaii.edu.powerkills.MIRACLE.HTM.
5Cf. Rummel (1976d: Chap. 22, 1981: Chap. 2).
6Chapter headings in Rummel (1997).
7Rummel (2007: Chap. 6).
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One of his Ph.D. students nonetheless studied this topic in his dissertation, with the
use of factor analysis! (Bond, 1988).
The work on democide is probably the aspect of Rummel’s work that captures
most attention now. It was also to be his last major research effort even though he
continued to publish shorter articles, blog posts—and six novels, to which I return
briefly later.
In this brief attempt at a periodization of Rummel’s work, I have omitted a book
that does not fall clearly into any of the major periods. This is his book on the
nuclear arms race, discussed in this volume by Matthew Kroenig & Bardia
Rahmani (Chap. 6). In Peace Endangered: Reality of Détente (1976a), Rummel
critiqued détente, expressed skepticism about arms control, and called for a policy
that would give the West a clear nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union.
Published at a time when liberals were hopeful about détente and arms control, it
created a significant distance between himself and scholars who might have been
receptive to his message about freedom and peace. Instead, it probably reinforced
the prejudice, still common in peace research, that talking about a democratic peace
just meant rehashing old enemy images of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and familiar propaganda
for ‘the free world’. Richard Chadwick notes in an aside (Chap. 5, note 2) an
estrangement between Rummel and himself. It dates to this period, though not
exclusively to this issue. Intriguingly, Rummel relates (1989: 317f) that his hawkish
message was not well received in the national security establishment either, which
led to a cut-off of his long-term funding from DARPA.
1.2 The Lone Ranger
Rummel’s extensive writings are listed in Chap. 13 of this book. His work is fre-
quently cited, and remains influential nearly two decades after he withdrew from
academic publishing. Figure 1.1 shows the number of citations to his articles indexed
in Web of Science for the past fifty years. Using the Author file, the total number of
citations to his articles as of mid-August 2016, was 797. The overall regression line is
obviously positive. But we can spot three humps in the annual citation rate. The first
(which peaks in 1972) relates to his early work on methods and on the relationship
between internal and external conflict. The next hump peaks in 1997 and is probably
linked to the democratic peace, although a more detailed analysis would be necessary
to establish this conclusively. The final peak, which is also the peak for the whole time
series, occurs in 2007, and includes citations to his work on democide. However, it is
not the case that his earlier work remains uncited in later periods. In fact, his 1967
factor analysis article has been cited more than 20 times since 2010.
Table 1.1 shows his most-cited articles. This table was compiled from the Cited
authors file of Web of Science rather than from the Author file. A Basic search on
Author yields lower numbers because it does not include periodicals not indexed by
WoS in that year (such as the European Journal of International Relations before
1997) and because a number of citations are not correctly linked to the relevant
article. The discrepancies between the numbers derived from the Author and Cited
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author files are larger for the earlier years, when citation data were hand-coded from
the print journals, apparently with little if any proofreading.
Table 1.1 underlines the wide impact of Rummel’s work on factor analysis as
well as the importance of Journal of Conflict Resolution throughout his career. Half
the top-cited articles appeared in that journal. The close personal relationship
between Rummel and Bruce Russett is only partly relevant here, since two of the
top articles were published before Russett took over as editor of JCR in 1972.
In turn, Rummel’s authorship was probably important to the reputation of the
journal, too. All the five Rummel articles listed here were among the top five
Fig. 1.1 Citations to Rummel’s articles, 1966–2016 Source Downloaded with permission from
the author file at Web of Science, 18 August 2016. © Copyright Thomson Reuters (2016). All
rights reserved. For a description of the limitations of this file to assess the total citations of an
author, see below in the main text. Apart from a brief comment (Rummel, 2004a, b) the last
WoS-indexed article by Rummel appeared in print in 1997
Table 1.1 Citations to Rummel’s ten most-cited journal articles, 1966–2015
1 Understanding factor analysis, JCR (1967) 228
2 Dimensions of conflict behavior within and between nations, GSY (1963) 205
3 Libertarianism and international violence, JCR (1983) 202
4 Democracy, power, genocide, and mass murder, JCR (1995) 87
5 Democracies ARE less warlike than other regimes, EJIR (1995 75
6 Dimensions of conflict behavior within nations, 1946–59, JCR (1966) 72
7 Libertarian propositions on violence within and between nations …, JCR (1985) 69
8 A field theory of social action with application to conflict …, GSY (1965) 61
9 How multinationals analyze political risk (with DA Heenan), HBR (1978) 40
10 Is collective violence correlated with social pluralism? JPR (1997) 38
Source Statistics from Web of Science, downloaded 26 August 2015. GSY = General Systems:
Yearbook of the Society for General Systems, HBR = Harvard Business Review, JCR = Journal of
Conflict Resolution, JPR = Journal of Peace Research. Articles in American Political Science
Review (1969) and World Politics (1969), as well as several other articles in Journal of Peace
Research (1966, 1967, 1994) were among those that fell just short of the top-ten list. Another
article close to the top ten was on the DON project in Comparing Nations (1969), a volume edited
by Richard Merritt & Stein Rokkan (Rummel, 1966)
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articles in terms of citations in their respective volumes—the 1967 and 1983 articles
were in first place, by a wide margin.
For the next generation of quantitative social scientists, the number of article
citations is the most important indicator of academic success. Rummel was a more
traditional scholar who published much of his most significant work in books. His
somewhat contrarian stance may have caused him some trouble with journal editors
and referees. In his autobiographical article (Rummel, 1989: 317), he hints at
getting a number of rejections for articles dealing with the topics discussed in his
book Peace Endangered (1976a). His books did not always travel a simple road to
publication either, but nine books found a home at Sage (until 1981) and six with
Transaction (from 1990). Table 1.2 lists citations to his most-frequently cited
books, once again compiled from the Cited author file of Web of Science.
This list also underlines the wide impact of his work on factor analysis (as Ray
suggests in Chap. 8). His factor analysis book was featured as a ‘citation classic’ in
Current Contents (Rummel, 1987b). His more recent work on democide is also
widely cited and has maintained high visibility in the current debate about the
waning of war and violence. For instance, in his widely-cited book on the decline of
violence, Pinker (2011) makes extensive use of Rummel’s work on democide.
Rummel’s magnum opus Understanding Conflict and War is not as widely cited as
one might expect. Because the books tend to be cited by the series title rather than
by the volume title, I have not attempted to provide individual citation data for the
five volumes. The importance of Rummel’s books is also made clear by the fact that
he has five times as many citations as Cited author than as Author, whereas
comparable scholars like Johan Galtung and Bruce Russett have more citations as
Author, because their articles are so widely cited.8
Another striking thing about Tables 1.1 and 1.2 is that Rummel has extremely
limited co-authorship. Only one co-authored article just barely makes into the
top-ten article list, and he has no co-authored books. By contrast, leading scholars
of the same generation such as Johan Galtung, J. David Singer, and Bruce Russett
have numerous co-authored articles and books. Co-authorship, although much less
frequent than in the natural sciences where articles can have several hundred
co-authors, is becoming increasingly common in the social sciences. In the earlier
volumes of Journal of Peace Research, for instance, the average number of authors
per article is generally between 1.1 and 1.3 (indicating that on average every third to
every tenth article has a co-author, since few articles have more than two authors),
rising to an average of nearly 2 for the most recent volumes.9
One plausible reason why Rummel has few co-authors is that as his daughter
reminds us inChap. 2, hewas a rather private person and perhaps not temperamentally
8The reader may wonder how it is possible to have more citation to Author than to Cited author,
when the latter includes all works, including books, whereas the first includes only WoS-indexed
articles. The reason is that the Author file counts all article citations individually, whereas in the
Cited author file the scholar only gets a single citation from an article that cites several of his/her
works.
9I am grateful to my colleague Jonas Nordkvelle for compiling these statistics.
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well suited to share the process of writing, although he maintained an active network
of academic collaborators and contacts and frequently discussed his work with his
students. He had a relatively low number of Ph.D. students. He was a very influential
force in their professional lives, as Sang-Woo Rhee explains in Chap. 4, and Doug
Bond describes him as the most supportive teacher he ever had.10 Whether or not he
encouraged or discouraged his students to publishwhileworking on their dissertations
is not entirely clear, but he certainly shared the prevailing notion that the dissertation
had to come first. So did J. David Singer, but unlike Rummel he co-authored exten-
sively, including with former students. And so did Russett and Galtung.
1.3 The Critics
Rummel’s work has been subjected to extensive examination by other scholars,
leading to praise as well as harsh criticism. The DON Project (along with three
other major quantitative empirical projects in international relations) was subjected
to close scrutiny in Hoole & Zinnes (1976), with separate chapters on the philos-
ophy of science and research design of the project (Hilton, 1976), its methodology
and statistical practices (Hazlewood, 1976), and the substantive findings (Van Atta
& Robertson, 1976), in addition to a presentation and a bibliography by Rummel
(1976d, f) and a brief response to the reviews (Rummel, 1976e). Hilton’s chapter
built on a detailed review of DON he had done earlier at Rummel’s invitation
(Hilton, 1973). It is impossible here to summarize all the specific points raised in
these reviews. Some of them may have been bypassed by the rapid theoretical and
empirical progress in social science since that time. Others, such as the role of
theory in international relations research, how to deal with missing data, and the
relative role of national attributes and relational characteristics in accounting for
international interaction, remain.
Table 1.2 Citations to Rummel’s ten most-cited books, 1966–2015
1 Applied Factor Analysis (1970) 1,561
2 Death by Government (1994) 262
3 Understanding Conflict and War (1975–81) 149
4 Dimensions of Nations (1976c) 116
5 Power Kills (1997) 82
6 Lethal Politics: Soviet Genocides … (1990) 35
7 China’s Bloody Century: Genocide … (1991) 30
8 Statistics of Democide (1997) 24
9 Democide: Nazi Genocide and Mass Murder (1992) 21
10 Field Theory Evolving (1977) 20
Source as in Table 1.1. The search was made on the Cited author file. The first book not to make it on to the
list was Peace Endangered (1976a). Total number of citations on the Cited author file: 2,863
10Personal communication, 9 October 2015.
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Ray (1982, 1998, and Chap. 8) was always a constructive critic, who carefully
read all five volumes of Understanding Conflict and War, which he characterized as
one of the most energetic and comprehensive contributions to the scientific study of
international relations. Despite criticism of many of Rummel’s answers, he credited
him with asking the right questions.
Another friendly critic was Warren R. Phillips, who had himself obtained his
Ph.D. under Rummel and had served (1968–71) as assistant director of the DON
Project. He was generally quite critical of the lack of theory in the international
relations discipline but found Rummel’s field theory to be a promising island of
theory (Phillips, 1974). Several years later, he was more critical in reviewing Peace
Endangered. While Rummel had done valuable work in mapping objective aspects
of power (capabilities) his attempt to deal with the subjective aspects (interests and
capability) were judged to be inadequate (Ensign & Phillips, 1980).
An equally well-read but more critical commentator was Wiberg (1982). While
acknowledging the extraordinarily prolific nature of Rummel’s scholarship, he crit-
icized Rummel for the tautological nature of his comprehensive field theory,
for biased summaries of some major schools in social science (such as
frustration-aggression theory and Marxism), and particularly for questionable judg-
ments in his wide-ranging literature review as to whether or not the empirical results
from published articles support his theoretical framework, Rummel responded briefly
(Rummel, 1983b) and later in a new article summarizing how published articles
supported his libertarian propositions on violence (Rummel, 1985: 435, note 6).
Another strong critic was Vincent (1987a, b) who argued that Rummel’s
interdemocratic peace could not be sustained with an alternative set of conflict data.
Rummel responded to this in the same journal issue. But Vincent used conflict data
for only a few years in the 1970s, as did Rummel (1983a, b), which Vincent had
critiqued. In view of the many analyses of the democratic peace using much longer
time series for different well-established datasets, this debate is less relevant today.
Rummel’s long-time colleague at the University of Hawaii, Michael Haas, had
found in an early article ‘a slight but consistent tendency for democratic countries to
have less foreign conflict’ (Haas, 1965: 313), but later became a vocal critic of the
democratic peace program (Haas, 2014).
Of great continuing interest is the debate about Rummel’s democide estimates.
Rummel created these on a country-by-country basis using published studies,
concluding with three figures, a high estimate, a low estimate, and a most probable
estimate. These could vary significantly. For the Soviet Union, for instance,
Rummel (1990: 3) estimated a most probable democide of 62 million people, but
with a range from 28 million to 127 million. In most of his work on democide, he
focused on the most probable estimates, leaving himself somewhat vulnerable to
criticism for excessive precision in these numbers. However, he also noted that he
would be amazed if future research did not come up with figures that deviated
significantly from his own. His figures should be viewed as rough approximations
(Rummel, 1994: vii–xx).
His volume on the statistics of democide, however, as well as the books on the
four ‘deka-megamurderers’ (the Soviet Union, China under Kuomintang, China
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under Mao, and Nazi Germany), contain all the sources and all the numbers and
extensive comments on how he selected his own numbers. Some critics, including
Harff (1996: 118) have argued that ‘Rummel chooses numbers of deaths that almost
always are skewed in the direction of the highest guesses’. In this volume, Barbara
Harff (Chap. 12) cites but does not reiterate this criticism. Rather, in discussing
Rummel’s numbers for Cambodia, she finds that given his wide definition of
democide, his estimates are consistent with established estimates in the literature
and she also acknowledges his ‘monumental job in collecting data and informa-
tion’. A reviewer of Rummel’s volume on democide in the Soviet Union chides him
for not using Russian-language sources and for assuming citing a range of sec-
ondary sources ‘as if they were all of equal worth’. He also faults Rummel for
assuming ‘that the entire labour camp population was innocent’ although some of
those who died in the camps ‘were common criminals or actual Nazi collaborators’
(Swain, 1991).
A critic of Rummel’s democide estimates for Yugoslavia (Dulić, 2004a) argued,
on the basis of considerable documentation, that Rummel’s estimates for democide
in Yugoslavia during World War II and in the immediate aftermath of the war were
much too high. He also questioned whether similar data problems might occur in
other democide estimates. Rummel (2004a, b) thanked him for his contribution to
research on democide, but dismissed the overall claims of the critique, since Dulić
had only commented on a portion of the time period covered by Rummel. Dulić
(2004b) was not convinced.
As Rummel pointed out in his reply to Dulić, it is not enough to criticize the
numbers he published. The issues are too important for criticism alone. Those who
disagree with his numbers should feel a responsibility to come up with alternative
and more reliable figures. Rummel’s work on democide was not only a gigantic data
collection effort, but also admirable in its transparency—long before the replication
requirement became a standard feature of empirical work in international relations.
1.4 The Novelist and the Artist
Rummel’s novels were written after he finished writing for academic journals and
book publishers, but they are in direct continuity of the main themes from his
research and were published under the general heading of the Never Again Series.
I have only read the first (Rummel, 2004b), but that puts me ahead of most of the
other contributors to this volume. The book is packed with love, sex, and action, and
written in a rather macho style, quite common in its genre. The basic plot is that the
hero, Rudolph Rummel himself in only a slight disguise, enters the past through a
time-machine with a female partner, to create an alternative world where major wars
and democides have been avoided. Through a mixture of bribery and assassinations,
they derail the Mexican revolution, dispose of Hitler, Lenin, and Stalin long before
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they are anywhere near political power, and prevent the two World Wars as well as
the Sino-Japanese War and the democide in China. One might wonder what is left to
save the world from in the following volumes, but it appears that the time travelers
ran into some unexpected future problems. Rummel’s novels were probably too
closely tied to his academic and political pursuits to stand much of a chance in the
mass market of paperback fiction. The books are still available in electronic form
from Llumina Press and from Rummel’s website, and hard copies can be obtained
from amazon.com. Llumina is a self-publishing press, and the publisher notes that
sales of such books depend on the author’s ability to promote and market them. In
Rummel’s cases, the sales were very limited.11 Apart from their merits as fiction, the
six novels reinforce the picture of an exceptionally diligent writer. Each book is 200–
300 pages, and all six were published in a two-year period, along with a nonfiction
supplement (Rummel, 2005).
Rummel was also an artist and in his later years spent a large part of his time
painting. I am even less qualified to comment on his art than on his novels and
happily defer to his daughter’s comments in Chap. 2. An example of his art is found
Rummel’s caption: Dinner? Paintage. Well, it would be dinner if not for mother hen. The
background was painted; and the chicks, hen, and two cats are each from separate photos I took
around the outside of our house. Soon after this picture was made, all but two of these chicks
disappeared—perhaps eaten by the cats. They are all wild animals that have taken to us, maybe
because we feed them. Source https://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/GAL2.CATS.CHICKS.HTM
11E-mail from Deborah Greenspan, Llumina Press, 17 November 2015.
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on the previous page of this book and many others can be found at https://www.
hawaii.edu/powerkills/GALLERY.HTM. But as someone who did know Rummel
personally, I can testify that the self-portrait reproduced in front of this introduction
is a good likeness. That brings me to a few final personal recollections.
1.5 Personal Recollections
I worked as research fellow for the Dimensionality of Nations Project in the spring of
1969. My visit had been arranged by correspondence between Johan Galtung and
Rudy. At the time their relations were pleasant. Rummel was interested in Galtung’s
work relating status inconsistency to conflict (Galtung, 1964). Indeed, he actively
tried to incorporate what he called status theory into his field theory (Rummel, 1971).
But as H.-C. Peterson relates (Chap. 10), the cordiality got lost along the way. For
many years they were colleagues in the Department of Political Science at the
University of Hawaii. By this time, Galtung held the view that ‘international relations
US style’ was bankrupt and when cut to pieces, it could be deconstructed as
self-serving US ideology (Galtung, 1989: 166). Rummel, on the other hand, came to
see Galtung’s concept of structural violence as a socialist theory of peace within a
neomarxist theory of exploitation (Rummel, 1981: 50, 83). The two colleagues hardly
interacted. Rummel’s relationship to Singer was much less acrimonious, although the
two had a life-long disagreement on the prospects of explaining international rela-
tions, at least in part, on the basis of national indicators (cf. Wayman in Chap. 9).
Rummel’s particular mix of realism and liberalism, noted by ErichWeede in Chap. 7,
may have made it difficult for him to form lasting alliances with other scholars.
Johan Galtung was my highly valued mentor, but over the years I came to rely
more on Rummel’s wisdom. As editor of Journal of Peace Research, I published the
harsh critique of Understanding Conflict and War by Wiberg (1982), but my
friendship with Rummel survived. I can recall two ‘friendly quarrels’ with Rummel.
One was over his Nobel Peace Prize nomination. For years, Rummel had on his
homepage that he had been shortlisted for the Nobel Peace Prize. Although the list of
nominations is not made public by the Norwegian Nobel Committee, many nomi-
nators publicize their nominations and it was on record that Rummel had been
nominated several times by former Swedish deputy prime minister Per Ahlmark.
I tried to convince Rummel that the nomination itself was not necessarily such an
unambiguous honor; indeed Adolf Hitler and Fidel Castro had also been nominated.
Furthermore, there was absolutely no reliable evidence regarding the composition of
the committee’s shortlist. I was pretty certain that Rummel had never been short-
listed and succeeded in getting the committee’s secretary to confirm that there was
no evidence for it.12 Evidently, Rummel had confused a news report that talked
about a final list (i.e., a list of all nominations received before the deadline) with a
12Telephone conversation with Geir Lundestad, then Director of the Norwegian Nobel Institute,
probably in 2005.
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shortlist. Eventually, he stopped referring to his having been ‘a finalist’, following as
he said ‘advice from a colleague who I highly respect, is a friend who supports my
research, and who is knowledgeable about the workings of the Nobel Committee’.13
A second friendly quarrel occurred when in 1995 I served as guest editor for a
special issue on democracy and peace in the European Journal of International
Relations. Rummel published an article on the monadic democratic peace—in fact
his fifth-most-cited article. In a previous much longer and widely circulated version,
Rummel had promoted the argument that if democracies don’t fight each other, the
world must necessarily become more peaceful as the number of democracies
increases. Although the two referees had not picked up this point, I argued in my
decision letter, as I have done elsewhere, that this was not necessarily the case
(Gleditsch & Hegre, 1997). We went back and forth. I was prepared to concede the
point, which was not central to the article, but not without a struggle. Therefore, I
set out to explain my argument in some detail. Finally Rummel wrote back to me.
‘Nils, you did it’.14 I have always felt that scholars should not give up their
cherished views too easily. For that reason, I valued Rummel’s persistence,
although some surely would call it stubbornness. Nevertheless I am happy to have
influenced this article and perhaps, even if in minor way, contributed to its success.
Finally, one of the perks of being president of the International Studies
Association is the power to award the Susan Strange award to the scholar ‘whose
singular intellect, assertiveness, and insight most challenge conventional wisdom
and intellectual and organizational complacency in the international studies com-
munity’.15 Nothing would have pleased me more than to give this award to Rudy
when I served my term in ISA in 2009—but he had already received the award! In
fact, he was the first, in 1999. I can think of no one more qualified in terms of
challenging conventional wisdom and intellectual complacency.
1.6 A Final Assessment
Rudy Rummel was a many-faceted scholar. It was not difficult to find things that
you could disagree with. But there was also much to admire. His scholarly pro-
ductivity. His enormous contributions to data on democide. His consistent com-
mitment to freedom and his marriage of research and policy advocacy. His
pioneering example in making data and research procedures transparent. His early
use of the internet and his comprehensive homepage, matched by few if any social
scientists of his generation. Hopefully, this little volume will inspire some readers to
go back to Rudy’s own work, for inspiration and for contradiction, but above all to
follow his lead in seeking new knowledge for a better world.
13See at: http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/NPP.FINALIST.HTM.
14Or something to that effect. I can no longer find the correspondence.
15See at: http://www.isanet.org/Programs/Awards/Susan-Strange.
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In 1980, I left Hawaii to attend American University in our nation’s capital. My first
class was Introduction to American Politics and the professor called out roll on the
first day. After I’d heard my name and raised my hand, the professor paused and
looked me over. ‘Are you related to Professor Rudolph Rummel in Hawaii?’
Stunned, I said, ‘He’s my father.’ I had sat at the back of a horseshoe-shaped
arrangement of tables and chairs, and everyone turned to look at me while the
professor launched into an adoring speech about the value of my father’s research
and theories. I basked in a brief sensation of being the child of a celebrity.
It was something that needed to be reconciled with the man I knew: my goofy
and spaced-out dad, whose brilliant intellect did not rise above the scatological joke
or other off-color humor. He seemed so silly to me as a youngster that when I asked
him what he did for a living and he said he was a scientist, I laughed at him and
said, ‘No you’re not. Scientists are smart!’
Of course, he was smart, brilliant even. I was never a student of my father’s and
can’t pretend to be an expert on his legacy. However, I was steeped in the knowledge
he was accumulating, imparted to me in a family culture of near-constant intellectual
discussions of current events and his research and views. He didn’t believe in
dumbing down information for children, and if I had the intellect to ask the question,
then I deserved the full adult answer. This and much more I inherited from him as he
leaves a legacy not only in his work but in his daughters.
He gave me his optimism and the general positive outlook of ‘Don’t assume a
negative.’ Looking back at the dark revelations from his statistical analysis of war
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and death, it’s a wonder how optimistic he could be. For many years, his study was
decorated with the macabre, wallpapered with horrifying cover images of blood and
strife, torn off of magazines. He called that inspiration.
He gave me a thirst for a worldview, a global understanding of the human
condition, as opposed to something regional or cultural. I was given exposure to
world politics, critical study, and philosophical thought for as long as I can
remember. Both my parents put a primary emphasis on education and scrimped his
university salary, living in the most expensive state in the Union, to send my sister
and me to private schools.
He made me a seeker with an inquisitive mind, instilling the imperative to
‘question authority’, including his own. He taught me to stand up for what I
believed, even if it went against norms or need (such as kissing up to a boss for
job), or friendship. He was always available to discuss parenting rules and was
willing to be persuaded to change them if I gave sufficient evidence as to their
deficiencies. He was able to question his motives, go against the flow, and entertain
new ideas. This took courage, a spirit for adventure in the mind.
He was a fantastic and very patient mentor and teacher. I was remedial in math,
the only one in my family without a proclivity for numbers. Dad had to coach me in
algebra and calculus and did so cheerfully. He also taught me chess. It didn’t matter
what he was working on. If I had an academic question or confusion, he would drop
everything to provide an answer or assistance.
He believed in maintaining the physical body for a strong mind. My parents
walked every day for exercise until his health failed him. Over the years, they became
involved in two sports—bowling and tennis—and joined leagues so they could
compete. He loved competition. All this he gave to me, especially a love for physical
activity. He approached sports with the same methodology as his work, studying
books and magazines to learn techniques and strategies, then applied his research and
taught it to his family. Next, it was practice, practice, practice! A couple of months
ago, I went bowling for the first time since I was a kid. I felt my father over my
shoulder, whispering those long ago instructions in my ear, and my old bowling
muscles came alive again under his tutelage. That evening, I felt very close tomyDad.
He encouraged me to ‘Do what you love and the money will come.’ This
idealism has ruled my life as I followed my heart into a variety of experimental
careers, encouraged by him at each risky turn: a Certified Public Accountant, a
chef’s apprentice, a salesman in food distribution, various positions in the restaurant
industry, a working actor in theatre and the entertainment industry, and now a writer
working on my first novel. Like my Dad, I had artistic yearnings, and have studied
and worked in the arts for most my adult life. Dad was the first person to encourage
my writing shortly after completing my college education, saying for years, even
before I started, that I was a better writer than he. There was some fatherly pride in
that statement, of course.
He gave his daughters the freedom to explore and discover who we were, and then
to bring that person to life’s challenges with full force. He fostered individuality in a
world that often demands conformity. My father walked his talk by applying liber-
tarian standards (his professed beliefs at the time, later to become even more
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extremely labeled as freedomism) to his parenting. This choice lent itself to a per-
missiveness during the liberal and experimental sixties and seventies that now seems
surprising, even to me. He believed in letting us follow our instincts and trusted that
we would learn and grow from the experiences. To protect us from that process with
strict rules would interfere with our growth and may not have prevented us from
doing what we wanted anyway. Only later did I discover this choice was absolutely at
odds with his conservative Mid-western upbringing, and it sometimes kept him
awake at night. My sister and I were beneficiaries of this heady freedom, as it was
grounded in the rock-solid foundation of ethics and morality present in my father’s
work. He was no hypocrite.
This is important to say because I think my father can look like a hypocrite. His
life’s work was spent researching the causes of war. His last brag was that he gave
the world a potential solution for world peace. He hated violence, yet supported the
Vietnam War, both Iraq Wars, and a host of other US military actions abroad. He
believed absolutely in our military buildup during the Cold War and continued to
support it even after the Berlin Wall came crashing down. At various times, he’s
been accused of being a war hawk. There’s still a framed cartoon from the 1970s on
the wall in our family home where my Dad is lampooned as a war hawk, standing
next to a colleague shown as a peacenik. He found it so absurd as to be funny and
worth memorializing. He could be confusingly contradictory. I used to think of him
as a fiscal Republican and a social Democrat, but then he really defied all labels.
I’ve always believed we’re a complicated species in a complex universe we barely
understand. Our world is organic, with messy boundaries and beautiful colors. It’s
impossible to impose upon it our black and white organizational grids without run-
ning into contradictions of their very purpose. I’ve never met someone with strong
opinions who didn’t sometimes look like a hypocrite. In that way, my father was like
any other. He had layers of rationalizations for his hierarchy of beliefs. He would’ve
called it all logical and scientific, but the rationalization of beliefs is a skin-deep
penetration into my Dad. In truth, I think there are deeper reasons for his contra-
dictions that lend insight but can never fully explain them. He understood gestalt and
that ‘You simply can’t divorce… personal elements from your work.’ In the end, he
did manage to separate aspects of himself, very private personal elements that he
didn’t want to look at or reveal, proving we are all mysteries and contradictions unto
ourselves.
My parents grew up in broken families filled with pain and sorrow, both suf-
fering through trauma at a young age. My mother’s formative years were indelibly
scorched by the horrors of World War II in Japan, particularly the US firebombing
of Tokyo. Her earliest memory is jumping into a ditch to avoid fire, her house
aflame. Her father was a violent alcoholic who abandoned her and her mother when
she was young. My father’s parents were poor and irresponsible, and their rela-
tionship was equally conflict-ridden. He remembered being so hungry he searched
for food crumbs in his pocket. Out of desperation, he ran away from home in his
teens, living in the streets of slums.
Other than these publicly related facts, I don’t know much more about either of
my parents’ upbringings. Their combined traumas left them defensive of too much
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psychotherapy, introspective analysis, and communication of feelings. Psychologists
often need a psychologist, my Dad would often joke. So why bother? Neither
forgave their past or parents, and both held onto a bitter privacy where they trusted
few. They didn’t heal their grief, as they didn’t believe such a thing needed to be
healed. Rather than try understanding these sorrows and transforming them into a
compassionate inner understanding of themselves and the human condition, they
clung to each other and stashed painful memories in a dark place, buried beneath
intellect, where they hoped no one could see, including themselves. While com-
partmentalization is understandable, we can’t isolate the shame or fear resulting from
trauma, intern them in an emotional concentration camp, and expect them to stay
confined without impacting society at large. Emotions remain alive, sometimes
festering, often bleeding into the mind and heart with unintended consequences, or
even psychosis. For my parents, those unexplored dark places created blocks and
blind spots in how they reacted to and interpreted their environment.
My parents alienated others, including me, with their sense of righteousness and
self-proclaimed ‘hermit lifestyle’. Their laissez-faire, non-interfering approach to
parenting, which gave me so much freedom as a child, could look like abandonment,
especially once I left home as an adult. Attempts on my part to pierce the veil with
questions as to the whys and wherefores of their behavior in order to connect more
deeply to my father yielded gentle rebukes saying he ‘didn’t wish to psychologize’
and ‘wasn’t laced with a disposition for introspective analysis’. My father’s spirit for
adventure came to a screeching halt at introspection. My mom was simply unap-
proachable on these matters. Their combined resistance was impenetrable.
In later adulthood, I presented the oft-used, very trite garden metaphor for rela-
tionships to my father: that gardens needed daily cultivation, such as watering
or fertilization, and weeding or pesticides; gardens also needed space and time
to grow, and could be given too much attention such as over-pruning or over-
watering. I was searching for a language for how to bridge the ever-increasing dis-
tance between us that didn’t directly demand he gaze at his navel. Before I could
expound completely on the metaphor, my father stopped me and said, ‘No, a rela-
tionship is like a landscape, to be viewed and appreciated from afar.’ This stymied me
and led to a five year silence between us where I withdrew to soothe my disap-
pointment and, unconsciously, to test my father’s mettle. How much distance did he
need before he would inch closer? I never found out, because I broke silence when his
health began to fail and accepted that such a question would never be answered.
In terms of the wider world, he loved studying politics but hated political
playing. His journals revealed a man insecure in his ability to speak publicly and
engage socially with aplomb, and so he kept himself private. Social expectations
were an infringement into his chosen lifestyle and a threat to long-held protections
of privacy. He kept a cerebral distance, a social and professional isolation, which
also protected him from criticisms of his work. As with myself, his wider profes-
sional relationships were a landscape to be viewed and judged from afar. I’ve often
wondered about possibilities if he had the openness to explore the mysteries of his
own behavior beyond the scope of his focused numerical and scholarly analysis, to
delve into self-awareness and introspection, to shine a light on his pain and personal
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sorrow, and to heal those dark festering spaces. He might have relinquished the
need to separate himself, promoted his work with more skill, and achieved the
wider recognition for his conclusions that he craved. Who knows what subtle
layering and insights it could have brought to his analysis, or his ability to relate to
his peers effectively?
My father’s aversion to his inner world and anti-social tendencies may seem like
splitting hairs in academia, but in the artistic world, it is the biggest inhibition to
creative expression. He wanted to be an artist at one point and dabbled all his life.
His painting was approached with the same methodical processes he gave his
research: analyzing an image, breaking it down into a grid of smaller reproducible
sections, and recreating the image with virtual photorealism and very little style. He
left sitting out on his worktable an unfinished grid of a work-in-process of an old
favorite picture of my sister and me. He also loved Photoshop, where he could play
with filters, color, and line. He mocked abstract art and ‘high-minded interpretations
of pretentious art critics’ in the world of fine art, especially when it came to modern
and post-modern expression. He seemed to push away the subtleties of emotional
and behavioral explorations inherent in such abstract work. His workman’s
approach to art wasn’t a bad method, and he created some fine images. As in his
life’s work, he had much talent and skill to offer. However, his process was craftual
and missed the bedrock of an artistic process which goes beyond the aesthetic to
interpret an object or event, to look inward to see how it makes the artist feel and to
imbue those feelings into the work. Art not only brings to life a subject, it expresses
ideas and feelings. Our introspective emotions are what give art power. In return, art
exorcises trauma by its release in expression. As intelligent as he was, I don’t
believe he metabolized this understanding, and it never came through in his art.
Dad considered the heart, with its often inconvenient emotions, to be an unreliable
decision maker. ‘Learn to control your emotions.’ and ‘Use your mind to control your
body.’ were two admonishments given to me and provided a strange contradiction to
his ‘ … do what you love …’ advice. It’s true the heart alone cannot make all
decisions. However, this is true of the mind as well. Both need to be consulted and
both have valuable information to impart. Emotions need to be heard. Our bodies are
more than a conveyance for our heads. Were he to have looked more deeply into his
heart, into the dark recesses he had hidden away, he may not have been so quick to
endorse policies of force against force. He may have found a more far-reaching
conclusion. This too could’ve earned his work the recognition he craved.
All of this isn’t to say my father was anything less than a great man, a great
teacher, and a great father—those things don’t demand great perfection. Nobody’s
perfect. American individualism purports that one discipline, or one person, can
hold the key to saving the world from war, or rather, humanity from itself. I don’t
believe that. It’s a very complex problem. My father died believing he had found a
solution in the Democratic Peace Theory. Perhaps. What I do believe is he
developed ideas whose time has not yet come, and he accumulated a mass of data
that can be used to refine the analysis and solution. He laid a great foundation, and
was a great benefit to humanity, a special man who overcame adversity and a tragic
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childhood to become a world-class scholar. He took that which was dark within him
and used it to fuel light, as coal makes fire. He was my Dad, lucky for me, and I
love him.
It’s my hope that we’re joining forces in this book to do more than simply
eulogize and reminisce about my father. The authors of this volume, and others, are
now charged with parsing and building upon his life’s work. I present these per-
sonal recollections of him, both light and dark, in an effort to paint a more complete
picture of the man behind the data and theories. If you imagine all knowledge as a
big dark room, and that we all have flashlights to illuminate, teach, learn and grow
from, then my Dad’s light shone bright and wide. Yet he couldn’t illuminate the
whole room. No one can. He was but one man, beautifully imperfect, brilliant with
the vitality of his unique life force. Progress in humanity is comprised of individuals
building on the discoveries made by those who came before. It’s a collective and
cooperative synthesis of information and ideas, involving both the head and heart.
This may eventually light up the room. The human journey isn’t finished. My
father’s prime legacy, his research and analyses, will always help enlighten that
which is dark.
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R.J. Rummel, Citizen Scholar:




Rudy Rummel’smotivating passion—his lifelong aversion to conflict and violence—
was eclipsed only by the fierce independence born of his experience as a homeless
youth from a broken family.1 His scholarship was characterized by his exceptionally
rigorous and open-minded quest to test theoretical explanations with empirical data
while explicating the associated assumptions and normative implications. His legacy,
however, lives on in his example of a citizen scholar, whose commitment to take
intellectual discussions beyond the academy into practice as he sought in everything
he did to realize freedom and dignity with peace.
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founded a social science consulting company (Virtual Research Associates, Inc.) that conducts
applied research and field training, and offers technical support for conflict early warning
systems in Africa and elsewhere. Email: doug.bond@vranet.com.
1This interview was conducted in Honolulu, Hawaii on 4 September 1996 shortly after Rudy
Rummel retired from teaching. As one of Rudy’s relatively few Ph.D. students (less than twenty
over thirty years of teaching), I sought to trace the origins and evolution of his values and views
and to solicit his reflections on his interaction with the community of scholarship, and also on the
lessons he learned in his life. In these excerpts from that interview, I draw mainly on Rudy’s own
words, editing only for readability. Parts of my introductory commentary were presented at the
46th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, HI, in March 2005 at
a panel celebrating Rudy’s life work.
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3.2 A Premature Retirement from Teaching
Upon learning of Rudy’s imminent retirement, I asked him if he was ill or if he was
finally going to move back to the mainland, perhaps to join another university. He
answered ‘no’ as he offered his explanation that began with a bit of personal
history.
Rudy had hearing difficulties throughout most of his adult life. By the time I met
him in 1979, his hearing loss was already evident and at some point he was fitted
with a hearing aid device. In those days these devices were quite crude, so the
echoing of the cinder block classrooms became an increasing challenge for him into
the 1990s.
One day in the mid-1990s, while teaching in a large classroom, Rudy was
leading a lecture-discussion using his usual Socratic method where he walked up
and down the aisles interacting with the students. A student sitting at the far end of
the classroom asked him a question and Rudy began to respond. However, even as
Rudy responded he realized that he had not really heard the question. It was in that
instant that Rudy made the decision to retire from teaching. If he could not hear
well enough to interact with his students, he knew his teaching days were over.
By the end of that school year Rudy retired from teaching and began working
full-time on his research, writing, and interaction via his evolving website and blogs
with numerous colleagues and others. Most of these communications were done via
email as Rudy increasingly avoided telephone conversations and minimized his
travel.
3.3 A Scientist’s Explicit Reference to Values
Rudy taught that science had three foundations: theory, data, and norms. He
explained that all three operated together, and all were required for scientific inquiry.
He also reminded his students that theory was always bounded, as was data. He
emphasized the inherent limitations of operationalization and in the methods of
measurement and he advocated the explication of all assumptions in any analysis.
Rudy was quite comfortable with the notion that all data are qualitative and some
data are also quantitative. His view of scientific inquiry bridged the qualitative-
quantitative chasm that has divided the academy for more than half a Century. His
intellectual autobiography chapter (Rummel, 1976) was titled ‘Roots of faith’, to
emphasize the importance he placed on motivating values and beliefs. Too often,
Rudy lamented, the normative foundation of science went unexamined out of
incompetence or ignorance, or was deliberately ignored due to a hidden agenda.
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3.4 The Interview, Part I: An Aversion
Q: Could you clarify your initial aversion … was it to violence or to conflict?
RJR: It’s both. I grew up in a very conflictual family. My parents were divorced at a
very early age and as a young boy I remember arguments of one sort or another
between them. It’s conflict that I’m talking about here. I developed an aversion
to people getting into arguments and fighting between people in what was
called conflict of some sort, whether it’s violent or nonviolent. Cussing at each
other, for example, was a form of conflict which I developed a strong aversion
to and the aversion comes out of my youth and my family, with parents who
couldn’t get along and argued constantly and subsequently got divorced with a
devastating impact on me because at a young age I was on the street.
I quit high school because of that. When I was of legal age, I could, and
did quit at 16. So I was on my own at a very young age which, incidentally,
had a great impact on me as an academic and a student because having my
family destroyed under me, being left alone to do what I could for money.
I actually starved because I didn’t have any food, and going through my
pockets looking for bread crumbs to see if I could find something to eat,
having to go fishing in Lake Erie to catch fish so I could go around to bars
and try to sell it so I would have some money to buy something to eat.
Having had, in other words, to order my own life so that I could survive on
the street when I became a student, I wasn’t about to be pushed around by
professors. So when I became an academic, I wasn’t about to be pushed
around by my fellow academics or to go along with the consensus simply
because I wanted to get along. Somy independent streak which has been noted
comes out of that early experience which is always a part, it’s a gestalt, the
growing independence, the aversion to conflict, the desire to see accommo-
dation between people and conflict while at the same time (in my mid-teens) I
was learning how to get along in the world in a way that I could survive.
However, I was in a dead end. I was working as a common laborer in a
variety of jobs that I hated. Again, I’m by myself, no family. I joined the
army when I was 18. What else am I going to do, ok? I had dreams of being
perhaps an equipment operator because no one around me completed high
school and nobody around me had a college education. I didn’t even
conceive of a college education. So I went into the army and volunteered for
Korea. I ended up in Japan in an engineering battalion.
Now that experience had two incredibly important effects on me. One of
which I developed as a result of growing up during World War II, viewing
the Japanese as buck-tooth, monkey-like, implacable, stoic, and violent—all
of this from the war propaganda that I had assimilated as a very young boy.
I get to Japan and I find the Japanese very much like I am. They could cry,
they could love flowers, they could play with dogs. They had a full range of
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emotions, a full range of desires. And as a result of that I went through a
cultural shock you might say. How come we made war against these people?
Now it’s one thing if the Japanese are all that they were purported to be
from the propaganda that I got during World War II, if they fit the stereotype
that I learned … but they weren’t. They were like you and me. It was a
profound cultural shock. When I went to Japan in 1950 you could still see
horrible wounds of war, and I became very anti-war. Why are we making
war? We shouldn’t make war on each other. Now, this is where the violent
part of my aversion came, my aversion to the violence of war. What I saw in
Japan. The aversion toward conflict came in with my family experience.
The second incredible impact was, by an act of God, I ended up in this
engineering battalion in Tokyo which was making maps for the Korean War.
They would get the data in from the planes doing the survey, then they
would make the map immediately. Those maps would be sent out to
divisions that needed them. I had no skills at the time. The reason I ended up
in this battalion is because of how much I built up my earlier factory work to
sound like it was great, so they put me down as an engineer.
In any case, the people around me had college degrees. I didn’t even have
a high school education. So I find myself with people with college degrees.
Well, wait a minute, they are not so bright! Hey, I know more than some of
these people. And I get back to the tremendous influence on my whole life in
research. From this experience there percolated the idea of going to college.
And then I read a book in Japan called The Professor’s Umbrella (Mary
Jane Ward, published in 1948), which was about the life of the professor and
that was it. I was going to go to college. Not to be become a professor, as
such at that time. But none-the-less, I’m going to go to college.
And so I studied while I was in Japan. I learned fractions, learned roots,
and all that sort of stuff. Studied grammar, studied history and finally took
the GRE exams for the high school equivalent diploma. I took those.
I passed them and I had my high school equivalent diploma. When I got out
of the army I applied for Ohio State University.
These are the circumstances that fueled my hatred of war and why war
became the focus of my early research. I saw war as the worst kind of
conflict, the worst kind of violence.
3.5 The Interview, Part II: An Affinity
Q: You have commented about science fiction. Please explain.
RJR: One more extraordinary influence on me that melted into everything else
was science fiction. I was on my own. I didn’t have money for movies.
I didn’t have a TV. I don’t even recall if I had a radio. When I left home I
went to work on a farm and in my spare time I read. I got interested in
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science fiction books and I really got educated through them. I developed a
fascination for science. I developed some knowledge of astronomy and other
kinds of science and I developed a vocabulary.
That was over a six or seven year period. I read virtually everything that
came out in science, virtually everything that I could get my hands on.
I became, therefore, in love with science. And as a matter of fact, I felt that I
could talk more knowledgably about science fromwhat I learned from science
fiction than could those with college degrees in the army that I talked to.
I was in my early teens when I was into science fiction. As a result of that,
when I went out to college and eventually found out that I could focus on the
study of war, what an amazing discovery that was. I had no prior knowledge of
that. I was first going to major in physics and math, in large part because of the
science fiction. I was going to go into rocket research. However, I also found
myself reading social science stuff, especially on Asia. So I transferred to the
University of Hawaii because I felt I could better study Asia in Hawaii. This
interest of course was developed during my stay in Japan. I could speak
Japanese conversationally.
I came here [to Hawaii] and had to choose a major. I was interested in Asian
studies, but was advised to major in political science because I was told it would
better prepare me for securing a job. I was persuaded by that. So I took political
science as my major. And I found out soon enough that in the field of interna-
tional relations I could study war. It was amazing. To me this was a blinding
discovery in that I wanted to do something about war. I’d seen the horror of it in
Japan and I thought that it waswrong for people tomakewar on each other. Here
was a way to study it and do something about it. And so from then on, I focused
on why people fight each other and what I could do about it.
One of the first courses that I took at Hawaii was Introduction to interna-
tional relations and the text book had a chapter on war. I learned that war was
a respectable sub-major, and thereby one could focus the study of war. My
first term papers were related to war in one way or another like unilateral
disarmament, why we should unilaterally disarm. I thought that if we didn’t
have arms, we wouldn’t have war. So my first naïve term paper, I think, was
to the effect that we should unilaterally disarm.
3.6 The Interview, Part III: Science as a Profession
Q: How did your aversion to conflict and war come to interact with your
interest in science fiction?
RJR: Science was a method. The substantive topic was violence. Violence and
war in particular, was the extreme form of conflict. When you have war, you
have people massacred by plan, by states and therefore, it seemed to me in
the hierarchy of conflict and violence, the worst is war. I didn’t know
anything about democide, except for the Jews.
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My aversion to conflict began when I was a young boy because of my
parents. My aversion to war, which I knew nothing really about until I got to
Japan and saw what was going on, came later. I became quite anti-war, and I
created problems for myself as a result. Orientation sessions in the Army
were conducted for the troops. They explained to us why we were fighting
the Korean War. A Lieutenant would give a reason and I would say can’t the
North Koreans give the same reason for fighting the war? I refused to salute
the flag. I resisted these kinds of things because I thought nationalism was
evil. Nationalism being one of the reasons we went to war.
So as a young boy, I went through this whole route. I was an absolute
pacifist, absolutely anti-war and absolutely opposed to nationalism. I was also,
to a certain extent, anti-American and a dedicated socialist. I was a left-wing,
anti-war type when that wasn’t a respectable thing. So, as you can imagine, I
had all kinds of problems. I remained a Private first class throughout my
career, except for the last months before I got out, they made me a Corporal.
3.7 The Interview, Part IV: Worse than War
Q: At what point did the cracks start appearing in this world view that perceived
war as the greatest thing to be overcome?
RJR: That was gradual. My view on war became inconsistent with what I was
beginning to understand about war. I wrote a paper logically detailing why
unilateral disarmament would not work. The field of international relations
at that time was not consistent with the pacifist view. I refer here to the idea
of a balance of power, the idea of war as a way of settling what diplomacy
cannot, the rationalization and justification of World War I and World
War II.
As I began to study World War II, I could not see how a pacifist could
justify allowing Hitler to conquer nations and kill people. Increasingly it
seemed to me that World War II was a just war. Now if we have one just
war, how can one say that all wars are bad? If we have one just war, how can
one be an absolute pacifist? So I moved to the Christian position.
I subscribed to the classical Catholic position on just war. Wars are evil,
but if the evil that would occur if one were not to fight is greater than the evil
of war, then one is justified in fighting.
Q: Can you articulate the standards that you applied to these issues?
RJR: It was just change. The values were already there and what happened was an
accumulation of things that were inconsistent with what I thought was the
empirical world to which the values apply. For example, my anti-war stance,
my absolute war stance is based on the empirical assessment of the world, of
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history, of how people operate. I have these basic values and the question is
always how to implement them and what I see as implementation
inconsistent empirically and theoretically gets discarded and I grow to
accept those that seem to be a better fit with the world.
Consequently I moved to accept the reality of nuclear weapons and their
usefulness as a deterrent, something that horrified pacifists. I was not horrified.
Now, one can argue with me that my view was wrong. We can talk about that.
But an assumption that because Iwas in favor of nuclear weapons as a deterrent
and somebody else isn’t, my values are all crooked, I think is wrong. It’s not a
matter of values, it’s a matter of practice and where the practice is inconsistent
with the world, then I think the practice has got to be changed.
3.8 The Interview, Part V: A Liberal Education
Q: You have characterized the early 1970s as the era of your liberal education.
Could you elaborate?
RJR: Oh yes, that was quite an education. I took a leave from my research
management responsibilities. I continued to teach. I came in one day a week
for my class and I’d do the necessary decision-making on the project. I was
able to take off day after day reading the basic books in the social sciences.
That was a very liberal education, something I never got before to that depth.
And that influenced me in two basic ways. One, my philosophy changed
from positivism, I’d say almost rigid positivism, to a kind of mushy mixture
of positive science on the one hand and intuition and imagination on the
other. Where I saw the virtue I felt there was a virtue now to intuitive
insights, to imagination, to traditional scholarship as well as science. One
melds these together as a conductor melds orchestra together in producing a
scientific work. That was quite a change. It’s still science. But now I relaxed
and terms of my definition of science to include imagination and intuition.
The second influence was that I changed from socialism to libertarianism.
I was a democratic socialist, not a state socialist, not a marxist, I was never a
marxist. I never believed in authoritarian socialism but nonetheless I was
really a socialist, at least for a while. The reason I moved on, is that I grew to
see through all the reading that I had done that socialism was unsustainable,
as a doctrine or a theory an unsustainable practice.
Q: So at this point, your evolution did not include any fundamental shift in your
perspective on war?
RJR: My position with respect to war did not change until I did my first work on
democide and that was in the early 1980s. I began to think about war
differently because some of the things I came across were crazy. Like the
Soviet Gulag, for example, and China under Mao. Of course I knew about
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what Hitler had done in Yugoslavia, Romania, Hungary, and so on but I
hadn’t yet put together how many people were being killed.
By 1984 or so I finished what I thought were conclusive studies on the
relationship between freedom and violence. I decided to deal with these facts
and do a pilot study on genocide and mass murder. I found that in this
century about 110 million people had been killed in cold blood. That was an
incomplete study. It was done in something like six months. On that basis I
went to the US Institute of Peace for funding to do a comprehensive study.
That started right away in 1986. This work was completed in 1995, and out
of it came five books.
My conclusion was that is war is not the worst evil: four times more
people are killed in cold blood by governments than die at war between
governments. That was a shock. That shook me. I had a lifetime devotion to
doing something about war because I thought it was the worst evil, the worst
violence and I discover that democide is the worst violence.
Equally important was that the solution for war that I found is the same
solution to democide. The solution of freedom was consistent with my
values, the empirical evidence and theory.
3.9 The Interview, Part VI: Theory Informed,
Data-driven Research
Q: Is there anything else that influenced the evolution of your aversion to
conflict and violence?
RJR: No. It is unusual how focused I’ve been in a field where you see colleagues
jump all over in terms of their research without apparently an underlying
theme. For me, there was only one reason for the research that I did. I wanted
to help solve the problem of conflict and violence, particularly war. Keep in
mind that my single mindedness did not mean that I focused on war to the
exclusion of other kinds of violence. I saw war as a part of a continuum and
that to understand war one had to understand other forms of related violence
such as war within societies, civil war, revolutions, and also to understand the
associated conflict. So I did a tremendous amount of research in psychology
and sociology. In my Understanding Conflict and War volumes I tried to
articulate a theory that helps us better understand conflict as a continuum
from conflict through violence which is the conflict helix.
I have placed in our discussion so far an inordinate amount of emphasis
on the empirical side. To me, data have to be interpreted. How do you
interpret data? You have to have a theory. What is a theory? It is a formal
system that can be disproven. How do you disprove it? You disprove it
through by trying to make it fit the empirical world, the data. Thus, what has
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to come first is theory. Once you have the theory, then you collect the data to
disprove it. In other words, the theory has to be falsifiable à la Popper.
I saw the Dimensionality of Nations (DON) project as a way of helping to
generate the theory. One of the intellectually satisfying events of my life
happened at the black board in my study at home, at Yale. I had been doing
the factor analysis of nations and attributes. I had conducted both monadic
and dyadic analysis of nations and these were two separate things within the
DON project. That bothered me. There was a tension there that had to be
resolved. And it all came together when working on the black board.
Mathematically I found that I could take the distances in the space of
attributes as forces in the field of dyads so that the two fields were joined.
The distances between the dyads became the forces.
Now, this field theory was not dissimilar from the notion of distance in
sociology or from Quincy Wright’s use of distance in his book on war. What
was new to me was to be able to mathematically link these two spaces. From
then on the DON project became one of articulating this theory, collecting
the data, testing it out because the theory was that the distances in the one
space would predict to conflict and war, the behavior of nations.
3.10 The Interview, Part VII: Lessons Learned
Q: Do you have any lessons that you would like to offer, any admonitions?
RJR: Don’t assume a negative. Because so many students say don’t do this or
don’t do that, and I say try to do it rather than assume you can’t.
Also, I suggest prioritizing family. One’s family is essential and why I
think it is so necessary to talk about gestalt. At the core of my life are my
wife Grace and our two daughters. I suppose one reason for this is because
my own family was destroyed, that is my mother and father. I was not going
to let this happen to my daughters. Family integrity and family first remains
a dominant element in my life. You can’t divorce these familial elements
from one’s philosophy of science, no more than one can separate data from
theory from norms. All are amorphously integrated.
International relations and political science are still pre-professional.
There is not a strong tradition of reviewing research, for example. That
people will do research without reviewing what has already been done is an
incredibly weak facet of our profession.
Finally, there is a very strong intolerance of different ideas and different
approaches. So many people in the field have firm beliefs that their approach
is the only one or their substantive conclusions are the only right conclusions.
They then attack people personally when their research findings differ. There
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is an absolutism in one’s own conclusions and research that ought not to be
part of the scholarly or scientific field. We must all accept that we could
be wrong. We probably are in many respects and let’s find out how.
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Rummel as a Great Teacher
Sang-Woo Rhee
4.1 The Great Teacher
Professor R.J. Rummel passed away in the spring of 2014. The ashes of his body
are now floating on the waves of the beautiful Kaneohe Bay he had loved so much,
but his soul and teaching will live on in the minds of his students. For them he will
forever remain a ‘Great Teacher.’
A Great Teacher himself should be a ‘perfect intellectual,’ since he is supposed
to train mature intellectual leaders of the community. A Great Teacher should be a
man of integrity who inspires others through his words and deeds. A Great Teacher
should be a role model for his disciples.
Rudy Rummel devoted his whole life to the study of war and conflict. Enhancing
peace had been his life-long academic goal. Throughout his whole academic career,
he concentrated his teaching and research on peace studies. Based on empirical
analysis of various cases of democide, the mass murder of citizens by their own
government, he concluded that psychopathic totalitarian ideologies such as Nazism,
Leninism, Maoism, and Japanese militarism are the real enemies of peace. From
these studies, he derived a simple but very strong thesis: ‘freedom fosters peace’.
His libertarian peace theory was developed in support of this belief. His magnum
opus, Understanding Conflict and War is the main output of his endeavor.
Rummel then launched a vigorous public campaign to spread his message. He
wrote a series of novels, Never Again, as well as The Blue Book of Freedom to
propagate his belief to the men on the street. His students were moved not only by
his academic sincerity but also by his deeds. Rummel was a real Great Teacher who
led his students to try to emulate his life style.
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AGreat Teacher should also be a good scholar andmaintain academic prominence.
Tomaintain his academic excellence, Rummel educated himself constantly in order to
continue as a positive rolemodel. He read enthusiastically until the day he drewhis last
breath. He readwidely, even exploring bookswritten by ancient Chinese sages aswell
as Western classics. Based on his readings of works by Chinese scholars such as
Confucius and Mencius, he held intensive discussion sessions on neo-confucian
political doctrines with his Korean students. Aside from his own field of political
science, his reading covered a wide range of areas frommathematics, philosophy, and
aesthetics to psychology and sociology. Understanding Conflict and War elegantly
demonstrates the breadth of his knowledge. He wrote a total of twenty books, and it is
difficult to believe theywerewritten by a single person.With his guidance and advice a
new generation of students were groomed into mature scholars.
4.2 Rummel’s Korean Students
During Rummel’s tenure at the University of Hawaii, for ten years, the East-West
Center annually brought in two Korean students for graduate training. Among these
students, more than half chose Rummel as their academic advisor. They felt
intellectually comfortable with Rummel and were attracted by his Weltanschauung
that was congenial with oriental academic thinking.
Traditional Oriental philosophy is based on the belief that the Universe evolves
following its own laws of change. We call it Heavenly Reason (tien-li). Since
human beings are partial elements of the Universe, they should abide inter-personal
ethical codes (ren-tao) derived from the tien-li. Political doctrines for communal
governance (chi-tao) then should reflect the ren-tao. Rummel’s firm belief in ‘Man
in Nature’ contrasts with the prevailing Western assumption of ‘Man versus Nature’
and was easily accepted by his Korean students. According to the standard thinking
in the oriental culture, a man’s identity is determined by his combined relations with
other people and things. Inter-personal relation is not the calculated distance
between men. Rather, the relations determine the identity of the man. These ways of
thinking fit with Rummel’s concept of ‘field’. ‘A nation’s attribute distances from
other nations in A-space will determine its behavioral pattern in B-space’. This is
the core argument in Rummels Field Theory, and one that his Korean students
could easily accept. These shared perspectives led Rummel’s Korean disciples to
accept his theoretical arguments easily.
Professor Rummel started his teaching career at Indiana University and then
taught at Yale University for two years. In 1966 he moved to University of Hawaii,
where he taught for 30 years until he chose early retirement in 1995. During his
tenure at University of Hawaii he served as the academic advisor for twelve Korean
Ph.D. students, more than half of the total number of Ph.D. candidates he advised.
Of the twelve Korean students, six wrote their dissertations under Rummel’s
guidance. Most of them returned to Korea and assumed professorship in various
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Korean universities and actively promoted Rummel’s work to their colleagues and
students. In the Korean academic community they were known as the ‘Rummel
School.’ They introduced Rummel’s theories, beliefs, and arguments in their own
monographs and textbooks. In addition to their academic activities, Rummel’s
Korean disciples also made a major contribution to the Korean government’s for-
eign policy development. For example, Dr. Chang-yoon Choi, who taught at the
Korean Military Academy, was later recruited by President Roh Tae-Woo to serve
as Minister of Culture and Information. Dr. Yong-ok Park who greatly contributed
to development of Rummel’s Field Theory Model II while he worked as a research
assistant for the DON Project, taught at the Korean Defense University and later
served as Deputy Minister of National Defense. Dr. Jong-yul Lee, another DON
research assistant, was elected to the National Assembly and served President Chun
Doo-Hwan as Chief Secretary of Political Affairs and Minister of Political Affairs.
Another DON assistant, Sang-Jin Choi, joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
later served as Ambassador to Finland. Dr. Young-Sun Song, the youngest Ph.D.
student in Rummel’s Korean brigade, worked as chief policy analyst at the Korean
Institute of Defense Analyses and was later elected as a Member of the National
Assembly. I myself, after thirty-year long teaching career at Sogang University,
worked for the ROK government as Chairman of Policy Advisory Committee in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Unification. I also served as Chairman
of the Presidential Commission of the 21st Century and as Chairman of the Military
Reform Committee of the Ministry of National Defense.
Rummel’s academic achievements are perhaps even better known in Korea than
in the United States, since he has been more broadly introduced in Korean academic
journals and textbooks than in any other country. His Korean students share his
critical thinking, his democratic values, and his political outlook, as well as his
attitude toward academic research. Through these Korean students, Rummel’s
philosophy and ideology of libertarian peace is widely spread among the Korean
intellectuals.
4.3 My Own Work with Rummel
It was in 1967 that I first met Professor Rummel at University of Hawaii. I was
awarded an East-West Center scholarship sponsored by the US State Department,
which enabled me to pursue graduate studies at University of Hawaii. Until I earned
my doctorate in 1971, Professor Rummel was my academic advisor. I completed
my dissertation, ‘Communist China’s Foreign Behavior: An Application of Field
Theory Model II,’ under his guidance.
For two years thereafter, from 1971 to 1973, I assisted Rummel in managing the
Dimensionality of Nations (DON) Project, as its Associate Director. I was also
deeply involved in projects dealing with issues related to conflict and war among
nations as well as peace-related theories, which were his core research subjects
throughout his academic career.
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I returned home to Korea in 1973. To disseminate what I learned from Rummel,
I I invited Rummel to Korea in 1978 to teach a two-week special summer class for
graduate students from universities all over the country. I also arranged for his book
In the Minds of Men to be published by Sogang University Press. This book has
been used as a textbook by many universities in Korea. Then I translated and
published his two books, Democide and The Blue Book of Freedom in Korea. I also
collected some of his writings, including his autobiographical account ‘Roots of
Faith’ along with some of my own essays in a book. This volume was published in
Korean as Rummel’s Libertarian Peace Theory. Unfortunately, my laziness pre-
vented me from doing more to disseminate this work and others that highlight his
great achievements—which I still regret today.
Since I returned to Korea in 1973, until three years before his death, I went to
visit Rummel and Grace in Hawaii at least once a year. Whenever we met, even
after I became a retired professor in my mid-seventies, he gave me a ‘special
lecture’ on new research trends in political science and kept me abreast of the
progress of his own research projects. These lectures easily lasted a few hours.
I was clearly his lifelong student.
4.4 Freedom and Dignity
Rummel’s love for all of humanity, transcending ideology, race and social status,
were limitless. His students including myself were deeply moved by his love for
humanity. While fire is the source of light, so love is the source of peace. Love
signifies respect for the dignity of fellow human beings. Only those who enjoy
freedom can respect the dignity of others. This led Rummel to conclude that
‘freedom makes and fosters peace’. He had a firm belief in the need for an order of
community whereby all human beings could enjoy freedom and happiness
regardless of their social status, ‘liberated from the willfulness of others’. He
thought peace was an order whereby all human beings could co-exist with mutual
respect. This philosophy became deeply imbued into the minds of his students. His
determination to contribute to establishing an order of peace launched him on a
lifelong academic career devoted to the study of peace, and his students tried to
emulate his life.
Rummel sincerely listened to all theories and arguments made by others that
were put forth, whether or not he agreed to them. Without obstinacy, he listened to
what others contended with an open mind. He was perhaps one of the best-read
scholars. Listening to diverse opinions, he carefully selected useful ones and
accommodated them in his theoretical frame. He always sought to extricate himself
from bias, and such an open scholarly attitude moved his students.
Rummel was not a pedantic scholar. He was more interested in down-to-earth
‘human life’ than in academic theories. To him, academic research had no signif-
icance in itself; it had significance only when it provided the wisdom needed to
improve realities or to promote the welfare of humanity. For instance, he searched
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through historical facts to locate instances of mass murders by dictators (democide)
to show the world how such events devastated the lives of ordinary individuals.
Most of his later academic efforts were geared toward identifying instances of
democide in order to develop a system to prevent it. His series of novels, Never
Again, is an outcome of such efforts. Rummel’s positive academic approach deeply
influenced his students, who followed in his footsteps and adopted empirical
approaches to research.
4.5 Rudy in Space
Professor Rummel quietly passed away in the spring of 2014. As dictated in his
will, his body was cremated and the ashes were scattered in Kaneohe Bay.
Although his body has disappeared, I do believe that his mind will be wandering in
space forever. I also believe his love will live on in the minds of his students, for
whom he will forever remain a Great Teacher.
I often have dreams in which I see Rudy flying in space with a bright smile,
holding hands of his wife Grace. I do miss him and Grace.
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Chapter 5
Contextualizing Rummel’s Field Theory
Richard W. Chadwick
5.1 A Genealogical Preface
I first met Rudy1 in 1962 when I was an incoming graduate student at Northwestern
University. Harold Guetzkow was then the principal investigator of the
Dimensionality of Nations (DON) Project, Harold appointed Rudy as his project
supervisor while Rudy was working on his dissertation. I was recruited by Harold to
work on the project as a data collector and statistical analyst. We worked well
together because of the rigor with which Rudy pursued his work on the DON
Project, an integral part of his thesis research. My job was initially to run basic
statistical analyses on published data put into tables by other graduate students.
I also collected data on conflict behavior within and between states for the period
1955–57 by content analyzing microfilmed New York Times (NYT) indexes. Rudy
and Harold developed an initial typology of conflict, defining threats, accusations,
protests, ultimatums, anti-government and anti-foreign demonstrations, numbers
killed in domestic and in foreign violence, and other variables. We modified these
definitions many times because the initial definitions were incompatible with the
terminology used by the NYT Index. At first, we found that inter-coder reliability
correlations between three NYT data coders (including me) using the same sources
and years with the same definitions, was almost exactly zero. At the same time,
Richard W. Chadwick, b. 1939, Ph.D. in political science (Northwestern University, 1966). He
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Rudy independently collected data from the NYT itself, which provided much
greater detail. The reliability problems were eventually resolved using a refined
coding procedure (Rummel, 1966a).
In the course of these labors Rudy and I, often with Harold, had many extended
and lively discussions about the meaning of what we were doing. Rudy was a
Korean War veteran and in the middle of his pioneering dissertation research and
Harold had a long professional history in psychology. When they spoke about their
concerns, fears, and hopes, I, barely 22 years old with no similar experience, listened
and probed. Out of such conversations, I formed the impression that we did not know
enough as scientists, nor obviously did politicians, to prevent catastrophes such as
wars, even potentially nuclear war.2 Secondly, it was possible to learn more that
might help to avoid war by studying social, political, and economic systems. And
finally, quantitative modeling with the data we were collecting, might serve to
structure the environment in laboratory-based human interactions designed to sim-
ulate foreign policy decision-making. In turn, this might further our knowledge of
decision-making sufficiently to offer some progress towards reducing the likelihood
of war. The urgency of this need for knowledge was widely recognized, and was at
the core of Harold’s creation of the Inter-Nation Simulation (INS) and the DON
Project. INS had been set up to simulate foreign policy decision-making environ-
ments and DON was created to collect data to test hypotheses that would emerge
from the INS work as well as to improve the quality of INS experiments. The intent
was, as I understood it, that INS and DON would work together synergistically, the
research output of each becoming input to the other over time. When Harold turned
over the DON project to Rudy, he also closed INS and began the Simulated
International Processes (SIP) project, which in time turned to all-computer simula-
tion despite Guetzkow’s initial preference for man-computer simulation. Though on
a much smaller scale, the hoped-for INS-DON synergy was very much in the spirit of
Wright’s (1957) plea for a ‘world intelligence center’ to develop and disseminate
knowledge aimed at reducing the likelihood of a global nuclear holocaust.
5.2 Field Theory Genealogy: Take-off Traces
The latent actor/agent-environment sketched above was a key component to field
theory frameworks as well as constructivist thinking a generation later (Onuf, 1989)
and quite distinct from the ‘inherited traits’ and Pavlovian and Skinnerian condi-
tioning literature. I am not implying that their orientation was fully constructivist,
only that the thinking of the many researchers who earned their MAs and Ph.D.s on
these two projects had a common orientation towards decision-making and lead-
ership which recognized that decision-makers and their environments were in large
measure defined by the beliefs, attitudes, and situational orientations of participants.
2For a fuller discussion of this point, see Chadwick (2011).
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In the classic S-O-R model, there was now substance not only in the ‘O’ but in the
‘-O-’, the dashed lines representing communication in its symbolic and semantic
fullness. As Richardson (1960: 12) put it, ‘Critic: Can you predict the date at which
the next war will break out? Author: No, of course not. The equations are merely a
description of what people would do if they did not stop to think.’
One can see in this simple dialog with an imagined critic the latent field theory
and constructivist insights, and also the need for the careful ontological synthesis
done by Onuf, Wendt, and others two generations later. With this focus, Rudy was
quite sensitive to social science theories and methods that might offer some pointers
to make progress in the direction of more volition-oriented theory. It was in this
learning process that Rudy introduced me to Quincy Wright’s The Study of
International Relations. In particular, he introduced me to Wright’s review and
interpretation of the general field theory approach to theory development (Wright,
1955: 524ff). Wright (1955: 546) introduces his field theory formulation with ‘six
capabilities and six value dimensions’ …, ‘the rapidity and direction of movement
of each depending in considerable measure upon the relation of its four structural
levels. This cannot, of course, be represented visually in three-dimensional space,
but imagination may picture a twelve-dimensional semi-opaque cheese, within
which maggots crawl around, the larger ones representing states with the govern-
ment at the head and the people at the tail.’
Wright did not take the representation further to develop a quantitative theory of
international relations. He apparently got the idea of representing the movements of
states as vectors in an n-dimensional space of countries’ attributes from his brother,
Sewall Wright, a geneticist and developer of path analysis. Jack Sawyer introduced
Rudy to the basics of factor analysis, the technique used in the DON Project to
uncover patterns in relations between variables. As I recall, some 236 variables were
collected across 82 countries but because of insufficient data fewer were actually
used. In the process I learned about factor analysis from him. I had an opportunity to
return the favor after Rudy left first for Indiana University and then Yale, where
Betty Bockelman assisted him in much the same manner. We were concerned with
how to compare factors in analyses of different data sets with the same variables.
Wandering through Northwestern’s library my eye caught a book in the psychology
section written by Ahmavaara & Markkanen (1958), which solved precisely the
same analytic problem, though the substance was different (comparing the brains of
alcoholics and non-alcoholics on various cognitive dimensions). The trick was to
treat the factor loadings as ordinary variables and do multiple regressions of each
factor’s loading from one data set on the factor loading matrix of the other data set.
5.3 Systems Thinking
Systems thinking was then a relatively new paradigm for understanding the nature
of creative change in beliefs, technology, and behavior of large aggregates of
people. It starts with the assumption that there is continuous interplay between
individuals and their environments complicated by the fact that individuals are a
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large part of each other’s environment. From a paradigmatic perspective field
theories are a type of systems theory that searches for causal explanations for
individual interactions or events not in prior events or environmental circumstances,
but in the purposive behavior of individuals shaped by their collective beliefs,
perceptions, and experience of what is real, what is possible, and what is desirable.
Understanding human behavior and communication in large aggregates over time is
not something for which we humans have good natural perceptions, not to mention
methods of organizing perception into data recordings, and even less explaining
such systematic observations with theory. For example, Sawyer & Levine (1966:
esp. 730f) applied factor analysis to cultural characteristics and concluded that
comparative economic efficiency of types of social and political organization, rather
than geographic cultural diffusion, accounts for similarities and differences among
different cultural groups. Incomplete as it is, their work represents a very high level
of grounded theory generalization about large scale human social systems, unde-
tectable by individuals within those systems unless they have a prior appreciation
for their system. A generation later, Inglehart & Welzel (2005) reach a similar
conclusion, that economic development influences value change in increasingly
democratic ways. For decades, these and similar results have pointed to the need to
use dynamic factor analysis in foreign policy studies. Thus, over-time relationships
can be perceived between changes in historical contexts, values, political policy
judgments, and cultural changes related to economic and political development.
Unfortunately, as Ricci (1984), Zegart (2015), and others have pointed out, the gaps
between academics, operational policy analysts, and philosophers remain as
abysmal as ever. We are still mired in historical institutionalism, path analysis, and
social network analysis, or even neural net analysis, none of which enable us to see
the forest for the trees, that is, the nature of human systems dynamics.
5.4 Field Theories
Field theory in the social sciences has an underlying system approach or paradigm,
but it did not begin that way. ‘Field theory’ began its use as a term to describe
models of magnetic and gravitational fields. By analogy, people are embedded in
fields that attract or repulse them, not in the sense of electrical energy force fields
but in Lewin’s sense of culturally conditioned linguistic and conceptual environ-
ments that induce their psychological and behavioral predispositions. ‘Fields’ exist
as individual and collective memories, motives, expectations, goals, and purposes
distributed over a geographical region and fluctuating over time as people interact.
The way Rudy put it much later, ‘We are a dynamic field of needs, attitudes,
sentiments, emotions, expectations, and perceptions; a subjective field within which
the world is given a unique interpretation; a perspective through which reality is
transformed.’ (Rummel, 1976b, Sect. 2.1.) To use ‘analogy as a source of knowl-
edge’ (Lorenz, 1974), consider computers. You cannot tell how people will behave
unless you know how they are ‘programmed,’ what they are prepared for or ‘need’
for input, how they are being used, what is presumed to be available for output, and
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what decisions are made which creatively regulate that output. The ‘political sys-
tem’ concept in the work of Easton (1953) fits this model, yet Easton himself, to my
knowledge, did not take the next step to a ‘field’ framework.
Early development of field theory in the social sciences begins with psychology,
chiefly in the work of Lewin (1939). In his framework, individuals (and groups) are
conceived of as goal-seeking life forms in environments which, over time, induce
learning. Environments are perceived as opportunities and obstructions to goal
attainment, motivating people to adapt their behavior. The goals themselves vary as
basic needs at the biological level are adequately met.3
All these ideas constituted my own ‘little field’ as I tried to understand the
purpose of the DON Project and what my mentors were about. As I recall, Rudy
began his thinking about fields with Wright’s idea of states propelled by interests
and power in an n-dimensional space defined by their attributes, and Lewin’s idea
of people interacting in fields constituted by their personalities. Over the next four
or so decades, Rudy made their insights for understanding international conflict
quantitatively and systematically researchable, at least in principle, and applicable
to Guetzkow’s and his concern with preventing war.
Lewin sketched his theory as an equation, B = F(P,E). Behavior B is a function of
the life space of an individual, the personality P and environment E (Fig. 5.1). Here,
the irregular sections represent an ‘intellectual geography’ or life space, that is,
events or situations through which a person travels over time and which influence the
person P moving from some origin O towards a desired goal G. Both the person and
the environment are in flux, thus different people at different times experience dif-
ferent situations. Each person (or group) may well constitute one of those irregular
shapes in the graph—each shape representing their ‘field’ of beliefs and predispo-
sitions, as each pursues their own goals in interaction with P. Although Rudy takes
exception to this graphical representation, at the end of his critical review of the
literature, he notes that he is in substantial agreement with Lewin’s equation.4
Further, consider one of Rummel’s concluding graphs (Fig. 5.2). As I see it, this is
clearly a more detailed rendering of one of Lewin’s irregular shapes, some details
applying Maslow’s concept of basic needs.5 Thus, Rudy is integrating a variety of
theories and, as such,makes an original contribution to at least one type offield theory.
Rudy represented his field theory of international politics by this simple
equation,
Xij ¼ aj1f1ðÞþ aj2f2ðÞþ    þ ajpfpðÞþUij
3While researchers and theorists are cognizant of environmental, anthropological, and genetic
perspectives, the feedback dynamics at various levels of analysis are not explicitly modeled in this
field theory approach.
4See at: http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/DPF.CHAP3.HTM (search for Lewin). However,
Burnes & Cooke (2013), building on Rudy’s critique, find the graphic representation superior to
the mathematical modeling attempted by Lewin himself.
5Rudy discusses Maslow’s theory of basic needs extensively in Chap. 21; see at: http://www.
hawaii.edu//powerkills/DPF.CHAP21.HTM.
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Fig. 5.1 Graphical rendering of Lewin’s field concept. Source https://commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Lewin%27s_field_theory_2.png
Fig. 5.2 Rummel’s sketch of the dynamic psychological field. Source Rummel (1975), Fig. 28.2;
see also Chap. 3
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where Xij is a ‘behavioral manifestation’ j taken by an actor i, the a’s are parameters
regarding the behavioral manifestation, the functions f1…p() in the equation are
intentionally left blank to represent the myriad latent functions composing a per-
sonality and an environment, and Uij represents the person’s uniqueness.
6
To connect to traditional international politics research, consider Fig. 5.3. Here
power and wealth are represented as vectors motivating states as decision-making
units to pursue survival through increasing power and wealth. So far, this is fairly
standard realist theory, expressed in a field-theoretic language.
Several key ideas in Rudy’s field theory make his perspective unique. The first is
‘distance’,7 usually conceived in a multidimensional space of differences between
states’ attributes, and typically related to estimates of power differentials. I write
‘usually,’ because although the vast majority of his work related differences in
states’ attributes to differences in their behavior (as did Wright, 1955), some of his
earlier work (Rummel, 1966b) used a variety of functions, multiplying attributes for
instance, with significant results. In discussions with him, I inquired as to why he
abandoned all but differences in attributes to produce differences in behavior; the
only answer I recall is that alternatives just were not elegant. Simplicity and beauty
are hallmarks of great theories, true enough, but then there is also evidence.
Another key characteristic of Rudy’s field theory is the construction of data tables
on pairs of states (dyads). Tables with dyads in rows and attributes or attribute
differences in columns are hallmarks of his theory. But quite apart from the role such
tables played in his field theory, that very format was a stroke of creative genius,
independent of whether the dyadic contents were conceptualized as ‘distances’ or
some other function of attributes I had not seen a prior use of data in that format. The
closest, even in principle, was Richardson’s (1960) differential equations modeling
Fig. 5.3 Rummel’s power and wealth distances and vectors. Source Rummel (1975), Fig. 17a–c.
Models based on this framework can become quite elaborate; for instance, see http://www.hawaii.
edu/powerkills/WPP.FIG7.1.GIF applying it to totalitarianism
6This equation is found in Rummel (1975), Chap. 11 and is, I think, fairly representative of the
generality of other equations in other chapters on related topics.
7The ‘distance’ concept is explicated throughout Rudy’s writing, but see Rummel (1976b).
Rummel (1966b) experimented with a departure from ‘distance’ as a key concept.
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conflict dynamics between two nations and his speculation about extending such
analysis to n nations, where n > 2. In Richardson’s work, it was the military
capabilities of a state’s rivals that impelled states to arm or conversely, disarm,
depending on the interpretation of their intentions. The fear parameter in
Richardson’s equations amplified and dampened the effect of power differentials
between states. While fear was included as a parameter in his best-known equations,
that parameter was defined by Richardson as the difference (‘distance’ in Rummel’s
terms) between pairs of states’ conflict and cooperation. (Cooperation was seen as a
function of trade in the Kantian tradition.) Thus, it was not simple differences in
attributes that produced behavioral differences. Rather, attribute differences evalu-
ated by differences in conflict and cooperation levels between them, create variable
levels of fear that in turn produce behavior (arming or disarming). One might infer
that mathematical ‘field theory’ has a longer history than conventionally assumed,
since Richardson first published his work as early as 1919.
The power and wealth vectors in Fig. 5.2 could be roughly measured with DON
data or similar collections, to calculate differences between states, but ‘rough’ also
implies—for the obvious reasons of validity and reliability—low associations with
behavioral data. Van Atta & Rummel (1970) used 1963 international relations and
state attribute data to test the differences cause behavior hypothesis. They found no
relationship (no variance in behavior explained by differences alone); however
when they controlled for certain ‘uniqueness’ of states, they found about half the
variance in behavior explained. Aside from the technical questions posed by using
the method of canonical factor analysis (the first canonical factor accounted for
about half the variance in the ‘space’ defined by the first three behavioral dimen-
sions), the difficulties of operationalizing a field theory are formidable. Consider
that the ‘field’ contains the psychological dimension, the beliefs goals, values,
worldview, and so on, none of which were made operational with data. Given these
handicaps, the results, though disappointing, might have been expected.
Rudy wrote a critical overview of other field theory approaches,8 which focuses
on the research being insufficiently cross-disciplinary in theory construction and
integration, on being insufficiently grounded in data, and on being insufficiently
sophisticated in mathematical formulation. These criticisms, valid as they are, are
fairly representative of scientific enterprises in general and Rudy’s would seem to
be no exception: The equations and graphical illustrations shown above are not
much different in detail, his data difficult to come by and analyze, and his inte-
gration of his theory with other disciplines incomplete. By the late 1970s, Rudy
himself shifted from further development of this framework to immersing himself
in traditional international relations and cognate fields’ literature mostly devoid of
mathematical representation and rigorous logical deductive formats.9
8See http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/DPF.TAB6.1.GIF for a tabular summary and Rummel
(1975), Chap. 6 for the detailed review.
9Rummel (1976a) was drafted much earlier, and contains a self–analysis of why he moved to non–
quantitative literature for inspiration.
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To stop at this point in evaluating field theory in general or his in particular
would be a disservice to both, for one needs to understand the larger context of this
shift from quantitative, empirically grounded research to the traditional library
research of scholars. The DON Project research agenda required substantial funding
and the principal supplier was ARPA. This funding ceased by 1975. However,
research of a quantitative nature into international politics continued inside the
intelligence community. For instance, this is where Stuart Bremer’s GLOBUS
Project ended up, after starting at the Berlin Science Center thanks to Karl Deutsch.
It had created a massive database and embodied a variety of theories about the
international behavior of states. Similarly, Mihajlo Mesarovic’s WIM computer
simulation, originally supported by the Club of Rome, morphed into the Pentagon’s
Globesight model and Aristotle database.10 For several decades following
Guetzkow, relatively large-scale quantitative international relations projects were
well funded, and as uses for them were found they lost their public funding and
drifted into the world of intelligence. To think that field theory and its parallel
constructions failed to develop would, I suspect, be a mistake.
5.5 Parallel Constructions
Burnes & Cook (2013) have written an extensive review of ‘field theory’ research
by that name. A broader framework, however, placing field theory in a larger social
science context, would be highly desirable. Only a few generations ago, about all
that existed of ‘political science’ was what we now call leadership theory, public
policy and administration, and political philosophy. Psychology was dominated by
the psychoanalysis schools inspired by Freud and behavior conditioning theories of
Pavlov and Skinner. Crowd psychology, especially mob psychology (Le Bon)
hinted at a crude form of field theory. But so far as I can see presently, it was the
insight of Adam Smith and the dynamic ‘invisible hand’ of the market place
(the idea that the behavior of individuals and communities in interaction had a
dynamic of their own that needed to be understood as distinct from individual
psychology or crowd dynamics), that ushered in a third ‘level of analysis,’ the
system level. Today, of course, there is wide acceptance of the insights by Singer
(1961) and others’ that at least three analytic levels (individual, organizational or
bureaucratic, and systemic) are needed in international relations theory, each with
their own structures and functions. But even today, there is no systematic effort to
integrate them into a multi-level theory, not to mention to follow the work of
Richardson to examine longer term multi-nation dynamics. In this context of
inchoate theory development, Rudy’s field theory transcends earlier efforts in rel-
ative clarity and comprehensiveness.
10For a short time in 1990 I acted as a ‘scientific adviser’ for the Pentagon to evaluate Globesight
and Aristotle at DRMEC (Defense Resources Management Education Center) at the request of its
then Director, Robert von Pagenhardt, in the Naval Postgraduate School.
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Rudy did not extend his formal field theory research to other problems than those
of understanding the behavior of states, preferring more expressive modalities, art
and literature appreciation, painting, and writing novels to express his deeply held
humanitarian values such as the avoidance of nuclear war. However, using Rudy’s
field theory equations and his more philosophical discussions of their implications,
one could imagine reinterpreting theories that are more partial in scope, for
example, operationalizing an historical institutionalism framework with dynamic
factor analysis, applied to historical trends in the satisfaction of basic needs, trends
in the organizational structure of corporations, governments and empires, and so on.
One could imagine reinterpreting social network analysis projects in terms of field
theory ‘distances’ between ‘nodes’ (people, groups, …). Similarly, in business
management, Deming (1982, 1993), who became well known for his systems
approach to understanding the dynamics of corporate-consumer relations, assumed
that we all live in systems (organized relations) which determine our average
behavior, that all systems decay and require intentional effort to be maintained and
reinvented as technology changes. His insights can easily be incorporated into field
theory. And as long as field theory equations are understood to be describing the
behavioral dynamics of human interaction at different levels, even constructivist
interpretations in terms of ‘rule making’ (Onuf, 1989) can find a place. Rules and
rule changing can be understood to be both the outcome of adapting to the patterns
described by field equations and the independent (exogenous) sources of new
patterns in ‘differences’ described by field equations. Such speculation is a far cry
from imaging states as Wright did, as maggots with states as heads and people as
tails, vaguely sensing each other and moving by instinct in a 12-dimensional green
cheese. But we still have a long way to go.
5.6 Implications and Possible Applications
Sooner or later, a generation of better mathematically equipped political scientists
will take advantage of the power of computers and big data to test theories of human
decision-making at multiple levels, and find ways to integrate such models into our
political and social cultures through education.11 That is, if we do not disintegrate
first in some ‘spasm’ nuclear war, nuclear winter, man-made pandemic, or some
such. I am reminded in that regard of an archeological dig in Petra, Jordan, of a
culture that excelled at sandstone carving, building thereby a city of over 30,000
people by some estimates, in the middle of a desert. They had learned to harness
water resources which gave them an economic advantage throughout the region.
They were apparently destroyed by a series of earthquakes that obliterated their dams
and wiped out the entire infrastructure, a catastrophe from which they never
11Cattell (1972) expressed this viewpoint quite eloquently and referenced Rummel as one of many
pioneers in this path.
48 R.W. Chadwick
recovered. From a field theory perspective, it was the interaction of the environment
with the culture and the motivational landscape of the people in it and other cultures
that related to it, that created the disaster, hence could have been avoided.
For me the question arises, do we have equivalent ‘fault lines’ in our thinking
and our cultural edifices? There is a long list of current dangers to our civilization,
developed by a number of scholars.12 Do we have the time to develop this field
theoretic perspective, as I am sure Rudy would hope, given his focus on freedom
and democracy, to identify such fault lines and educate ourselves at all levels so that
we can in fact empower ourselves as a species, if not a culture, to survive them?
I’ve come full circle from Guetzkow’s and Rudy’s concern with the catastrophic
potential for nuclear war, via Cattell’s review of the infant steps of political science
to address such issues and the details of Rudy’s field theory developments fol-
lowing the efforts of Wright and Lewin, to a number of complementary develop-
ments in systems theory of which field theory is a part. I also noted the
non-mathematical developments in constructivist thinking which complement field
theory rather than compete with it, if field theory is understood to describe the
environment within which people learn to make decisions and in turn change their
environments. As with the human actors in Guetzkow’s Simulated International
Processes Project, perhaps the least developed aspect of field theory is precisely that
noted by Rudy when he hypothesized that ‘We are a dynamic field of needs,
attitudes, sentiments, emotions, expectations, and perceptions; a subjective field
within which the world is given a unique interpretation; a perspective through
which reality is transformed.’ We have mapped much of the environment of human
decision-making, but very little in decision-making in comparison with the work
ahead. Field theory is still in its infancy, but current researchers like Inglehart and
Schwartz are teaching it to walk.13
References
Ahmavaara, Yrjö & Touko Markkanen (1958) The Unified Factor Model. Helsinki: Finnish Foundation
for Alcohol Studies & Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.
Burnes, Bernard & Bill Cooke (2013) Kurt Lewin’s field theory: A review and re-evaluation.
International Journal of Management Reviews 15(4): 408–425.
Cattell, Raymond B (1972) A New Morality from Science: Beyondism. Elmsford, NY: Pergamon.
Chadwick, Richard W (2011) My mentored relationship with Harold Guetzkow. Simulation & Gaming
42(3): 308–313.
Chadwick, Richard W (2014) Fraud and deceit, or a failure of American political and social sciences:
Towards a theory about the impact of banking on the rise and fall of civilizations. International
Relations and Diplomacy 2(10): 639–654.
Deming, W Edwards (1982) Out of the Crisis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
12For a modest effort of my own at coming to grips with one of them, see Chadwick (2014).
13See Inglehart & Welzel (2005, 2010) and Schwartz (1994) and Dobewall & Strack (2014) for a
comparison.
5 Contextualizing Rummel’s Field Theory 49
Deming, W Edwards (1993) The New Economics for Industry, Government, Education. Cambridge
MA: Center for Advanced Engineering Study, MIT.
Dobewall, Henrik & Micha Strack (2014) Relationship of Inglehart’s and Schwartz’s value dimensions
revisited. International Journal of Psychology 49(4): 240–248.
Easton, David (1953) The Political System: An Enquiry into the State of Political Science. New York:
Knopf.
Inglehart, Ronald & Christian Welzel (2005) Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: the
Human Development Sequence. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Inglehart, Ronald & Christian Welzel (2010) Changing Mass Priorities: the Link between
Modernization and Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lewin, Kurt (1939) Field theory and experiment in social psychology. American Journal of Sociology
44(6): 868–896.
Lorenz, Konrad Z (1974) Analogy as a source of knowledge. Science 185(4147): 229–234, available
on-line at https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1973/lorenz-lecture.html.
Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood (1989) World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and
International Relations. Columbia SC: University of South Carolina Press.
Ricci, David (1984) The Tragedy of Political Science: Politics, Scholarship and Democracy. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Richardson, Lewis Fry (1960) Arms and Insecurity. Pittsburgh, PA: Boxwood.
Rummel, Rudolph J (1966a) A foreign conflict behavior code sheet. World Politics 18(2): 283–296.
Rummel, RJ (1966b) A social field theory of foreign conflict behavior. Peace Research Society, Papers
4: 131–150.
Rummel, RJ (1975) Understanding Conflict and War. Vol. 1: The Dynamic Psychological Field.
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Rummel, RJ (1976a) The Roots of Faith, in: James N Rosenau (ed.) In Search of Global Patterns. New
York: Free Press, 10-30.
Rummel, RJ (1976b) Understanding Conflict and War: Vol. 2: The Conflict Helix. Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage.
Sawyer, Jack & Robert A Levine (1966) Cultural dimensions: A factor analysis of the World
Ethnographic Sample. American Anthropologist 68(3): 708–731.
Schwartz, Shalom H (1994) Are there universal aspects in the structure and contents of human-values?
Journal of Social Issues 50(4): 19–45.
Singer, J David (1961) The level-of-analysis problem in international relations. World Politics 14(1):
77–92.
Van Atta, Richard & RJ Rummel (1970) Testing field theory on the 1963 behavior space of nations.
Dimensionality of Nations Project Report (43), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/710989.pdf.
Wright, Quincy (1955) The Study of International Relations. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Wright, Quincy (1957) Project for a world intelligence center and the value for conflict resolution of a
general discipline of international relations. Conflict Resolution 1(1): 315–325.
Zegart, Amy B (2015) Cloaks, daggers, and ivory towers: Why academics don’t study US intelligence.
In: Loch K Johnson (ed.) Essentials of Strategic Intelligence. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 31–48.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by




R.J. Rummel, Nuclear Superiority,
and the Limits of Détente
Matthew Kroenig and Bardia Rahmani
6.1 Introduction
Amid the intense security competition of the Cold War, the decade-long détente
between the United States and Soviet Union stands out to many as a moment of
pragmatic cooperation among rivals. The 1970s saw, among other developments,
the adoption of arms control treaties such as SALT I and II, scientific collaboration
between astronauts and cosmonauts, and the expanding of trade ties between
Washington and Moscow. Bookended by the crises of the 1960s and the proxy wars
of the 1980s, détente is the chapter of the Cold War in which peaceful coexistence
seemed closest at hand. ‘Détente is peace’, wrote political scientist R.J. Rummel,
‘Who in his right mind could speak out against peace?’ (Rummel, 1976: 22).
In Peace Endangered: The Reality of Détente (1976), Rummel does just that.
Tipping his hat to its intuitive appeal, Rummel nonetheless dismisses détente as
faith, not sound policy. By conflating arms control and cooperative interaction with
a durable peace, détente, in his view, weakened the West relative to the USSR and,
in so doing, made war more, not less, likely. Détente, Rummel argues, is a road
paved with good intentions and bad assumptions. And it is a road that forks off in
one of two directions: nuclear war or unconditional Western surrender. ‘This is the
only choice’, Rummel writes, ‘unless we understand the dilemma and act to avoid
it’ (Rummel, 1976: 19).
Nearly forty years later, it might be tempting for us to dismiss Rummel’s
arguments as analysis distorted by Cold War paranoia. After all, history has proven
Rummel wrong on many counts: America did not surrender to the Soviet Union;
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Moscow was neither resistant to the logic of mutual assured destruction nor as
reckless as Rummel feared; and there is now substantial evidence that cooperative
transactions can, in fact, lay the groundwork for peace among nations.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to conclude that Rummel’s analysis of the
nuclear arms race does not have important implications for those of us wrestling
with similar issues today. Despite several predictions that missed their mark,
Rummel’s work sheds light on a number of fundamental scholarly debates,
including those related to the nature of power in international politics, arms control,
and nuclear deterrence. Moreover, many of his arguments seem evergreen in the
light of a renewed Russian nuclear threat in contemporary Europe. Rummel’s work,
therefore, offers enduring lessons not only for international relations scholars, but
also for policymakers attempting to minimize the enduring danger of nuclear
annihilation.
6.2 Rummel’s Arguments
Rummel identifies the logic of détente as stemming from two major assumptions.
The first is that increased transactions between nations will result in greater har-
mony in their relations. Since cooperative transactions, such as trade, treaties, and
conferences, tend to build trust, they establish a framework for nonviolent conflict
resolution. Rummel calls this assumption Détente 1.
The second assumption, which Rummel calls Détente 2, is that we can reduce
conflict between nations through arms control measures. Henry Kissinger described
strategic arms reductions as ‘the single most important component of our policy
toward the Soviet Union’ (Rummel, 1976: 24). According to Rummel, Kissinger
viewed conflict as a product of the unbridled growth of national power and,
therefore, Kissinger believed that limitations on military capabilities help states to
cultivate peaceful relations and avoid war.
Rummel takes aim at both assumptions, beginning with Détente 1. From a
theoretical standpoint, Rummel objects to the dichotomy between conflict and
cooperation. A more apt bifurcation, Rummel argues, would be between isolation
and interaction—conflict and cooperation being two different manifestations of the
latter. Rummel offers the analogy of two individuals marooned on an island. The
castaways can either (a) not interact or (b) combine efforts to find food and shelter.
If they opt to do the latter, conflicts will naturally arise over any number of issues—
for example, the appropriate distribution of resources. Conflict serves to rebalance
the power dynamic between the castaways, creating a new status quo in which
cooperation is also possible. Rummel’s point here is not that interaction will nec-
essarily increase conflict, but that we should also not expect cooperation to nec-
essarily engender peace.
The numbers, Rummel argues, bear out his conclusion. Dividing cooperation
into four categories (cooperative transactions, student flows, joint membership in
international organizations, and trade), and analyzing thousands of bilateral
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interactions between nations, including those between the United States and Soviet
Union, Rummel finds cooperative interaction and conflict to be uncorrelated. He
does find that conflict begets conflict. For example, he finds that military action and
anti-foreign demonstrations are correlated. But insofar as the central premise of
Détente 1 is concerned, cooperative transactions reduce neither the frequency nor
the scope of inter-state conflict.
Rummel begins his critique of Détente 2, the notion that arms control reduces
conflict, with an examination of the nature of power. Rummel observes that
capability, or military strength, is ‘often mistaken for power’s essence’ (Rummel,
1976: 49). A more holistic notion of power should incorporate two additional
elements: interests, or national attention toward a goal, and credibility, which
Rummel defines as collective will—a nation’s ability to transform attention into
action. Power is the sum of capability, interests, and credibility. If one of these three
variables flags, power decreases, and if any of the variables is zero, a nation will be
effectively impotent.
This leads to Rummel’s criticism of Détente 2: proponents of détente danger-
ously conflate capability with power. Détente, Rummel writes, ‘considers neither
interests nor credibility, but focuses on military strength as the variable most related
to conflict.’ By attempting to lock in the US-Soviet balance of power through
‘essentially equivalent’ reductions in military capability, détente has the practical
effect of unbalancing the bilateral relationship. This is because, according to
Rummel, the Soviet Union has more invested in winning the Cold War; its geo-
graphical location and ideological commitments imbue it with greater resolve.
Pointing to America’s withdrawal from Vietnam, its removal of military bases from
South Korea, and what he considered its self-sabotage in the nuclear arms race,
Rummel paints a picture of a nation in retreat. Meanwhile, the USSR’s invasion of
Czechoslovakia, its infusion of aid to the North Vietnamese and the marxists in
Angola, and its support to the Arab states during the Yom Kippur War, demonstrate
its ‘superordinate interest in defeating the West’ (Rummel, 1976: 50). Because US
nuclear superiority serves to offset the Soviet Union’s advantages in terms of
interest and credibility, arms control disproportionately harms the United States.
Rummel backs his assertions with statistical analysis, finding that ‘… neither
parity nor superiority in military capability is associated with bilateral peace’
(Rummel, 1976: 55). This seems to fit with Rummel’s multifaceted understanding
of power. So long as interest and credibility factor into the overall balance of power,
quantitative evaluations of military capability will fail to tell the whole story.
After addressing the internal logic of détente, Rummel turns his attention to its
practical effects. Rummel accuses Soviet leaders of engaging in bad faith, and
American leaders of acting on blind faith. According to Rummel, while Washington
views détente as a means of diffusing the security dilemma, Moscow sees it as ‘a
tactical policy change to permit the Soviet bloc to establish its superiority in the
next 12–15 years’ (Rummel, 1976: 29). This mismatch in expectations, therefore,
puts the West in a position of unknowingly ceding global hegemony to the
Communist bloc.
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Comparing a range of US and Soviet military indicators (and acknowledging
that Soviet figures can only be estimated), Rummel calculates that far from main-
taining ‘essential equivalence’, the détente-era arms control agreements ceded
significant advantages to Moscow. He found that, from cruisers to cruise missiles,
Moscow bested Washington on 40 out of 48 measures of military strength (see
Fig. 6.1). Further, in the eight categories in which the United States led the USSR,
it generally did so by a narrow margin, whereas the Soviet Union maintained robust
Fig. 6.1 Rummel’s estimate of the US-USSR balance of military power. Source Rummel (1976:
60–61). Reprinted by permission of the publisher
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leads. ‘The stark picture that emerges,’ Rummel writes (1976: 133), ‘is of an overall
Soviet superiority that will continue to grow.’
Crucially, while the two sides arguably maintained a rough parity at the strategic
nuclear level, Rummel saw America’s capabilities along the spectrum of conflict as
an invitation to war rather than a bulwark against it.
This is because, according to Rummel, nuclear deterrence rests on three pillars.
First, each side must have sufficient strategic force to survive a surprise attack and
retaliate with unacceptable damage on the attacker; neither side must be allowed to
develop a first-strike capability. Second, each side must have adequate military
power to meet diverse threats at all rungs of the nuclear escalation ladder, including
tactical nuclear weapons. If there is a clear weakness for an opponent to exploit, this
will encourage an attack and could force the actor with gaps in its capabilities to fall
back on its strategic nuclear weapons. Third, each side must have robust conven-
tional capabilities, which prevents them from resorting to nuclear options in the first
place. If an actor can respond with conventional force, conflict might be contained.
But if it must instead resort to tactical nuclear systems, this will make it easier for an
exchange to escalate to the level of massive retaliation.
Rummel’s view was that, under détente, the United States lost its conventional
and tactical nuclear edge, and as a result was forced to rely too heavily on its
strategic nuclear warheads. US weakness at the conventional and tactical nuclear
level made it more likely that a conventional clash would snowball into all-out
nuclear war. On the other hand, if Washington refrained from escalating to avoid
this outcome, it would essentially cede victory to the USSR. Hence Rummel’s
central thesis: détente, by creating a power imbalance, forces an inevitable decision
between American surrender and nuclear war. Furthermore, because Moscow
recognizes Washington’s dilemma, it may be motivated to initiate armed conflict in
the first place.
In the final section of Peace Endangered, Rummel addresses the state of
NATO’s strategic nuclear arsenal. Given the Soviet drive toward military
superiority, could it be possible for the USSR to one day gain strategic nuclear
superiority, depriving the West of one of its few remaining advantages? Could
this superiority grow to such an extent that the Soviets even achieve a first strike
capability?
In answering this question, Rummel distinguishes between a preclusive first
strike and a dominant one. A preclusive first strike deals only with the technical
ability of the Soviet Union to completely destroy the American strategic arsenal,
eliminating its retaliatory capacity. A dominant first strike focuses on a nation’s will
to retaliate. Rummel argued that even if the Soviets were technically unable to wipe
out the US offensive strategic force, they might still achieve a dominant first strike
if they could dissuade Washington from retaliating.
According to Rummel’s calculations, the Soviets ‘will soon have a preclusive
first strike, if not by 1977 [one year after the book’s publication], at least by 1981’
(Rummel, 1976: 137).
Even if estimates of Soviet strategic capability are overblown, however, Rummel
argues that the Soviets may already have achieved a dominant first strike. He asks
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the reader to imagine a surprise attack that takes out the majority of US land-based
strategic forces, but leaves its sea-based forces and population centers intact.
Moscow then issues an ultimatum: retaliate against our strategic forces, and we will
destroy a city; retaliate against our population centers, and we will launch an attack
that will kill roughly 100 million Americans. No matter how Washington responds,
Moscow would be better positioned for any escalation. In such a scenario, Rummel
argues, the choice would once again be between suicide and surrender—no choice
at all. Rummel writes: ‘Our weapons were meant to deter aggression. If deterrence
fails, would a president still press the button? Of course not.’ (Rummel, 1976: 141).
By pursuing a strategy built upon the shaky pillars of cooperation, disarmament,
and misplaced empathy, Rummel concluded that American policymakers put the
United States at a strategic disadvantage. He argued that détente must be aban-
doned, but objected to critics who claimed that this put the superpowers on a path to
war. He writes,
Throughout history, peace has been maintained by clear purposes, military
power, and the will to use it. … When a nation’s purposes become confused, its
strength eroded, or its credibility questioned, aggression against it is encouraged,
and is likely to occur (Rummel, 1976: 149).
According to Rummel, therefore, the solution is clear. The West must regain its
military edge, demonstrate its willingness to use force, and reaffirm its commitment
to winning the Cold War. In Rummel’s view, it is military weakness, not military
power, which is the principal cause of conflict.
6.3 The Legacy of Peace Endangered
Evaluating Peace Endangered is a challenging task. On the one hand, Rummel’s
prediction that the Soviet Union would achieve a first-strike capability, and that it
might exploit this military imbalance to launch a nuclear sneak attack, never came
to pass. Not only did the US emerge victorious from the Cold War, it did so despite
a persistent nuclear deficit. By the conclusion of the Cold War in 1989, the Soviet
Union’s total nuclear stockpile outstripped that of the United States by some 13,000
warheads (Natural Resources Defense Council, 2006). Nevertheless, the internal
weakness of the Soviet system and its disproportionate military spending placed the
country on an unsustainable course—a fact that does not emerge in Rummel’s
analysis of national capability.
Rummel’s criticism of Détente 1 is not without problems either. Even as the
United States adopted a more confrontational stance under the Reagan adminis-
tration, it continued to engage in cooperative interactions with the Soviet Union,
including on major arms control initiatives like the INF treaty. Furthermore, and in
direct contradiction to Rummel’s claims, recent scholarship demonstrates that
increased interaction does have a positive impact on peace. Research has consis-
tently shown that countries with higher levels of membership in international
organizations and greater levels of economic interdependence, for example, are less
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likely to experience militarized disputes (Oneal & Russett, 1997). Rummel’s
findings likely diverge from those of other scholars because his analysis does not
control for contiguity and geographic distance. Countries are more likely to go to
war with their neighbors. Once that factor is taken into account, we find that
increased economic interaction is associated with reduction in militarized conflict.
Since Rummel’s time it has become standard practice in modern analyses of liberal
peace theory to control for contiguity and distance.
On the other hand, Rummel was right about much. The shift from détente to
rollback under the Reagan administration—a new strategy that reflected many of
Rummel’s suggestions—did presage the end of the Cold War. During the 1980s,
the United States engaged in a campaign of foreign interventions aimed not just at
countering Soviet aggression, as in Afghanistan in 1979, but actively ‘rolling back’
communist and leftist governments. These interventions, including the invasion of
Granada (1983), the bombing of Libya (1986), and the provision of arms and funds
to the Contras in Nicaragua (1982), were designed to signal American intent and
credibility. Meanwhile, Washington rebuilt its military forces, such that by 1986, it
had surpassed the Soviet Union in terms of military expenditure (Noren, 2007).
This campaign of defense spending, including reinstatement of the B-1 Lancer
program, production of LGM-118 Peacekeeper missile, and investment in the
Strategic Defense Initiative, eventually convinced the Soviet Union that it could no
longer spend itself into exhaustion.
Did the United States win the Cold War because it followed a path similar to the
one Rummel advocated or despite doing so? This chapter, of course, will not be
able to resolve longstanding debates about the drivers of the Soviet Union’s col-
lapse, but it can evaluate the impact of the ideas contained in Peace Endangered for
other issues in contemporary scholarship and policy. The rest of the article will,
therefore, consider the implications of Rummel’s views of power, arms control, and
nuclear deterrence.
Rummel’s definition of power as the product of a nation’s capability, intent, and
credibility is a nuanced take on an often-oversimplified concept. It is a formulation
that casts light on seemingly inexplicable outcomes. Why, despite overwhelming
advantages in terms of military technology, training, and manpower, did the United
States falter in Vietnam (and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan)? Why was Adolf
Hitler not deterred by British and French threats despite the overwhelming power of
the alliance that they were able to bring together just a few years later? Why was
Iran able to continue to enrich uranium despite demands from all five United
Nations Security Council members that it suspend its program?
Rummel’s formulation of power suggests an answer: many ‘asymmetrical’
conflicts are not asymmetrical at all. When intent, resolve, and credibility are taken
into account, the seemingly weaker actor may even have the advantage.
This is a theme that has been picked up and extended by contemporary scholars.
Arreguin-Toft (2005) has explained how the weak win wars. Press (2005) has
argued that both power and interests must be taken into account in order to
understand the credibility of military threats. And models of inter-state crises
continue to focus on the interaction of resolve and capabilities (Fearon, 1995). For
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example, a recent comprehensive empirical examination by one of the authors of
this article shows that, much as Rummel might have hypothesized, both the balance
of resolve and the balance of nuclear forces are critical determinants of nuclear
crisis outcomes (Kroenig, 2013).
It is precisely because of the multidimensional nature of power that arms control
agreements so often break down, which Rummel believed would be inevitable. As
his statistical analysis demonstrated, merely restraining a nation’s military capa-
bility will not necessarily change its attitudes or manufacture goodwill from thin air;
in fact, the causal effect often runs the opposite way. As Ronald Reagan was fond of
saying about the US-Soviet relationship, ‘We do not distrust each other because we
are armed, we are armed because we distrust each other’ (Reagan, 1985). In other
words, arms races are often the product of conflicts of interest rather than the cause
of them. By failing to recognize this dynamic, arms control regimes often do not
address the root of the problem.
By the logic of Détente 2, for example, the ratification of the New START treaty
in 2010 should have ushered in a period of reduced tensions between Washington
and Moscow. Yet instead of a ‘reset’, we have seen in recent years a rapid dete-
rioration in the relationship. The countries have engaged in policy clashes including
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and threats to the rest of NATO. Russia has flouted its
obligations under existing arms control regimes, testing a new intermediate-range,
ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) in direct violation of the 1987 INF treaty.
Moreover, Russia’s long-range RS-26 ballistic missile program can also be oper-
ated at intermediate range, allowing the country a technical circumvention of the
agreement. These developments are part and parcel of a new and more assertive
Russian foreign policy.
Some hoped that the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) would
bring Washington and Moscow together through a common interest in battling
Islamic extremism, but the interests here too are misaligned. While both would
prefer to defeat ISIS, they have fundamentally different preferences for how best to
go about it. Russia’s foremost goal is to prop up embattled Syrian dictator Bashar al
Assad, while Washington believes that ISIS can only be defeated after Assad is
ousted from power.
It is this clash of interests between Washington and Moscow that renders
Russian policymakers resistant to arms control measures. Arms control is predi-
cated in part upon the notion that bad relations arise from the uncertain haze of the
security dilemma. By allowing nations to signal their benign intent in a controlled
manner, arms control regimes seek to clear this haze. Yet, because the ongoing
tension between Washington and Moscow stems from a misalignment of interests
rather than a misunderstanding of them, arms control regimes like New START and
INF merely address the symptoms, not the causes, of conflict.
Indeed, the risk of nuclear war between the United States and Russia might be
higher now than at any time since the Cold War. To understand why, let us revisit
Rummel’s discussion of the necessary conditions for bilateral deterrence.
According to Rummel, deterrence requires strength in conventional, tactical and
strategic capabilities. A gap at any of these levels creates an opening for an
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opponent to exploit, encouraging aggression and making war more likely. It also
makes conflict more likely to escalate when it does occur. If a defending nation has
a missing rung in the escalation ladder, it may be forced to reach for a higher rung.
In this way, a conventional war can evolve into a tactical nuclear one, and a limited
nuclear exchange can spiral into strategic exchange.
This account of nuclear deterrence has direct implications for the US-Russian
relationship today, for several reasons. First, Russia has undertaken a massive
modernization of and reinvestment in its nuclear forces, including new long-range,
nuclear-armed cruise missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and
silo-based and road-mobile ICBMs. Second, Russia has moved nuclear weapons to
the center of its national security strategy and military doctrine. In 2000, Russia
revised its nuclear ‘no first use’ doctrine to allow for ‘de-escalatory’ nuclear strikes.
While this language was excluded from Russia’s most recent public documents, the
mentality of ‘escalate to de-escalate’ persists in Russian military circles and Russian
officials have not shied away from issuing explicit nuclear threats (Kroenig, 2015a, b).
Moreover, even as Russia strengthens its nuclear capability and doctrine, the
United States and NATO have moved in the opposite direction, deemphasizing
nuclear weapons as a tool of statecraft. As it stands, NATO maintains a strong
conventional force, a robust strategic nuclear capability and a significant gap in the
middle, leaving Russia with a significant battlefield nuclear advantage. The tactical
nuclear gap between Washington and Moscow, as Rummel would argue, encour-
ages Russia’s model of hybrid warfare, a combination of low-level aggression
backstopped by threats of early nuclear escalation.
Moreover, US and NATO tactical deficiency puts it in a difficult situation should
war break out. If the United States becomes embroiled in conflict in Ukraine or a
NATO member country, and Russia opts for a limited nuclear strike, a US president
would have few good options for a tailored, sub-strategic response. Under the
current strategy in Europe, much as in Rummel’s time, we in the West are ‘seriously
deteriorating our nuclear retaliatory capability while increasingly relying on an
incredible massive retaliation threat’ (Rummel, 1976: viii). A Russian tactical strike
might very well then force a choice between ‘war or surrender’ (Rummel, 1976: ix).
The solution, Rummel would argue, would be for NATO to develop a more
credible nuclear response option. Possibilities proposed by one of the authors of
this article include placing lower-yield nuclear warheads on existing SLBMs and
ICBMs, bringing back a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile, or rotationally
basing B-52 bombers and nuclear air-launched cruise missiles in Europe (Kroenig,
2015a, b). By signaling US and NATO capability and credibility to Moscow, a
strengthened nuclear capability could deter Russian aggression and help avert
nuclear exchange.
Of course, for many, nuclear war remains an unthinkable prospect. But, as
Rummel writes, ‘From our contemporary viewpoint some aspects of the future
always will be unthinkable.’ The job of scholars and practitioners of national
security is in part to anticipate and prepare for the kinds of scenarios that ‘would not
be accepted as a realistic novel’ (Rummel, 1976: 17). The strength of Rummel’s
work lies in his willingness to engage with such ideas.
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Although Rummel’s bold analysis caused him to ring some false alarms, it just
as often led to conclusions that have stood the test of time. As the West faces a
resurgent Russia and a new generation of scholars flocks to issues of nuclear
deterrence and arms control, Rummel’s A Peace Endangered continues to deserve a
prominent place on our bookshelves.
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Chapter 7
Rummel’s Unfinished Legacy: Reconciling
Peace Research and Realpolitik
Erich Weede
7.1 The Legacy
Rudy Rummel consistently was a bold and innovative scholar. In the 1960s, the
field of international relations was still in the grip of contemporary and diplomatic
historians or international lawyers. This did not satisfy him. He looked for a more
scientific approach modeled on the natural sciences. He wrote one of the first
dissertations that may be labeled as quantitative international politics or scientific
peace research. His ‘Dimensionality of Nations Project’ (Rummel, 1972) was one
of the early big data collection efforts in international politics. As far as I can see, he
was one of the first (or even the first) to make the dyad instead of the nation state
into his most important unit of analysis (Rummel, 1977). Today it is hard to
imagine quantitative research in international politics without analyzing dyads.
Psychometrics rather than econometrics provided the research paradigm in the early
days of the quantitative approach to world politics. That is why much of Rummel’s
work relied on factor analysis which is a basic tool of psychometrics. By contrast,
current quantitative research on international relations is more influenced by
econometrics where regression is the most basic tool. His methodological inno-
vations first attracted me to Rummel and his work. He also permitted me to use his
data base for my quantitative dissertation project. Having had some education in
psychometrics before I turned to political science and international relations, his
approach to the field looked plausible and convincing, even paradigmatic to me.
Important as his methodological innovations have been, he also contributed to
substantive theory. The intellectual roots of the democratic peace theory date back
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at least to the 18th century, and another American scholar revived interest in the
idea shortly before Rudy, but it was his work that instigated an explosion of interest
and research on the topic. Although nothing is beyond dispute in the social sci-
ences, Rummel’s view on the existence of a democratic peace has become the
dominant view among contemporary researchers. Later, Rummel expanded his
research agenda. He no longer investigated only wars or deadly quarrels, but mass
murder or ‘death by government’ (Rummel, 1994). In his view: ‘Freedom inhibits
violence’ (Rummel, 1979: 292). Whereas many or most adherents of the democratic
peace theory may be labeled ‘doves’ or even ‘leftists’, these labels never fitted
Rudy. He was a staunch anti-Communist during the Cold War (Rummel, 1976) and
a hawk even beyond it. He was a libertarian and a believer in limited government.
Although his work did never really focus on ‘the capitalist peace’, one may regard
this more recent line of thinking and research as a continuation of his work.
Certainly, it fits his libertarian spirit.
This sketch of Rummel’s research agenda and conclusions raises the question:
How can one simultaneously be a libertarian and a hawk? Libertarians want to
minimize government. Hawkish foreign policies cannot avoid expanding govern-
ment, at least military establishments. To put the same issue into a slightly different
perspective: Most hawks are adherents of the realist approach to world politics. Like
Rummel, realists believe in military power, not in soft power. Are Rummel’s views
consistent? They might be, if one assumes that enemies exist, that they are not merely
products of misguided imagination. Here, Rummel (1979: 292) himself provides
some cues in his writing: ‘Libertarian systems are the natural enemies of authoritarian
and totalitarian states. By their example and the products of freedom they are naturally
subversive of authoritarian and totalitarian systems; and these freedoms seem tomake
libertarian states defenseless against unilateral changes in the status quo.’ Like
realists, he worried about challenges to national security, deterrence, and defense.
Since I largely share his views and also combine libertarianism with a certain degree
of hawkishness, I shall dare to attempt to reconcile what many or even most political
scientists regard as irreconcilable. Russian aggression or the persistent crisis in the
Ukraine provides the background for my attempt. Being a hawk, Rummel was close
to realism. Nevertheless, he was not a member of that school of thought. Otherwise,
he would have been more interested in the distinction between vital and peripheral
interests, in power transitions and the decline of nations, and in spheres of influence.
7.2 Russian Expansion in the Ukraine: A Realist View
Using the label ‘realist’ does not necessarily say that ‘realist’ theorizing is true, or at
least better than other theories. But there is probably no view of world politics that is
more widely accepted than realism among national security elites of the great
powers. The starting point of realism is the belief in the existence of a ‘security
dilemma’ or an ‘anarchical order of power’. Since there is no effective authority
which can impose order and peace on great powers, states have to take security into
their own hands. They have to prepare for the worst, i.e., aggression by other powers.
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The obvious strategy is to seek ‘security by superiority’ or ‘peace by strength’.
Unfortunately, it is inconceivable that all great powers are superior to all others and
therefore safe. Superiority is a positional good. Claiming it for oneself implies denial
to others. Therefore, realists regard world politics as a ‘tragedy’. In contrast to many
adherents and promoters of the democratic peace, they consider moralizing dan-
gerous, more likely to enhance risks of war than to diminish them. Realism is
descriptive as well as prescriptive. According to Mearsheimer (2001: 12), ‘Although
there is much truth in the description of great powers as prisoners trapped in an iron
cage, the fact remains that they sometimes—although not often—act in contradiction
to the theory. … As we shall see, such foolish behavior invariably has negative
consequences.’ From a realist point of view it is important not to let moral judgments
cloud the distinction between vital interests which might merit a fight and lesser
interests which could detract one’s attention from more important issues.
The Russian take-over of the Crimea, Russian support of separatism in the
Eastern Ukraine, and Russian destabilization of the Ukraine alarmed Western
politicians. Before 2014 Russia was believed to be—or, at least, hoped to be—a
status quo power and resigned to its loss of influence in its near-abroad. Politicians
in the West rarely thought about red lines which might exist in Putin’s or other
influential Russian minds. NATO and the EU expanded, in the Baltic even
including three states which had been forced to be part of the Soviet Union itself. In
contrast to the small Baltic republics, however, the Ukraine was not a victor’s booty
after World War II. The historical link between the Ukraine and Russia is
deep. Talk about Ukrainian NATO membership, and later about a special rela-
tionship with the EU must have raised alarm bells in Moscow. But many European
politicians are so innocent of familiarity with realist thinking that they could not
imagine that Russia did simply not believe in the pacific self-image of the EU.
Realists in Moscow observed relentless NATO and EU expansion into former
Soviet territory and assumed the worst about Western intentions. In order to
forestall an imagined Western expansion, Russia itself expanded.
Should the West do something about it, or should it take consolation from the
proposition that Russia is a declining power for demographic, geopolitical1 and
economic reasons that does not need to be contained? If Russia were a declining
power, and if Western reactions to Russian expansion or aggression could make
Russia align with a rising power likely to challenge the West in future, i.e., China,
then containing Russia would be a mistake, then this would be ‘foolish’, or a failure to
distinguish between vital and peripheral interests (Mearsheimer, 2014a). The only
1According to some geopolitical theories (Bernholz, 1985; Collins, 1986: 167–185), accessibility
to other great powers or an interior location in the configuration of great powers is a disadvantage,
whereas a peripheral or marshland location is an advantage. Russia currently has the least
favorable geopolitical location of all great powers or candidates for great power status. It faces
China and Japan in the East, and Europe in the West. By contrast, the US has the most favorable
location. It is surrounded by oceans rather than being close to other great powers. Collins (1986:
167ff) predicted the future decline of the Russian empire. Since he underlines the continuity
between Muscovy, Tsarist Russia, and the Soviet Union, it is plausible to extend his geopolitical
arguments to Putin’s Russia.
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significant consequence of containing China might be assisting the rise of China.
From a ‘realist’ point of view, the West should not treat Russia as a permanent
adversary and thereby turn it into one. As Mearsheimer (2014b: 89) has observed:
‘The United States will also someday need Russia’s help containing a rising China.’
7.3 Realism and the Capitalist Peace
Although ‘realism’ is the dominant school of thought in international relations, it is
not the only one. According to realism, the security dilemma condemns mankind to
live with the risk of war forever. Since realists focus on conflicts of interest, they
might nevertheless (or: therefore?) empathize better with opponents than others.2 In
debating NATO expansion eastwards, some realists are less expansionist than
others (Mearsheimer, 2014b). In the nuclear age, admitting that great power politics
remains a tragedy is not attractive. A rival school of thought is sometimes called
‘idealism’ or ‘liberalism’. It is more optimistic. In contrast to realism, it even
provides some hope for avoiding a clash of Chinese and Western civilizations.
According to this line of thinking, either economic interdependence or democra-
tization or both may significantly reduce the risk of war. From this perspective,
globalization is useful by spreading interdependence and prosperity first and,
possibly, democratization later. For some time quantitative research (Gartzke, 2005,
2007; Russett & Oneal, 2001; summarized by Weede, 2011) has demonstrated that
the risk of war between nations is reduced, if they trade a lot with each other. There
is something like a commercial peace or peace by trade.3 Until recently the debate
among researchers was whether the commercial or capitalist peace is as strong as
the democratic peace. Now, the ground is shifting toward the question which
aspects of a capitalist order promote the avoidance of war most effectively: Is it
trade or the expectation of future free trade (Copeland, 2015)? Or, is it the avoid-
ance of protectionism? Or, is it the avoidance of state ownership of the means of
production, of state-owned enterprises (McDonald, 2007)? Or, is it financial market
openness and economic freedom (Gartzke, 2005, 2007)? All of these specific
interpretations of the general idea of a capitalist or commercial peace seem to justify
some optimism about the effects of globalization or the export of capitalism from
the West to the rest of the world. In particular, it should be underlined that eco-
nomic cooperation pacifies the relationship between a rising China and the West.
2See, for example, Gelb (2015: 10): ‘It is totally unrealistic, however, to think that the West can
gain desired Russian restraint and cooperation without dealing with Moscow as a great power that
possesses real and legitimate interests, especially in its border areas.’ Obviously, the Ukraine is the
most important border area for Russia.
3Copeland (2015: Chap. 2) reads the quantitative literature somewhat differently from me. But he
agrees with me on the fact that most researchers see economic interdependence as a pacifying
condition and that the democratic peace is anchored in economic cooperation. He focuses on
interactions which permit interdependence to increase or decrease conflict contingent on condi-
tioning variables.
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One could even conceptualize the democratic peace as a component of the capitalist
peace (Weede, 2011), because democracies prosper best in wealthy countries,
because capitalism or economic freedom and thereby globalization contribute to
prosperity. Since rising powers tend to challenge the political status quo (Organski,
1958; Organski & Kugler, 1980), it is good luck that the still dominant US and
rising China seem to prosper under global capitalism, that they trade a lot with each
other and are economically interdependent.
Since neither realist nor liberal—or, in Rummel’s terms, libertarian—hopes for
peace based on economic interdependence, prosperity, and democracy present a full
picture of world politics, one has to face the question whether realist and liberal
convictions can be reconciled. A prerequisite for reconciling these seemingly
irreconcilable views might be the recognition of spheres of influence (Etzioni,
2015).4 During the Cold War the Western alliance system was something like an
American sphere of influence, and according to Brzezinski (1997: 53) this remained
true beyond it, whereas the Warsaw Pact was the Soviet sphere of influence.
Deterrence could work because both sides understood where the red lines were.
Recognition of spheres of influence comes easily to realists, but is more difficult for
liberals or peace researchers who are interested in human rights and democracy. But
the capitalist peace, including the democratic peace, may be attainable only, if the
West recognizes that non-democratic great powers, including Russia, insist on
maintaining spheres of influence. Except for North Korea and the South China Sea
the outlines of China’s sphere of influence are not yet clarified. In Moscow or
Beijing, a Western denial of Russian or Chinese spheres of influence looks indis-
tinguishable from a Western claim to global hegemony.
7.4 Beyond Rummel: Dovish Realism
Russia always considered the Ukraine to be part of its sphere. Western attempts to
offer the Ukraine, but not Russia itself, the long-run prospect of EU or even NATO
membership could only alienate Russia. Western economic sanctions against Russia
cannot promote the economic interdependence and common prosperity on which a
capitalist peace between Europe or the West and Russia might be built. Nor would
Western sanctions promote democracy in Russia. Only Western recognition of the
Ukraine being a part of Moscow’s sphere of influence might give interdependence
between Europe or the West on the one hand and Russia and the Ukraine on the other
hand a chance to reduce tensions and to promote peace. As suggested by a Russian
writer associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Lukin, 2014: 93),
‘Finlandization’ of the Ukraine might be one way to reconcile Western and Russian
4Copeland (2015) provides an alternative approach. In his argument, the pacifying impact derives
from expectations about the future rather than from the present state of affairs. I cannot imagine
that Western sanctions today make Russians, or even the Chinese, more likely to expect lasting
benefits from interdependence with the West.
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interests. Whereas Finns were personally as free as Western citizens, the West
accepted during the Cold War that Finnish NATO membership would be incom-
patible with Russian national interest. If the West succeeded in making the Ukraine
part of the EU and the West, this would be perceived by Russians as a new ‘iron
curtain’ dividing the traditional Russian empire. Alienating Russia by expanding the
West into the Ukraine without co-opting Russia at the same time would be aWestern
gift to China because China could welcome Russia in its sphere of influence.5
In essence, advocates of sanctions against Russia neglect many types of cost.
First, they forget that Russia might become a partner of a rising China. Second, they
forget that sanctions necessarily reduce economic interdependence between Russia
and the West and thereby weaken a pacifying factor, possibly the only pacifying
factor, in Russian-Western relations. Western sanctions against Russia are even
likely to undermine the Chinese hope for future resource or market access within
the Western sphere of influence and thereby reduce even the prospects of
Western-Chinese peace. Third, advocates of sanctions forget the boomerang effect
(Coyne & Hall, 2014) or the impact of sanctions on the character of Western
economies. Inevitably, sanctions require Western governments to expand regulation
and to interfere even more with the economy. It is dubious whether bigger gov-
ernment is the solution to Western economic problems. Should the West incur these
costs, if there is very little hope that sanctions work and achieve their objectives?6
As Huntington (1996) has underlined, the United States and Europe (including
Poland and the Baltic states) belong to the same civilization. From this perspective,
the Atlantic Alliance looks natural, certainly more natural than Putin’s vision of a
Greater Europe running from Lisbon to Vladivostok where Russia could hope to play
a leading role.7 From an American perspective and, possibly, from a British per-
spective, too, a united Greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok would transform
the fruits of victory in two world wars and the succeeding cold war into a nightmare.
Gray (1986: 17) has characterized the foreign policy goals of the Anglophone
sea-powers in these terms: ‘The same rationale that for four hundred years moved
5Here, I strongly disagree with Brzezinski (1997: 56) who argues: ‘If a choice must be made
between a larger Europe-Atlantic system and a better relationship with Russia, the former must
rank higher.’ But I do endorse the view of Mearsheimer (2014b: 87): ‘The United States and its
allies should abandon their plan to westernize Ukraine and instead aim to make it a neutral buffer
between NATO and Russia, akin to Austria’s position during the Cold War.’
6According to the empirical literature (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott & Oegg, 1997; Morgan, Bapat &
Krustev, 2009; Pape, 1997; Whang & Kim, 2015) contentions about their effectiveness vary, but
include some devastating comments, such as: ‘In most cases a state imposing sanctions on its
opponent can expect an outcome that is just about the same as would be obtained without sanctions.’
(Morgan & Schwebach, 1997: 46) Moreover, even Hufbauer et al. who do assert that economic
sanctions sometimes work, admit that they tend to be least effective against strong, stable, autocratic,
and hostile targets. As Simes (2014: 11) pointed out, even resolute sanctions against Cuba, North
Korea, Iraq, or Iran did not produce the desired result. One should expect Russia to be somewhat less
vulnerable to sanctions than these much smaller countries. The American oil embargo against Japan
before World War II may even have contributed to the subsequent war.
7Lukin (2015: 65) recently called for ‘a pan-European center of power based on three legs: Paris,
Berlin and Moscow’.
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British statesmen to join or organize coalitions to deny continental hegemony, has
been the publicly under-acknowledged geopolitical Leitmotiv for American inter-
national security policy since 1917 (though with an extensive lapse in the interwar
period). A continental super-state would be able, if unopposed by land, to translate
superior land power into what might become superior sea power … From a geopo-
litical perspective, the Soviet challenge to American security is the same as was the
German.’ If one puts aside the demographic weakness of most of Europe as well as of
Russia, then Putin’s plans for Greater Europe—though unlikely ever to be realized—
would be a worse challenge to Atlantic sea-power than previous historical challenges.
One should also consider, however, that the inclusion of Russia in a Chinese sphere of
influence might be even worse from an American perspective than Putin’s dreams
about Eurasia. Given the decline of Europe and Japan, and the economic head-start of
China over India, future struggles for hegemony will put China against the United
States. A core issue of the future hegemonic rivalry concerns whether the Russian
natural resource treasure chest will become more easily accessible to Europe and the
West or to China. By not conceding a sphere of influence to Russia now, in Ukraine
and elsewhere in Russia’s near-abroad, the West might push Russia into a nascent
Chinese sphere. Simultaneously, Western economic sanctions against Russia might
teach ascending China the lesson that economic interdependence with theWest might
be incompatible with its national interest.
7.5 Rummel’s Strategic Environment and Ours
Rudy’s research program and his strategic views evolved during the cold war.
Bipolarity and the mutual balance of terror looked like persistent characteristics of the
strategic environment. Under these conditions, the tension between libertarianism or
the promotion of the democratic peace and deterrence or balancing the Soviet Union
was limited. Libertarianism and the democratic peace were applicable within the
West. Realism and the need for ‘security by superiority’ were essential towards the
Soviet Union. Currently, the strategic situation is different. Bipolarity has gone, the
Soviet Union has disappeared. But China is rising. Of course, no one can know,
whether Rudy would have made an argument like this or developed an entirely
different one. But we do know that he would have had a definite view on the
Ukrainian crisis and been outspoken about it. Ultimately, his legacy is his example.
He was not afraid of a new research paradigm, nor of offending the strategic con-
sensus of the multitude who never even thought of doing research.
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Soon after it was published, a perspicacious review of R.J. Rummel’sUnderstanding
Conflict and War (UCW)1 predicted that the work would ‘not have the immediate
impact… that one might otherwise expect from a work of such scope written by one
of the more famous names in the field’ (Ray, 1982: 185). By 1988, Rummel himself
acknowledged regarding UCW that ‘I did not expect it to be a hit’, but that ‘I was not
prepared … for UCW to be so widely ignored’ (personal correspondence).
Nevertheless, Rummel received 15 research grants, authored over 70 articles,
and 21 books, one of which (Applied Factor Analysis, 1970), was selected by the
Institute of Scientific Information as a ‘Citation Classic’, so the point here is not that
Rummel in general labored in vain or in obscurity. But subsequent to the publi-
cation of UCW, the democratic peace proposition received an enormous amount of
attention. Unfortunately, even when Rummel’s contribution to the formulation and
exposition of this idea is recognized, the specific citations are usually limited to a
couple of derivative articles, published after UCW (i.e., Rummel 1983, 1985). And
Rummel’s role in bringing the democratic peace proposition to the fore is far from
universally recognized. For example, Spiro (1994: 50) asserts that ‘the absence of
wars among liberal democracies was noted before (Doyle, 1983), but it was not
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seen as confirmation of any particular theory’, an intriguing statement in light of the
five volumes of theoretical (as well as metaphysical and epistemological) elabo-
ration upon which the democratic peace proposition is based in UCW.
The point of this chapter is that, especially in light of the subsequent level of
interest in the democratic peace proposition, perhaps there are additional aspects of
UCW that merit a more thorough consideration than they have received to date.
I will highlight some of the theoretical notions and empirical implications to be
found in UCW that are arguably especially undeserving of the absence of attention
they have received. A special emphasis will be placed on the aspects of UCW that
resonate with more current work, in complementary or competing ways.
8.2 UCW: Structure and Main Themes
The first of Rummel’s five volumes, The Dynamic Psychological Field, addresses
basic questions regarding human behavior. Rummel argues that it is a function of
dispositions weighted by expectations, and also of personality weighted by per-
ceived situations. He then places individuals within a sociocultural context,
stressing that personality, society, and culture form a continuous whole, and that
they interact within a ‘field’. It is here, too, that Rummel begins to develop a theme
about the importance of status as a determinant of an individual’s behavior.
This first volume also dwells at some length on the question of whether or not
people have a ‘free will’. He feels that most social scientists tend to see the behavior
of human beings as determined. He resolves this dilemma for social science, at least
to his own satisfaction, by arguing that the human will is free at the underlying level
of ‘things-in-themselves’, while at the level of phenomena it is determined, thus
making it a suitable target for scientific investigation. The first volume concludes
with the development of a metaphysical, epistemological framework called ‘in-
tentional humanism’, which integrates human perceptions, attitudes, personality
traits, and needs with sociocultural, physical, and biophysical surroundings.
In the second volume, The Conflict Helix, Rummel focuses on human interac-
tion, and on the impact of distance with respect to status on relationships between
social entities. He also differentiates between types of power. Bargaining power is
distinguished from coercive power, and from authoritative power. What distin-
guishes national societies from each other most fundamentally, according to
Rummel, is the type of power that is most prevalent in relationships within those
societies. Bargaining power is the basis for exchange societies; authoritative power
predominates in closed, aristocratic, or traditional societies; while coercive power is
the most important distinguishing characteristic of totalitarian political systems, in
which elites use such power to propel society toward some ideologically inspired
goal. Rummel’s analysis of empirical data leads him to conclude that these ideal
types do in fact conform to the existence of exchange (or libertarian, or democratic),
authoritative, and totalitarian political systems in the ‘real world’.
In the third volume, Conflict in Perspective, Rummel compares his theory of
conflict and violencewith others, and concludes that his is superior to or subsumes the
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most prominent alternatives. He argues that his theory suggests that aggression is
both instinctive and learned. Rummel, like Marx, argues that class conflict is
important in most societies; however, for Rummel the two most fundamentally
important classes are the rulers, on the one hand, and the ruled, on the other. He feels
that cross-pressures among groups can mitigate such conflict in exchange societies,
but in others class conflict between the rulers and the ruled is also potentially, and
often in fact, dramatically violent. Only decentralization, or ‘democracy’, can solve
this problem.
It is in the fourth volume,War, Power, Peace that Rummel deals most specifically
with international relations in general and international conflict in particular. He
offers propositions, as opposed to hypotheses about conflict, which he defines as
‘definite affirmations about conflict grounded in a perspective on man’s psychology,
society, and conflict’ (Rummel, 1979: 211), that is, statements that are more definitive
and less tentative than hypotheses. There are 54 propositions in all, 33 of which focus
specifically on the causes and conditions of conflict. It is in this volume where the
democratic peace, or the interdemocratic peace proposition, is first presented.
The Just Peace, the final volume, is devoted to an effort to demonstrate how
Rummel’s theory of conflict can have a profound impact on the future of interna-
tional politics. ‘My answer …’, he asserts at the outset of the volume, can be put
simply: ‘promote freedom’ (Rummel, 1981: 15). He defends this answer through the
development of a social contract model. That model relies importantly on a first
principle of John Rawls, which is that a society should be devised and structured in
such a way as self-interested people would have it structured if they are ignorant of
their own interests and the positions and advantages they would have in that society.
8.3 UCW: System-level Propositions
Neither Rummel’s work in general, nor UCW in particular, is generally perceived to
be particularly relevant to theoretical nor research concerns focused on the inter-
national systemic level of analysis. Nevertheless, there are systemic level implica-
tions of the theoretical approach to conflict developed in UCW that are among its
unexploited aspects. Among the 33 basic ‘theoretical propositions on the causes and
conditions of international conflict behavior’, there are two that focus on the rela-
tionship between polarity and international conflict. The first is ‘polarity stimulates
intense violence’, (Rummel, 1979: 284), and the other is ‘polarity inhibits nonviolent
conflict and low level violence’, (Rummel, 1979: 288). Though these appear
contradictory, in fact they jointly posit a curvilinear relationship. Another related
proposition relevant to analyses of the international system asserts that
‘cross-pressures inhibit intense violence’ (Rummel, 1979: 290).
Perhaps the most intriguing derivation from Rummel’s theoretical approach in
UCW regarding the international system is that ‘international relations are an
exchange society with a libertarian political system’ (Rummel, 1979: 431), and that,
accordingly, ‘international relations could be better characterized as a state of
peace’ (Rummel, 1979: 46). Rummel follows up on the implications of such
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assertions and concludes that in general international politics are on average less
violent than domestic politics. He asserts that ‘political regimes-governments-have
probably murdered nearly 170,000,000 of their own citizens and foreigners in this
century-about four times the number killed in all international and domestic wars
and revolutions’ (Rummel, 1995a: 3).
The implication of Rummel’s theory that international politics are on average
less violent than domestic politics certainly qualifies as one of those
counter-intuitive findings that are supposed to be a hallmark of valid and valuable
theory.2 A related counter-intuitive notion would assert that international law,
contrary to continual disparaging remarks to the contrary about it, is actually more
effective than domestic law.
In sum, Rummel’s UCW has intriguing, mostly unexplored implications for
analyses of international politics on the systemic level of analysis.
8.4 Dyadic-level Propositions in UCW
and Contemporary Research
Rummel is appropriately identified as a theorist most intently focused on the dyadic
level of analysis, and the proposition in UCW that has received the most attention
(even if by many who are only dimly aware of UCW), asserts that ‘violence does
not occur between free societies’ (Rummel, 1979: 374).3
Quite consistently, Rummel refers to the ‘free societies’ as ‘libertarian’ rather
than ‘democratic’. ‘Libertarian’ states, by his definition, must rely to a substantial
extent on ‘free markets.’ In other words, socialist states, even if they are ‘demo-
cratic,’ are not ‘libertarian,’ and therefore may not, in his view be peaceful in their
relationships with each other. This theme in UCW is arguably an important precursor
to arguments emphasizing the pacifying impact of free markets or capitalism, even as
opposed to ‘democracy’ per se (Gartzke, 2007; Mousseau, 2013). Mousseau in
particular, emphasizes the pacifying impact of the degree of ‘contract intensity’ in a
society. Rummel (1976: 310) asserts that an essential feature of ‘libertarianism’ to
which he attributes significant pacifying impact is the ‘freedom to contract’.
But there are other dyadic-level propositions in UCW that deserve more atten-
tion, partly because they overlap with other important sectors of research on
international conflict. This might suggest that the framework developed in UCW
has untapped potential to integrate, or even subsume, those other approaches.
For example, an ‘age-old theme of international politics’ suggests that ‘uneven
rates of growth in power are the fundamental cause of both war and change in the
2‘A beautiful model is unpredictable. It produces some interesting implications that are surprising
to us’ (Lave & March, 1975: 61–62).
3Rummel goes on to explain that ‘violence should almost never occur between exchange societies
due to cross-pressures, the diversity of internal groups and interests, and the limited and responsive
nature of libertarian government … In other words, pluralistic democracies with limited govern-
ment form islands of nonviolent relations’ (1979: 374).
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international system’ (Schweller, 1992: 237). The roots of the idea go back at least to
Thucydides. More recently, the idea has been espoused in terms of hegemonic
stability theory (Gilpin, 1981), long cycle theory (Modelski, 1978; Goldstein, 1988;
Thompson, 1988), theories about preventive war (Levy, 1987), power cycle theory
(Doran & Parsons, 1980), and power transition theory (Organski, 1968; Organski &
Kugler, 1980). These theories have had a definite tendency to focus on major powers
and the impact of transitions as well as re-distributions of power on the international
system as a whole; therefore, many of them are perceived as system level theories
(see, for example, Midlarsky, 1989). But they focus most intently on dynamics of
interaction involving pairs of states. In addition, recent evidence suggests that the
logic and impact of power transitions, for example, are not necessarily restricted to
major powers, or world hegemons and challengers (Lemke, 1995).
The approach to international conflict developed by Rummel resonates with,
could be integrated with, and might even be interpreted as subsuming all of these
strands of theoretical work and empirical analyses focusing on the impact of
changes in power ratios between states. The first three of the 33 theoretical
propositions on the causes and conditions of international conflict behavior pre-
sented by Rummel in Volume 4 of UCW are as follows: (1) Conflict Behavior
occurs if and only if a mutual structure of expectations is disrupted; (2) Tension and
hostility occur if there is a significant shift in the ‘balance of powers’; and
(3) Conflict Behavior occurs only if there is a significant shift in the ‘balance of
powers’ (Rummel, 1979: 262). These propositions bear an obvious relationship to
others focusing on the impact of changes in power distributions or ratios.
The relationship is made even stronger by two additional propositions constituting
the theoretical edifice developed in UCW, i.e., ‘Power parity is correlated with
war’, and ‘An actual or growing weakness of the status quo party compared to the
anti-status quo party is particularly correlated with violence’ (Rummel, 1979: 264).
Another recent stream of research on international conflict and war has focused
on recurring crises and enduring rivalries. Leng (1983, 1993), for example, has
analyzed the impact of recurrent crises on the bargaining behavior of the disputants,
and vice versa. Gochman & Maoz (1984) note that a large portion of the world’s
militarized conflict is accounted for by a relatively small number of pairs of states
that have come to be known as ‘enduring rivals’ (Goertz & Diehl, 1992, 1993).
All of this research is obviously congruent with a basic aspect of the theory of
conflict developed by Rummel in UCW, namely that ‘conflict is helixal’. More
specifically, Rummel argues that ‘no conflict begins … de novo, without history.
Leaders and peoples learn. Each conflict is informed by previous ones … Each
successive turn from cooperation to conflict to conflict is at a higher level of
experience and insight between the parties; each turn incorporates what was learned
before’ (Rummel, 1979: 337). There certainly appears here to be substantial room
for progress toward theoretical integration of recent work on recurring crises and
enduring rivalries and the approach toward international conflict developed by
Rummel in UCW.
Another important strand of research on conflict between pairs of states
emphasizes the impact of geographic contiguity or proximity as well as territory.
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The impact of territorial changes on conflicts between states ties in nicely with
research focusing on recurring crises or enduring rivalries. For example, Goertz &
Diehl (1992) report that the likelihood of a subsequent conflict between enduring
rivals if an episode in the rivalry involves territorial change is affected by various
characteristics of that territory and the process by which it is transferred. Similarly
Hensel (1994: 281) finds that for enduring rivalries involving Latin American states
from 1816 to 1986, ‘conflict between the same two adversaries is … more likely
when territorial issues are under contention’.
Vasquez (1993) cites several sources pointing out the important impact of
contiguity on the probability of war between states (such as Wallensteen, 1981;
Diehl, 1985; and Bremer, 1992; another important source of support for the idea is
Maoz & Russett, 1993). From this, Vasquez infers the key significance of territory
and territorial disputes as factors explaining why some disputes escalate to inter-
national war and others do not. Finally, and more recently, Gibler (2012) argues
that stable borders are a key to peace. He also argues that stable borders create a
spurious relationship between democracy and peace, and thus differentiates his
work from Rummel’s approach to conflict in striking manner.4
Nevertheless, Gibler’s work and the entire set of research and theoretical notions
regarding the impact of territorial issues and contiguity on international war could be,
but virtually never is seen as important validation for the theoretical approach to
international conflict developed byRummel in UCW.One of the basic 33 propositions
there on the causes of international conflict is ‘geographic distance is negatively
correlated with conflict behavior’ (Rummel, 1979: 263). Rummel also asserts
unequivocally in UCW: ‘We thus have three types of status quo: territorial, contrac-
tual, and behavioral. It is only attempts to change the territorial status quo by hostile
states that risks violence and war.’ (Rummel, 1979: 177, emphasis in the original)
Recent research on the impact of regime type on conflict between states has
taken note of the importance not only of democracy, but of the distance, or dif-
ferences between states in regime type, to an understanding of the conflict prone-
ness of those states. Oneal & Ray (1997: 751) conclude, for example, that ‘the
political distance separating states along the democracy-autocracy continuum is an
important indicator of the likelihood of dyadic conflict …’ Bremer (1996: 28)
comes to the similar conclusion that ‘political dissimilarity [that is, differences
between democracies and autocracies] seems to encourage conflict …’. These
findings support Rummel’s (1979: 296) argument that ‘differences (distance vec-
tors) in wealth, power and politics are of all differences the most correlated with
conflict behavior …’ and that ‘power, wealth and political distance reflect the
primary lines of opposition among … states’.
Russett (1995a, b: 268–269) notes that three recent important works on inter-
national conflict (Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman, 1992; Maoz, 1990; Vasquez,
1993), have in common the notion that foreign policy decision making ‘may vary
with international context… But in no case is it purely endogenous to the
4However, Rummel’s emphasis on the importance of a stable status quo to the preservation of
peace discussed above is quite congruent with Gibler’s work on the impact of stable borders.
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international system…’. Russett goes on to point out that ‘the process is likely to be
markedly different for different countries. And the process is also importantly
interdependent as a dyadic phenomenon.’ By this point, the relevance of UCW to
this characteristic theme in these three volumes regarding the impact of domestic
politics on foreign policy choices, and regarding the importance of analyzing these
choices within a dyadic context, should need no more elaboration.
8.5 National-level Hypotheses in UCW
Whether or not democratic states are less war prone, period (a national-level idea)
rather than just less war prone in their relationships with each other (a dyadic-level
idea) is one of the most important questions to consider in the context of a dis-
cussion of Rummel’s work on international conflict.5 Chan (1984) and Weede
(1984) challenged Rummel’s proposition that libertarianism correlates negatively
with degrees of foreign violence, even though neither of them directly evaluated
that idea. (Their models focused on war involvement as a dichotomous variable,
rather than degrees of violence.) Those articles constitute an important part of the
core of findings that lead to the continually repeated assertion that while democratic
states do not fight wars against each other, they are as war prone and conflict prone
as autocratic states (for two important examples, see Levy, 1988: 661–662 and
Gleditsch, 1992: 369–370).
So, the casual, or even the careful reader might understandably conclude that
Rummel is a voice in the wilderness calling out against the virtually unanimous
opinion and overwhelming evidence that democracies are not less war prone, or
conflict prone than nondemocratic states, even though they do not fight wars against
each other. But in fact there is substantial evidence to support Rummel’s argument
that democratic states are less prone to violence, escalation and war than
undemocratic states in general, not just in their relationships with each other.
A partial list of sources of that evidence would include Geller (1985), Maoz &
Russett (1992), Maoz & Abdolali (1989), Morgan & Schwebach (1992), Bueno de
Mesquita & Lalman (1992), Bremer (1992), Rousseau, Gelpi, Reiter & Huth
(1996), and Benoit (1996) in the more recent era, as well as East & Gregg (1967),
Salmore & Hermann (1969), and Zinnes & Wilkenfeld (1971) from earlier decades.
Huth (1996: 187), in effect, speaks for all of these sources when he concludes that
‘the findings in this book challenge the conventional wisdom that democratic states
are only more pacific in their political and military relations with other democracies
…’. If true, this finding tends to disconfirm all those theoretical approaches that
imply that democratic states are more peaceful only in their relationships with each
other, while it provides support for Rummel’s theoretical arguments.
Another reason that Rummel’s approach in UCW in general, as well as its
national-level ideas in particular, may be deserving of more attention has to do with
5This section relies extensively on a discussion in Chap. 1 of Ray (1995).
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the apparent increasing prevalence of intranational, as opposed to international
violence in the contemporary international system. Interpretations of this trend
should take into account the fact that intrastate wars have been considerably more
common that interstate wars for a long time. Sarkees & Wayman (2010: 564–565)
report that there were 95 interstate wars between 1816 and 2007, while during that
same time period there were 335 intrastate wars. Furthermore, there were more
interstate war onsets than intrastate war onsets in only one decade during this time
period (1937–46). Nevertheless 229 out of the 335 intrastate wars occurring between
1816 and 2007 (or 68%) have taken place just since 1982, while only 13 interstate
wars began during that same time period. Granted, this proliferation of intrastate
wars in recent decades might be accounted for in part by the larger number of states
coming into existence in that time period. But the number of pairs of states that in
principle could have become involved in interstate wars increased much more
rapidly in those same decades. If we focus on the most recent data, we see that ‘what
stands out in the 21st century is the lack of large-scale interstate conflict’ (Pettersson
& Wallensteen, 2015: 537). In 2014 specifically, there were 40 armed conflicts
resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths, only one of which was an interstate
conflict. In that same year, there were 11 wars, with at least 1,000 battle-related
deaths, all of which were intrastate conflicts. It is particularly interesting, then, that
Rummel (1994, 1995a) turned his attention to domestic political strife, and that he
did so in a way based on the theoretical approach to conflict developed in UCW.
8.6 Conclusion
One of the basic 33 propositions on the causes and conditions of conflict behavior
in UCW asserts that ‘intense violence will occur only if there is an expectation of
success’ (Rummel, 1979: 263). In spite of this potentially important overlap
between the approach to conflict developed in UCW and rational choice theories,
for example, Rummel’s theory is not ‘formal’. ‘The … theory presented here’,
Rummel (1979: 211) observes, ‘… is a comprehensive perspective involving hard
theory (equations and explicit logic) integrated within a philosophical, metasocial
and intuitive framework.’ Even though Rummel’s approach is not reducible to an
‘axiomatic system’, he does provide 33 propositions on conflict that are closely
inter-related, and based on an extensively developed theoretical, as well as epis-
temological (even metaphysical) framework. A substantial portion of the theoretical
and empirical work in the field of international relations today is either formal in
nature, or when it moves beyond bivariate theoretical notions, has a tendency to
bring in additional factors and hypotheses in a basically arbitrary (even if usually
intuitively plausible) or ad hoc fashion. In UCW, Rummel may provide not only a
valuable source of theoretical guidance and inspiration. Analysts who want to
develop better theory, but are disinclined for whatever reason to rely on formal
methods need an alternative. RJ Rummel’s Understanding Conflict and War may
provide such an alternative.
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Chapter 9
Rummel and Singer, DON and COW
Frank Whelon Wayman
When the scientific revolution in the study of international relations (IR) started in
the 1960s, two prominent early pioneers who had particularly lasting impact on the
field were Rudolph J. Rummel and J. David Singer.1 Each led an enormous data
project gathering information on sovereign states across the entire world over many
decades, up to their time. Rummel’s enterprise was the Dimensionality of Nations
(DON) Project, while Singer’s was the Correlates of War (COW) Project. This
essay explains how the differences in these two projects have affected the study of
world politics down to the present day. If so, in the future, the productivity of the
field will depend in part on our understanding of the contrasting views of Rummel
and Singer, which continue to affect what we are currently doing, and have
implications for what we should do next.
To Rummel the regime (and, later, the pairing of regimes, or ‘dyad’) was the
place to start in the study of warfare, genocide, and related mass killing, whereas to
Singer the central point was the inter-state system in which various regimes (called
state system members) were embedded.
Rummel’s theoretical orientation, field theory, was similar to Singer’s, general
systems theory. Compared to most theories of the time (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff,
1990), field and systems theory are relatively vague, providing a general orientation
rather than predictions. This open architecture was part of the appeal of these
frameworks to folks like Singer, who wanted empirically driven results rather than
a priori pontification, and to develop datasets that were multi-theoretic in the sense
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of being able to test warring hypotheses from different contending schools of IR.
There are differences between system and field, in that a system has directed
relations among its component parts, with feedback (e.g., A attacks B, B defeats A,
B changes the system, establishing an international organization to try to prevent
attacks; or A attacks B because of a certain systemic power distribution, then war
changes the power distribution, affecting the probability of subsequent wars),
whereas in field theory there usually is not such a ‘cybernetic’ set of relationships
and feedback loops. Instead, in a force field, there can be continuous pair-wise
repulsion or attraction.
As explained in his five-volume study, Understanding Conflict and War,
Rummel (1975) organized his thinking around a certain type of field theory. In
practice, fields involve variables whose associations or correlations have an angular
expression, which leads to Rummel’s (1970) most widely-cited publication,
Applied Factor Analysis, about a statistical tool for determining the number of
dimensions in a space we need to study, and telling us the coordinates of the
variables and cases in the resulting or ‘reduced’ space. A field can be a geographic
grid, such as a farmer’s field or the longitudes and latitudes of Earth; an abstract,
mathematical expression of this, such as the Cartesian coordinates; or a force field
in such a spatial array, in which forces acting at a distance, such as electromag-
netism or gravity, pull objects around. Rummel (1975) distinguishes ‘a region of
space’ from ‘the area in which a force operates’, and says the former undergirds
spatial theory, the latter, field theory. He is concerned with ‘intentional’ fields that
one would find in psychological and social work (the latter including Wright,
1955).
This orientation became central to Rummel’s DON project. Rummel earned his
Ph.D. at Northwestern University, where he developed DON for his dissertation
while under the tutelage of Harold Guetzkow, one of the pioneers in the behavioral
revolution in international relations. Guetkow was searching for cross-national data
for his Inter-Nation Simulation, and this led him to imagine what became the DON
Project. In that crucible, ‘the earliest event-data project of major proportions began
in 1962 … [when] Rummel assembled data … originally for use in Harold
Guetzkow’s Inter-Nation Simulation’ (Merritt, Muncaster & Zinnes, 1993: 4). By
contrast, Singer’s COW Project, launched the next year, was Singer’s own idea
from the outset, and as such would become a more central and hence more per-
sistent part of Singer’s professional identity and life work.
After Rummel had dealt with missing data by an iterative process—beginning
with variables that had little missing data, and then gradually filling in estimates of
values for the other variables, a phase one of the project emerged, with nations
placed in a multidimensional space of numbered factors. There was a lack of
association between domestic instability and foreign conflict. At the start of his
career, however, Rummel (1966) indicated where he was going with this null
finding; his words anticipated DON’s phase two, the dyadic studies:
Foreign conflict behavior is not internally derived. Its genesis lies outside the
nation. It is a relational phenomenon depending on the degree of economic, social,
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and political similarity between nations. … Whether conflict actually occurs
depends in part on the social and value distances between the nations.
Rummel’s example is dyadic: ‘Even nations that participate very little in the
international system may have great conflict with each other if they are contiguous
while having a great social and value distance between them (e.g. Israel and Syria)’.
Staying this course of looking at dyadic relations, Rummel (1983) eventually
published the law that followed from it, the inter-democratic peace.
At Rummel’s website, the dominant theme is that power kills (http://www.
hawaii.edu/powerkills/). As he began one of his books (Rummel, 1994: 1), ‘Power
kills; absolute power kills absolutely. This new Power Principle is the message
emerging from my previous work on the causes of war and from this work on
genocide and government mass murder … The more power a government has, the
more it can act arbitrarily.’
A major supporting idea is the term regime, as operationalized by Rummel
(1995) and used as the organizing principle for his datasets on ‘democide—geno-
cide and mass murder’ (Rummel, 1998: 1). This idea of a regime is important to his
work because there is a lot of variation from regime to regime in the regime’s
amount of power, and also in the number of people the regime kills. And Rummel’s
dominant theme is that those two characteristics of a regime (power and deaths)
co-vary. In my own ordinary language, a regime is a type of government controlling
a state apparatus. As Rummel (1995: 9) says, ‘The changes from the Kaiser
monarchy to the Weimar Republic to Hitler’s rule… give us three different German
regimes. … I count 432 distinct state regimes during the period from 1900 to 1987’.
Hence, there would be the czarist regime in Russia until 1917, and then the com-
munist regime from 1917 to 1991. Between February and October 1917, there
should I think be a transition period and transitional regime (under Kerensky).
Individual rulers, such as general secretaries Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev, and
their governments, do not represent distinct regimes of their own, but instead are all
leaders, successively, of different administrations in the communist regime.
To me, Rummel’s (1983) article made the first really convincing case for the
inter-liberal or inter-democratic peace. I have since challenged thousands of people,
from classrooms to conferences where I am speaking, to name any other proposi-
tion in the social sciences that is surprising or counter-intuitive, and that has (ac-
cording to its advocates at least) no exceptions. No one has ever been able, in my
presence, to name such a proposition—other than Rummel’s.
The COW Project generated the data for the bulk of the hypothesis tests in IR for
decades (Wayman & Singer, 1990: 247–248). And ‘realist theory informed 90% of
the hypotheses tested by IR scholars up to the 1970s’ (Walker, 2013: 148). It was a
bit of a shock that an anti-realist hypothesis, the inter-democratic peace, had pro-
duced such a paradigm-shattering result. Sadly, I never heard Singer say a good
word about Rummel’s studies confirming the inter-democratic peace hypothesis.
Rummel had used COW data on wars, plus other people’s data on democracy,
Liberalism, and freedom of nations, to contradict one of Singer’s claims (namely,
Singer’s contention that the inter-democratic peace was based on too few cases and
too flawed in other ways to be taken to be true; Small & Singer, 1976). Deciphering
9 Rummel and Singer, DON and COW 83
Singer’s true position on this is complicated. When Geller & Singer (1998) pro-
duced a literature review of scientific studies of international conflict, while they did
caution that the evidence is ‘not indisputable’, they did acknowledge that ‘the
evidence in the area of the joint freedom proposition is consistent and cumulative.
Democratic dyads are less likely to engage in war than are non-democratic pairs’
(Geller & Singer, 1998: 87–88). But on the other hand, on his own at his weekly
COW seminar, Singer was much more skeptical about the inter-democratic peace.
So it is not surprising that, four years after Geller & Singer’s assessment, one of
Singer’s students, Henderson (2002) wrote a book that constituted an attack on the
democratic peace literature. In the opening paragraph, Henderson says, ‘It struck
me as strange that one of the doyen of the behavioral revolution would be such an
avid critic of what some scholars hail as the closest thing to an empirical law in the
field’.
Instead, Singer seemed more interested in the international or interstate system.
While Waltz (1979: 94) defined ‘international political structures in terms of states’,
Singer spoke of ‘the national state as level of analysis’ (Singer, 1961: 82–89). Thus,
whereas Waltz writes of a system whose basic units are sovereign states, Singer
ends up with two systems: an inter-state system and an international system. The
international system consists of entities that have an international political goal
(including … state creation or survival), engage in international political behavior
(including inter-state or extra-state conflict, alliances, trade, or international orga-
nizations), or engage in political behavior that has international consequences (such
as civil wars). The [international] system … includes … terrorist groups (Sarkees &
Wayman, 2010: 27).
Nested within this international system is the interstate system, beginning in
1816, distinguished in terms of ‘recurring international interactions between and
among the interstate system members’ (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010: 16). Singer’s
COW data are organized around a focus on state system membership. Basically,
between 1816 and 1919 an entity is a state system member if it has 500,000 people
or more and is diplomatically recognized at an adequate level by Britain and France,
while after 1919 it is a state if it is a League of Nations or UN member or has
500,000 people and diplomatic recognition by two major powers. (Note that ‘state’
becomes a short-hand for ‘state system member’; Bremer & Ghosn, 2003.)
Much confusion results from the short-hand expressions ‘state’ and ‘system’.
‘Whenever the word “system” was used without a modifier, Singer & Small were
referring to the interstate system’ (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010: 16). Likewise, the
‘states’ whose characteristics are listed in the COW datasets are not the population
of states, but the population of state system members.
Singer’s most widely-cited explanatory articles on interstate war are probably
Deutsch & Singer (1964) and Singer, Bremer & Stuckey (1972). Both operate at the
system level of analysis. It may be that Singer’s devotion to the interstate system is
part of what made him reluctant to embrace the inter-democratic peace. As he said
in another widely-cited article, the international system level of analysis ‘almost
inevitably requires that we postulate a high degree of uniformity in the foreign
policy codes of our national actors’, and ‘the system-oriented approach tends to
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produce a sort of “black box” or “billiard ball” concept of national actors’. This is
consistent with his foreign policy instincts, which were loath to attribute ‘white
hats’ to the ‘free world’ and ‘black hats’ to the Soviet Union, in the assigning of
blame for the dangers to world peace in the Cold War era. Singer’s posture was
very different from Rummel’s, with Rummel in favor of Reagan’s foreign policy
and against détente. In these Cold War contexts, Singer may have been uncom-
fortable with Rummel’s summary that ‘freedom preserves peace and life’.
Singer wrote ‘it is evident that my research and teaching has unambiguously been
problem-driven’, and ‘for reasons that I struggle to articulate, the problem has been,
and remains, that of war’ (Singer, 1990: 2). The COW Project was founded by him at
the University of Michigan in 1963, the year after the world nearly was destroyed,
had the Cuban Missiles Crisis gone badly. International war attracted Singer’s best
efforts at finding the ‘causes of war and conditions of peace’ (1990: 3). As he and
Small put it, their focus is a ‘preoccupation with the elimination of international war
and the possible role of solid explanatory knowledge in that enterprise’ (Small &
Singer, 1982: 17). The first COW war handbook, Wages of War (Singer & Small,
1972) was consequently limited to international wars. Karl Deutsch subsequently
convinced Singer that there was a need for a comparable list of civil wars. This led to
a new handbook, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980, pre-
senting a ‘comprehensive list that will enhance … study of civil wars’ (Small &
Singer, 1982: 204). The civil war list is accompanied with a cautionary note,
‘International war remains our major concern … A research assault on [explanation
of ] civil war … is clearly a task better left to others’ (Small & Singer, 1982: 17).
Consequently, the COW project had many datasets (such as the Militarized Interstate
Dispute dataset) on the correlates of interstate war, but nothing comparable on the
civil war data. Nevertheless, the publication of the civil war data was a valuable
contribution to studies of civil war, and was also a step toward the full delineation of
the totality of modern war. This was followed, in the third COW handbook (Sarkees
& Wayman, 2010) with a definition and list of non-state wars, completing the full
reckoning of the patterns of war in the past two centuries. Also, the focus of Singer
on international war was somewhat vindicated by his co-authored article revealing
that, over the time since the Congress of Vienna, inter-state wars had resulted in 32
million battle deaths, intra-state wars only 18 million (Sarkees, Wayman & Singer,
2003).
Critics often ask if the COW project has a state-centric bias. A more subtle and I
think effective line of inquiry is to ask why the COW project has emphasized
state-system-membership rather than simple sovereignty and independence as the
defining characteristic of the state. This can cause confusion. For example, a
number of non-state wars, including the main phase of one of the deadliest wars in
history, the Taiping Rebellion, have been fought in areas that would be considered
to be states by students of comparative politics. This and other related difficulties
have led pioneers outside the COW project (Gleditsch, 2004; Fazal, 2007), as well
as Singer’s successor at the COW Project (Bremer & Ghosn, 2003) to propose
various revisions and expansions of the concept of the state, to go beyond the COW
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state membership definition. These difficulties and challenges continue to provide
important frontiers for research on war and the state in coming years.
In contrast to Singer, Rummel seems to me to have taken a more inductivist,
practical approach to states and similar entities. On his website, powerkills.com,
one finds a focus on killing, even of one person. The perpetrators are often leaders
of totalitarian states, such as Mao, but can also be rebel leaders (the young Mao) or
a king (Leopold of Belgium) who controls what some call a colony (the Belgian
Congo) but Rummel calls Leopold’s personal property. The unit of analysis
becomes the regime and regime-like power-centers such as Leopold’s Congo or
Mao’s rebel territory.
Rummel (1986) concluded that ‘War isn’t this century’s biggest killer’. As he
said then, ‘About 35,654,000 people have died in this century’s international and
domestic wars, revolutions, and violent conflicts. … The number of people killed
by totalitarian or extreme authoritarian governments already far exceeds that for all
wars, civil and international. Indeed, this number already approximates the number
that might be killed in a nuclear war’. He itemized 95 million killed by communist
governments, but only ‘831,000 killed by free democratic governments’. Those
killed by free democratic governments were always foreigners:
In no case have I found a democratic government carrying out massacres,
genocide and mass executions of its own citizens … Absolutist governments (those
that Freedom House would classify as not free) are not only many times deadlier
than war, but are themselves the major factor causing war and other forms of violent
conflict. They are a major cause of militarism. Indeed, absolutism, not war, is
mankind’s deadliest scourge of all. In light of all this, the peaceful, nonviolent
fostering of civil liberties and political rights must be made mankind’s highest
humanitarian goal … because freedom preserves peace and life (Rummel, 1986).
A foundational premise of the COW Project was well expressed by Singer’s
student, Paul F Diehl, in the opening line of his Presidential address at ISA: ‘War is
the most important subject matter you can study’,2 because of the hundreds of
millions dead in modern war and the trillions of dollars spent on the military every
year. It was a shock to COW then when Rummel (1986) asserted that, in the
catalogue of carnage carried out by modern humans against their own species, war
wasn’t the biggest killer. I agree it is more useful than usually realized to emulate
Rummel and study both war and the slaughter of the innocents with the totality of
such carnage in mind.
We certainly could use more work on the regime, a form of government with a
temporal extent in-between the long-enduring state and the evanescent individual
administration. It would be great to have a Rummel-inspired mutually exclusive and
exhaustive list of regimes; and useful to have more refinements of Rummel’s data
on regimes and democide. Very constructively, Rolseth, Gleditsch & Theisen
(2015) have built a nation-year version of Rummel’s democide data. When Tago
and I, in the footsteps of Rummel and Harff, created our own nation-year dataset on
2For a revised version, see Diehl (2016: 1).
86 F.W. Wayman
wars, genocides, and political characteristics of nations (Wayman & Tago, 2004,
2010), we pored over Rummel’s valuable Statistics of Democide (Rummel, 1998).
We have entries from Rummel 1998—e.g., for Japan 1937–45, Japanese war dead
2,521,000 (Rummel, 1998: 39), and 5,964,000 democide (Rummel, 1998: 46–47).
We can divide them by the number of years (nine in this case), and arrive at a
genocide and mass murder total of 662,667 per year. This would be true of COW
data on a war, too—think of World War I—but it is a little trickier for Rummel.
These data are often aggregated in Rummel (1998) into totals by regime, and, for
instance, the USSR regime lasts from 1917 to the end of his dataset in 1987, and so
it is time-consuming at best to break out the effects in different years (how many
died, e.g., in 1954?) and by government (e.g., Stalin vs. Khrushchev). One could
compare what Tago and I did with the Rolseth, Theisen & Gleditsch data, and then
see if the benefits of more refinements would warrant the costs.
When the first survey of IR scholars was done by Foreign Policy magazine, to
assess who was most influential in their midst (Peterson, Tierney & Maliniak,
2005), Rummel did not make the top twenty-five thinkers; Singer did. Citations to
their work produce similar results—Rummel a tad behind Singer. Realism, often
claiming separation of domestic and international politics, was the only paradigm
with more than one person in that top five. Nothing could be more destructive of
this realist claim than Rummel’s work on regimes, which shows that regime type
matters (Wayman & Diehl, 1994). It is heartening to me that two people who
continued Rummel’s investigation of the inter-democratic peace, Bruce Russett and
Michael Doyle, did make the list of the top IR scholars. Apparently, evidence was
making some headway in undermining old paradigms. This makes me recall the
prediction of Anatol Rapoport, on the trajectory of the COW Project as it was being
launched in 1963. Rapoport said to David Singer ‘we were not likely to come up
with an integrated explanatory theory of war, … but at least we would lay to rest
many of the foolish platitudes that had… led too many nations into the brutal abyss
of war’ (Singer paraphrasing Rapoport, in Sarkees & Wayman, 2010: xiii). The
progress described in this essay, the progress of Rummel’s doing, was based on the
opposite of realism on this point, namely, his insisting on the unity of the study of
international and domestic politics, including an examination of the role of regime
type in mass violence—both democide and the inter-democratic peace.
When he took over from Singer as COW Director, Stuart Bremer convened a
conference at Penn State University, on ‘Future Wars and the Future Study of War’.
Bremer’s keynote address (Bremer & Ghosn, 2003) focused on whether the COW
definition of state was too restrictive, and proposed measuring two dimensions of
statehood, autonomy (stamps, money, military forces, autonomous foreign policy,
size of territory and of population) and recognition (treaties, diplomatic recognition,
participation in international conferences and in IGOs)—more as continuous vari-
ables than dichotomies. If done by COW, would this Herculean endeavor not make
COW a ‘DON’ project?
The non-state wars list of Sarkees & Wayman (2010) has hopefully been a
helpful move in expanding our understanding of armed conflict beyond system
members, but, just to take one example from that book, a list of all sovereign states
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would help us divide the newly listed non-state wars into those internal to and those
external to a given autonomous state.
The 21st century differs from the 20th. There have been no inter-state war onsets
since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The twelve-year gap is the longest since the
18-year lull of 1828–1846. There are 25 war onsets since the end of 2007, for 3.33
onsets per year. That’s the same pace as in Sarkees & Wayman (2010), which
records 3.41 per year. The 25 recent wars are mostly intra-state. Democide is most
closely correlated with intra-state war, less associated with extra-state war, and least
associated with inter-state war (Wayman & Tago, 2010: 13). So far in the 21st
century then, we have intra-state wars, causing great harm to civilian populations.
The totalitarianism of the Nazis, Stalin, and Mao largely passed from the scene even
before the end of the Cold War. War and death of the innocents continue, but not
exactly as in the day of Rummel and Singer. With warfare now more civil, and the
civilian deaths less from communist gulags, and more connected to insurgent and
counter-guerrilla fighting, it seems that the tide has swung more around to the views
of Harff & Gurr (1988) and Harff (2003). Harff warned that ‘geno-politicide’ was
continuing at an alarming rate, and was predictable from a set of six variables—e.g.,
authoritarian regimes, but also civil war and lack of openness to international trade.
While it would be great to have Rummel’s democide data updated from 1987 (when
he retired it), in the meantime we are well-served by war data and Harff’s
geno-politicide data, both of which fit well into the post-Cold-War narrative of civil
war and geno-politicide.
As one indication of the enduring legacy of Rummel and Singer, in the judgment
of Moore (1995), first director of the US Institute of Peace, the greatest advances in
the study of war and peace included (1) Wright’s pioneering organization of the
field, A Study of War; (2) the project that Wright inspired, COW; (3) the recognition
of the human, governmental, and international systemic levels of analysis through
the impact of Waltz’s Man, the State, and War; and (4) the discovery of the first
powerful and surprising regularity in the field, the proposition of the
inter-democratic peace, by Rummel. Shakespeare wrote, ‘The evil that men do lives
after them. The good is oft interred with their bones’. Oft interred, but not always.
Further good will yet come, I think, from Singer’s and Rummel’s work.
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Rummel’s pioneering work is giving us a revolutionary, practical solution to vio-
lence between states (war) and between people and state (democide): democracy.
He finds ‘regime type’ (kind of government) to be one of the strongest explanations
for war and democide because it deals with restraining government power. The
solution is revolutionary because it challenges existing ways of looking at the
world, and practical because it is within the capability of states and the international
system to accomplish.
Here is Rummel (2005a) on how regime type matters:
I do believe that some governments are better than others; that the current German gov-
ernment is morally superior to Hitler’s, contemporary Russia’s to Stalin’s, and Japan’s to its
militarist government of World War II. Indeed, I believe that the government that best
promotes the development of its people in terms of their own interests and capabilities,
while minimizing internal and foreign violence and democide, as does democracy, is better
than those that don’t. This is my prejudice and sense of social justice.
This regime-based approach is superficially known as ‘no wars between
democracies,’ but not yet fully grasped. This despite Russett (1993: 138), who
closes with ‘But if the chance for wider democratization can be grasped and con-
solidated, international politics might be transformed,’ and ‘A system created by
autocracies centuries ago might now be recreated by a critical mass of democratic
states.’ These two ‘might’ statements have not yet transformed international poli-
tics nor recreated the international system, and the democratic peace remains in
limbo.
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Rummel’s work is an integrated worldview: its foundation is that the kind of
government is of utmost importance to its own citizens (will our government kill
us?) and other countries (will there be war?), so Rummel can by synthesized:
regime type matters. This bridges the empirical democratic peace with a powerful
prescription: if you want peace, and life, you must choose the regime type that
protects it best: democracy.
From this worldview comes one general principle, that democracy is a powerful
and reliable method of nonviolence, and five associated propositions, best set forth
in Rummel (1997): first, a pair of democracies do not make war on each other;
second, the more democratic any two countries, the less their bilateral violence; and
third, the more democratic a country, the fewer its own casualties in war. These are
about international relations. The fourth is internal: the more democratic a country,
the less internal political violence. Finally, the more democratic a country, the less
its democide.
Ending war and mass murder, and building positive peace, are the highest goals
of secular life, and because Rummel offers empirically valid, theoretically sound,
practical solutions to that end, I view Rummel as one of the most important thinkers
of the 20th century.
To understand this I have found Chadwick’s (2006) Goal-Drift-Actual framework
invaluable. The GDA model centers on science, philosophy, and praxis, integrating
political science (the empirical, what we know), political philosophy (theory, our
understanding and convictions), and political action (what we do). The GDA is a
powerful alternative to Johan Galtung’s Diagnosis-Prognosis-Therapy (DPT) model,
which treats human interactions as illnesses to be cured. The GDA is less arrogant,
lacking the DPTs presumptive privilege of the analyst as wise doctor, and from a
power-limiting, freedom-favoring perspective, the GDA is a preferred model.
Using the GDA to look at Rummel’s work we find extensive political science in
his robust empirical work that was essential to establish the democratic peace. There
is highly developed political philosophy, from the ‘the conflict helix’ (Rummel,
1991), to the three levels of explanation for democracy as a method of nonviolence
(Rummel, 1997). Regarding praxis, Rummel argues that because of the science of
the democratic peace, and the conviction that democracy reliably reduces violence,
there is an imperative to ‘foster freedom.’ This integration, linked by regime type,
offers a transformative politics, transcending realism and liberalism, while negating
neither. For Rummel, realism must understand that democracies behave differently,
and liberalism must understand that peace is best achieved among democracies.
10.2 Rummel’s Regime Type Matters Trajectory—From
DON to BBF
Throughout his career Rummel tried to answer ‘what gives my life meaning?’ He
explains (Rummel, 1997: ix): ‘My true interest was in understanding and doing
something about the legal killing called war’ and ‘this has been my ultimate
92 H.-C. Peterson
concern.’ Later he was ‘shocked to discover that several times more people were
killed in democide (genocide and mass murder) by governments than died in
warfare.’ War and democide, the two most lethal of human interactions, have been
Rummel’s lifetime work. From Rummel’s first book in 1975 to his last in 2007,
every book, article, chapter, monograph, chart, novel, docudrama, and blog com-
mentary supports the fact that the kind of government countries have has enormous
consequences: life or death, peace or war. This connects everything in Rummel’s
life’s work, which is an unfolding discovery of how and why regime differences are
important, from the initial glimmers of the DON, to the democratic peace, then
democide, and finally positive peace. This trajectory can be traced in his major
works, culminating in his call for an alliance of democracies.
Early in his career, he was the prime mover of the Dimensionality of Nations
(DON) Project, which was the foundation for his analysis of regime type, done in
Understanding Conflict and War (1975–81). Next, he zeroed in on the democratic
peace with three groundbreaking articles (Rummel, 1983, 1984, 1985) that became
the first four propositions. Democide was added in 1986 with ‘War isn’t this
century’s biggest killer,’ becoming the fifth proposition.
Democide research continued with four books documenting the over ten million
each killed by the Soviet Union, both Communist and Nationalist Chinese regimes,
and Nazi Germany. Death by Government (1994), his best known and best-selling
book (apart from the one on factor analysis), defined democide more rigorously,
and presented empirical work in 15 case studies. Finally, Statistics of Democide
(1998) contains all the data linking specific regimes to democide, with extensive
exposition; this is the only resource I have found specifically including US
democide.
In 1997 Rummel presented his grand summary, Power Kills: Democracy as A
Method of Nonviolence. It reads easily, and is organized simply: 5–3–3. The five
propositions cover a wide range of empirical relationships between regime type and
violence; there are three regime types (democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian);
and three levels of theory explain why democracy reduces violence. This is the
single best work on the democratic peace, integrating empirical evidence with
well-argued theory. Every graph of regime type and violence shows the same: more
democracy, less violence.
Retiring in 1995, Rummel did updates and current analysis. A reticent speaker,
and losing his hearing, he communicated mostly on the internet, publishing
extensively on his website, Power Kills. This remains the single most important
Rummel resource, containing most of his books, many stand-alone articles, over
500 blog posts, six alternative history novels based on his work, an update on his
democide estimates for the 20th century (from 174 million to 262 million), and an
extensive Democratic Peace Q&A (Rummel, 2005a).
Rummel’s last book was The Blue Book of Freedom: Ending Famine, Poverty,
Democide and War (2007), a decade after Power Kills. This non-academic, but well
documented book shows how much Rummel added to the original democratic
peace, arguing that democracy not only reduced violence, but made for better life.
This was an important expansion of his work, much less appreciated than the
10 Regime Type Matters 93
conventional democratic peace. Two tables are illustrative (Rummel, 2007: 62, 116,
also in Rummel, 2005b: 224): one on ‘surviving’: democracies experience the least
war, international violence, internal violence, and democide; the other on ‘thriving’:
democracies have the highest levels of human development, and the lowest levels
of poverty. Reinforcing the importance of regime type, he made a plea for the
freedom that democracy protects (2007: 117): ‘Freedom is every person’s right.
And it is a moral good in that it promotes wealth, prosperity, social justice, and
nonviolence, and it preserves human life.’
Although many may disagree, if he was correct about his work also connecting
democracy with positive peace by means of asserting that regime type is so critical,
then his work will become more widely known, understood, and acted on, and he
will be recognized as the grand thinker I believe he was.
10.3 An Assessment
What has become of Rummel’s work? For perspective, consider this prediction
(Gleditsch, 1992: 372):
… the perfect or near-perfect correlation between democracy and nonwar in dyads should
soon begin to have a very different effect: all research on the causes of war in modern times
will be regarded as suspect if it is not corrected for this factor. In fact, I would argue that
most behavioral research on conditions for war and peace in the modern world can now be
throw on the scrap-heap of history, and researchers can start again on a new basis.
What happened? Despite extensive democratic peace research during the 1990s,
not much. The ‘no wars between democracies’ proposition has indeed become
widely accepted in international relations, but remains curiously unimportant, even
disparaged as an excuse to do forcible regime change (Russett, 2005, 2008). The
other propositions are largely absent, regime type is not routinely included in
studies of war and peace, and has not permeated standard models of international
relations. Realism doesn’t like democracy, preferring ‘stability’; liberalism doesn’t
want anything to do with regime change. And democide is largely disconnected
from the democratic peace. Regime type is not a significant part of academic or
policy-related international relations.
10.4 Academics
Scholarly research continues on the democratic peace, mostly about internal
nuances such as the relative strength of various factors, and the addition to regime
type of trade and international organizations (Russett & Oneal, 2001) which revives
and modernizes Kant’s Perpetual Peace. Rummel supported such research, but saw
it as ancillary to the ‘prime directive’ that democracy, as a regime type, best limits
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violence. Yet the discipline fragments rather than integrates the democratic peace,
which has certainly not achieved paradigm status.
One way to see this is in textbooks, reflecting the state of a discipline. Although I
have taught international relations for over a decade, it has been hard to find one
that makes more than a passing reference to the peace among democracies, much
less the larger issue of democracy as a method of nonviolence. A notable exception
was Russett, Starr & Kinsella (2010), although subsequent editions have less
democratic peace emphasis. Democide, responsible for over 260 million deaths in
the 20th century (far more than war deaths), is consistently absent, at best getting a
short paragraph. This is true even in the genocide literature. For example, Totten &
Bartop (2009), a thorough presentation of genocide studies, is almost completely
democide-free: the index has only one mention of Rummel, and one of democide.
10.5 Policy
Have Rummel’s propositions transformed international relations? US foreign policy
shows little evidence. President Barack Obama was agnostic about regime type
mattering, much less about democracy promotion. This is understandable given the
assertive foreign policy (Russett, Starr & Kinsella, 2010: 102 call it ‘offensive
idealism’) of President George W. Bush, who mentioned peace between democ-
racies as one of several, but not the main, reasons for going to war against the
regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003. The consensus now is that if promoting
democracy involves such wars, we shouldn’t: in President Obama’s words, ‘don’t
do stupid stuff’. This is reflected (Clinton, 2009) in the ‘3D’s’ of Obama foreign
policy: Defense, Diplomacy, and Development. But no Democracy. And no hint
that regime type matters. Yet it does, and the refusal to assist the transition of Iraq in
2011 toward democracy will be an enduring case study of the consequences of
ignoring regime type.
What about democide? The Obama administration ignored links between regime
type and mass murder, and was not motivated to intervene to prevent democide,
Syria being the best example. A possible exception was against the Muhamar
Qaddafi regime in Libya in 2011, ostensibly to save Libyan lives. However, this
fiasco may have been worse than Bush’s deeply flawed regime change in Iraq
(Diamond, 2005), because after regime destruction, nothing was done to effect
democratic regime building, and violence and democide in Libya continue. Even
having the great advocate for human rights, Samantha Power, as the US
Ambassador to the UN since 2013 had not moved the US or the international
community to actually do much about the proliferation of democides in the world.
Perhaps the new UN doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) will change
this, although one can remain skeptical as it is not grounded in regime type.
In contrast, Rummel (2001) presented his most specific and ambitious proposal
for what to do. His approach was regime based, arguing that since democracies do
not war against each other, and democracies have virtually no democide, it is in the
10 Regime Type Matters 95
national interest of democracies to pursue democratization in order to avoid wars
and humanitarian interventions. Since the UN has not aided democratization, an
Alliance of Democracies should operate within the UN as a pro-democracy political
party, and outside the UN to intervene to stop democides. This was a radical
proposal, much more than the existing Community of Democracies, which
Diamond (2008: 235) characterized as largely symbolic, forecasting it would
‘gradually fade into insignificance.’ Rummel’s Alliance, in contrast, would escape
the security dilemma (we fear and distrust others because they really might hurt us)
by creating a security community, or zone of peace (no actual or expectation of
violence) based on the pacifying effects of democracy. This was Rummel’s praxis:
democracies strengthening each other, especially newcomers, to effect sustained
regime change in the world. But where is it?
My conclusion is that Rummel’s work, while an extremely important contri-
bution to politics, has not transformed it, nor become a new paradigm. Yet!
10.6 GDA-ing Rummel
The GDA helps understand why the democratic peace has not been transformative,
and one might even conclude that it has failed in all three areas. Within political
science, knowledge of the democratic peace is limited to the ‘no wars between
democracies’ and perhaps the ‘no democratic democide’ propositions. They exist as
social science facts, but as mere acknowledgements. The other propositions are
mostly unknown, and Rummel’s bold statement (1997: 3) that we have a realistic
solution to war, violence, and democide remains ignored, contested, denied, or
discarded.
Regarding political philosophy, few are grappling with why democracies are
peaceful. Despite Rummel’s three levels of explanation, a rich discourse on institu-
tions and norms, and even the revived Kantian peace, agnosticism prevails.
Academics are ambivalent, policy makers skeptical. Without understanding why the
democratic peace is true and developing strong beliefs in its importance, it will remain
a curiosity more than a motivation. If you don’t believe in it, why commit to it?
Finally, in praxis, if knowledge and understanding are lacking, we cannot expect
good action. The idea of regime changes toward democracy in order to achieve
peace is a rejected project, absent from the declaratory and actual foreign policy of
democracies.
10.7 Reflections on Rummel and Galtung
While a graduate student at Hawaii, I studied extensively with Rummel, and took his
last classes. I also studied with a very different ‘great thinker,’ Johan Galtung. Both
impressed me greatly, and influenced my thinking, although in very different ways.
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My first day in class with Rummel, when he stated that democracies did not war
against each other: ‘this cannot be true … but what if it is?’
My first day in class with Galtung, as he set forth an exploration of six char-
acteristics of five civilizations: ‘wow, this is fascinating and very cool!’
Those impressions sum up my view of these two remarkable men. Galtung was a
feast of new perspectives. He was great raconteur, and a joy to learn from. Nothing
was irrelevant, and everything was viewed through a lens of peace: is it, or isn’t it?
Who could not be fascinated by fault lines, cosmologies, traumas, dialectics, civ-
ilizations, conflict life cycles, gender, culture, theses on development, inner and
outer sectors of six kinds of spaces, and whatever else his broad epistemological
mind-net could capture? This was a great adventure, but it was also easy: the only
discipline was to try to fit everything into some semblance of inter-connected
categories, and if you didn’t like something, you could discard it. You did not need
‘rigorous analysis:’ anecdotes sufficed for evidence, profound comments for theory,
and categories and charts for paradigm construction.
Listening to Galtung lecture was like lifting off in a rocket, the weighty g-forces
of his intellect taking us far beyond the limits of earth’s gravity, soaring into the
omniscience of his own special gravitas, to boldly go where no social scientist had
gone before. But soaring can also disconnect, and after a while, I saw Galtung as a
master idea creator, using empirical terminology, but making bold assertions that
were contradictory, confusing, and not well-grounded, particularly regarding
democracy.
Rummel was exciting in a different way. Wars and regime types were not
abstractions and were subjected to comprehensive rather than selective compilation,
resolving rather than expanding debates over definitions (what is democracy?), and
data were bounced off each other to see what would stick (did democracies ever
fight each other?). Theories were constructed not to impress and astound, but to be
disproved, and statistical analysis done to determine significance. Democide
was morbidly fascinating, and morally exhausting, with the unbelievable numbers
showing the prolific propensity for those with power to kill and kill and kill. But
it all fit together. There was a unified theory explaining both wars and democide,
and what kept it all together was power, connected by regime type. You could
measure this with Freedom House (for regime type), the Correlates of War Project
(for wars and violence), and Statistics of Democide. And you could do something
about it: from Rummel’s cautious ‘foster freedom’, to a global alliance of
democracies.
Galtung and Rummel had little respect for each other. Galtung, profoundly of the
left, saw Rummel as a war-mongering apologist for Imperial America. Rummel, a
profoundly classical liberal, saw Galtung as a once-brilliant scholar drifting deeper
into a freedom disparaging, US-hating left field. Rummel (1997: 113) recounts a
1988 Galtung memo alleging the CIA had killed six million people. This could not
be misinterpreted, accusing the US of as much evil as Hitler’s Holocaust of six
million Jews. For Galtung, the democratic peace was impossible.
Galtung’s Peace by Peaceful Means (1996) is the closest I can find of sustained
engagement with the democratic peace, and shows deep misunderstanding. Galtung
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summarily dismissed ‘democracies almost never fight each other’ with ‘I do not
even believe in that one’ (:58). No evidence needed, it is Galtung who says so.
Instead, he developed nine theorems connecting democracy with vague ‘belliger-
ence.’ But Galtung could not escape the realities of regime types, noting (:58) that
‘Democratic rule is one of the greatest innovations of mankind.’ Left unwritten is
why. Or what he means by democracy, since (at least at the time I knew him) he
believed that the Mao regime in China was an exemplar of what government should
do. Galtung & Nishimura (1976) found six things we could learn from the Chinese,
but not killing one’s own citizens was not one of them. In a talk in Beijing (Galtung
2010) he said that China’s image had been bad in the past because of ‘certain
excesses’. So much for the democide of 76 million Chinese. Even in 2015 he made
the bizarre assertion that China was a model for positive peace, again overturning
conventional political science. This was and is exciting stuff, but reflects an
understanding of the world deeply at odds with Rummel’s, ignoring the importance
of regime type, and utterly dismissive of democide.
Another tempering of my fascination with him was during a class discussion
about repression in North Korea, when Galtung said that he had visited the country,
and all the people seemed happy, so reports of repression and killing were most
likely Western fabrications. This comment from one of the core founders of peace
studies was astonishing, and I realized that while Rummel’s ‘one big thing’ was
freedom and life, Galtung’s was apparently the negation of the West.
Rummel found that regimes matter because of how they are limited from using
power, something Galtung dismissed because I think he was neutral about power.
To be hyper-critical of the West while ambivalent about communist regimes killing
over 100 million people (Rummel, 1993) was about deeply incompatible world-
views. There was no way Rummel and Galtung could follow the words of the
prophet Isaiah to ‘come let us reason together’, even though both deeply desired the
goal of that same Isaiah, that nations may ‘beat their swords into plowshares.’
Their ideas will endure into the future, but I think Rummel’s will prevail because
he reminds us we must construct governments that cannot kill us, whereas
Galtung’s hundreds of ideas, much applauded on the peace and justice lecture
circuit, will be scattered to the winds of unfolding history.
10.8 In Summary
Rummel sought an end of violence between and within states. His found empiri-
cally that wars and democide occurred because governments with unchecked power
commit much more violence than those with limits on their power, hence ‘power
kills.’ He explained how and why democracy is a method of nonviolence, later
adding that it reduces famine and poverty. This comprises the broad ‘democratic
peace.’ The integrating link is that ‘regime type matters.’ Moving from science and
philosophy to praxis, Rummel’s prescription was to ‘foster freedom’, to nudge and
change regimes toward democracy. Some aspects of the democratic peace are well
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accepted, but not the overall principle of democracy as a method of nonviolence
which he called ‘the most important fact of our time’ (Rummel, 2007: 11, 21, 23).
This has not captured the imagination of policy makers, nor generated policies to
put the principle to work. Despite its achievements, this is the tragedy of the
democratic peace.
What about the future of Rummel’s work? I have two forecasts.
Optimistically, by mid-century (echoing Diamond, 2003) we will have near
global democracy. A widespread realization will emerge that without more
democracy, interstate violence will remain a constant threat to peace, and mass
murders and genocides will continue. Based on this change in global consciousness
—an enormous paradigm shift—there will be functional alliance of democracies to
put the democratic peace into practice, and we will be on the way toward a Pax
Democratica.
Pessimistically, democracy will still be a ‘good thing,’ and democratization will
ebb and flow in the world. But because of the allure of power, and the difficulties in
actually limiting it, there will still not be any widespread sense of urgency about
fostering, nudging, or making pro-democracy regime changes. We will not realis-
tically and reliably achieve what Rummel dreamed about: world peace, between
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Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence
Erica Chenoweth
In his seminal book Power Kills, Rummel (1997) summarizes decades of research
on the democratic peace to make a single, pointed argument: that the worst kinds of
violence—mass killings carried out by governments—are entirely explained by the
tyrannical nature of the regime that commit such crimes.1 His proposed solution to
eliminating ‘democide’—as well as collective violence, war initiation, and other
forms of political violence—is a well-known known one: to promote and reinforce
democratic government. His view is that strengthening democracy, both in terms of
procedural practices and qualitative, liberal behavior—could result in world peace,
defined as eliminating violence between states and within them. Rummel concludes
that democracy is ‘a method of nonviolence’—the subtitle of his book. In this
chapter, I share some reflections on Rummel’s basic argument, offering some
observations, some critiques, and some paths forward for contemporary research on
peace, democracy, and nonviolent change. In particular, I highlight one key deficit
of Rummel’s thesis: that he neglects the power of nonviolent civil resistance in
bringing about democratization from below.
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What were Rummel’s stated intentions in writing this book? He overtly expressed
his normative goals. Although his study offers a sophisticated and detailed review
of the empirical patterns of democracy, democide, war, and collective violence, he
clearly lays out the primary source of his interest—to reduce war in all its forms
while also elevating what he saw as the most practical and realistic method of
political rule. In the preface, he writes:
‘I hope to have something specific to recommend about ending war. But in the
mid-1980s I was shocked to discover that several times more people were killed in
democide (genocide and mass murder) by governments than died in warfare. And
with that my aim broadened to help end or at least lessen this killing as well. This
book presents the sum of all this research. And, I believe, I can finally offer what
appears a most realistic and practical solution to war, democide, and other collective
violence’ (1997: ix).
Later, he writes: ‘There is one solution to each and the solution in each case is
the same. It is to foster democratic freedom and to democratize coercive power and
force. That is, mass killing and mass murder carried out by government is a result of
indiscriminate, irresponsible Power at the center’ (ibid: 3).
What strikes the reader is the somewhat rare and refreshing statement about the
author’s own normative commitments—that of global emancipation as well as
freedom from violence—motivating him to undertake the study. Such bold and
self-revealing statements do not often appear at the outset of contemporary political
science works, which are more typically characterized by the statement of an
empirical puzzle, a correction to a theoretical framework, or the presentation of a
new case. Here one sees an author who is not just interested in knowledge for its
own sake, but who also wants to know how his academic discipline can bring its
insights to bear on what he viewed as the most important questions of our time.
11.2 The Basic Argument
Rummel argues that democracy is indeed the most effective method by which
societies can reduce violence. Although he concedes that institutional and cultural
arguments have some merit, he also insists that his own field theory best explains
the different norms and practices that vary across democratic and authoritarian
regime types. In his view, democracy is comprised of social fields, constantly in
flux and normalizing the bounds of civilized behavior; authoritarianism is static,
increasingly rigid, and generating the cleavages over which people resort to vio-
lence to secure their survival (or prosperity).
Throughout the text, Rummel meticulously details the various arguments and
empirical evidence for democracy’s generally pacifying effects. He is never naïve in
his portrayal of these effects. He suggests that democracy reduces violence by
degrees; that although imperfections persist, democracy remains the most peaceful
form of government devised by human societies.
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Recent empirical work has generally supported this claim. Indeed, notwith-
standing a few definitional quibbles (e.g., Oren, 1995; Rosato, 2003; Ray, 2003), a
major war between modern democratic states has still never occurred (Goldstein,
2011). Current studies confirm that civil wars are less likely in democracies (Hegre
et al., 2001) and mass killings and democides are virtually unheard of (Davenport,
2007), although critiques abound as to the structural violence imposed by Western
democracies on ‘periphery’ states as well as the ethical and normative implications
of democratic peace theory (Galtung, 1990; Hobson, 2011). Terrorism, although
somewhat common in democracies, has become something of a substitute for civil
war in them (Chenoweth, 2010; Li, 2005), suggesting a decline in severity of
political violence in freer states. Such patterns would square well with Rummel’s
suggestion that democracy reduces most forms of violence, although it would be
impossible to eliminate violence from society entirely. His main concern—and the
main focus of his book—is on eliminating unrestrained state violence: a goal which
he argues is only achievable through the robust construction of democratic societies.
As the book progresses, each chapter addresses common critiques of democratic
peace theory on both theoretical and empirical grounds. For example, he was very
concerned that the critics of democratic peace were overrating minor skirmishes and
equating them to very destructive wars. In responding to the argument byMansfield&
Snyder (1995) that the democratization process can usher in particularly unstable and
bloody periods within transitioning states, Rummel argued (p. 102) that Mansfield &
Snyder supported this argument by looking at conflict frequency rather than conflict
intensity—a crucial conceptual distinction. All conflicts are not equal, according to
Rummel. And while transitioning states may be vulnerable to civil conflict, the
lethality and global consequence of such internal wars pale in comparison to the
far-reaching devastation wrought by major power wars in the twentieth century.
11.3 Nonviolence as the Absence of Unrestrained State
Violence
Rummel conceptualized ‘nonviolence’ in its most elementary way—the lack of
violence, and the use of alternatives to war that are not violent. For example, he
expects that democracies in disagreement with one another will negotiate, since such
forms of conflict resolution are deeply embedded in the culture, social expectations,
and practices of democratic societies. He expects democratic leaders to eschew
overreaction to domestic political opposition—and to avoid mass killings.
He does not, as far as I can tell, conceive of nonviolence as the active promotion
of nonviolent contentious action, or as an active and coercive method of conflict in
itself. Around the same time Rummel was completing his thesis, for example, a
series of scholars such as Thomas Schelling, Gene Sharp, and Adam Roberts were
writing about civilian-based defense—a sort of nonviolent deterrent to foreign
occupation where civilians would train in civil disobedience so as to make any
foreign occupation too costly and therefore unlikely (see, for instance, Roberts,
1969).
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Nor does he conceive of nonviolence in the principled sense in which it is often
proffered today (i.e. pacifism), where one would advocate the avoidance of violence
simply on the grounds that it is immoral.
Instead, he views nonviolence simply as the absence of violence. As many note, a
simple lack of overt violence is a far cry from a positive peace (Galtung, 1996).
Rummel is not blind to this—he suggests that a lack of major violence is his goal, and
that minor forms of violence will inevitably remain even within democratic states.
Of course, some critics aver that democracy reinforces and promotes structural
violence in many different forms (e.g. Hobson, 2011). Rummel sees such critiques
as emanating from a leftist bias from within academia, and he sees proponents of
such views as influenced by socialists and Marxist critics of classical liberal theory
more generally (1997: 100–115). By focusing on the failing of democracies and the
structural violence perpetrated by them, he argues, such critics trivialize the scale of
violence witnessed by war and democide. That said, he tries to address some of
these critiques in his 2007 Blue Book of Freedom, in which he claims that political
freedom provides economic and food security. However, he seems to miss a pri-
mary critique regarding structural violence—that economic, social, and political
freedoms are unequally distributed even within ‘free’ societies based on race,
gender, class, or other arbitrary social distinctions. Somewhat surprisingly, Rummel
may have missed an opportunity in such dismissals—an opportunity to generate
data to demonstrate the value of democracy on various other indicators of social
life, such as economic equality, rule of law, quality of life, human development,
trust in government, etc. This could have demonstrated that democracies perform
well on a number of other indicators besides direct violence. Because his work is so
empirically driven, it would make sense to allow empirics to shore up the case for
democracy on these other counts as well.
Moreover, one can recognize the benefits of liberal theory without arguing that
its applications have been flawless. For instance, the benefits of free societies have
been distributed unevenly within them. Rummel himself brings up several examples
of direct violence occurring in democracies, such as the beatings of Rodney King
(and the subsequent race riots of 1992) in the United States. Such violence occurs
quite easily and commonly in democracies. And this is precisely the concern of
many critics of democracy and neoliberalism—that they conceal the worst kinds of
abuses under the veil of a satisfied, apathetic, and perhaps privileged majority. That
is, democracy and justice are not necessarily synonymous with one another, and
justice may be a superior indicator of peace compared to democracy.
11.4 The Path to Democracy: Necessarily Bloody?
Rummel expressed frustration at the blunt measures at the disposal of states in
bringing about democratic transition. He suggested that many forms of violent
intervention, such as the sponsoring of violent rebellions, are anathema to the whole
enterprise of both peace and democracy. In Power Kills, Rummel (1997: 9) clearly
rejected military intervention as a method to bring about democracy in foreign
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countries. However, he later reversed course on this, suggesting that the invasion of
Iraq in 2003 was necessary to stave off Saddam Hussein’s brutality and catalyze a
wave of democratic transition transitions in the Middle East—and justified in its
attempt to form an alliance of democracies to support the invasion (Rummel, 2005a;
Tucille, 2014). His prediction was that although an American invasion and occu-
pation would be temporarily painful, it would mostly be ruinous for the dictator and
his inner entourage; in the end, the invasion would allow Iraqis the opportunity to
liberate themselves from Hussein’s tyranny and obtain the power and opportunity to
chart their own course forward.
Hence, through one of Rummel’s most controversial political stances, he found
himself ideologically allied with neoconservative foreign policy elites in endorsing
the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003 (and, indeed, at one point he endorsed
censorship on the media on his blog; Rummel, 2005b). Like many neoconservative
thinkers, Rummel proved to underestimate the devastating impacts of that war, in
terms of both its immediate devastation and its continually bloody aftermath. Some
commentators have even suggested that the war in Iraq initiated the period of turmoil
in which the Middle East continues to find itself today (Tyler, 2015). It is impossible
to know how Rummel would interpret this debacle now—and whether, in hindsight,
he would have seen the Iraq War as worth the price in blood and treasure.
In the end, Rummel (1997: 9) suggests that plebiscites or referenda are the ideal
ways for people to assert their power and choose their own government. Yet the
implementation of this suggestion remains impractical. How are such plebiscites to
come about in autocracies? This question is left unanswered. This leaves open the
possibility of forced regime change, which has proved ineffective at best and dis-
astrous at worst (Downes & Monten, 2013).
Perhaps hewould have revised his views on Iraq if he had known about the realistic
alternatives to violent conflict in bringing about democratic transitions. For instance,
one wonders what Rummel would have made of the diffusion of mass nonviolent
uprisings during the second half of the Twentieth Century—and into the current one
(Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2005). Since 1970, the world has witnessed the explosion
of mass upheavals characterized primarily by nonviolent forms of contention
(Chenoweth & Stephan, 2014). Although states have used exceptional methods to try
to counter these uprisings, we have nonetheless seen various waves of these mass
movements in Eastern Europe in 1989, the former Soviet Bloc in the mid-2000s, the
Arab Spring in 2011, and throughout the industrialized world since 2011. Data on
these movements show that mass nonviolent contention has virtually replaced armed
uprisings in terms of frequency (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Despite what obser-
vers might infer from watching the news, mass violent rebellion is going out of style,
and mass nonviolent contention is the new game in town—at least for the time being.
As a consequence, nonviolence is now a prominent research agenda within political
science (Chenoweth & Cunningham, 2013).
This recent upswing of nonviolent mass movements is not unrelated to Rummel’s
core interests, and it may even connect to one of his remaining key practical puzzles
—that of how countries actually achieve democracy through nonviolent means.
In an article on democratization, Ulfelder (2005) finds that one of the strongest
associations is that between mass protests and subsequent democratization.
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Similarly, a report by Freedom House finds that 75% of recent democratic transi-
tions were initiated in part (or in whole) by high levels of active civic pressure from
below (Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2005). And campaigns of civil resistance—or
nonviolence—are more likely to usher in democratic transitions than their violent
counterparts (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Indeed, in recent private correspon-
dence, Jay Ulfelder has suggested that he now sees protests as a necessary (but not
sufficient) condition in bringing about democratic transitions. According to two
separate studies by Johnstad (2010) and Celestino & Gleditsch (2013), such
nonviolence-initiated democratic transitions are exceedingly durable.
Rummel’s omission of nonviolent resistance from discussion is ironic on several
counts. First, his field theory explicitly argues that democratic politics enjoy social
fields, which involve ‘a high level of nonviolent conflict across the society, the stuff of
democratic politics’ (Rummel, 1997: 147, emphasis in original). Indeed, nonviolent
conflict—and nonviolent resistance in correcting democratic politics when necessary
—is clearly linked to the key mechanisms through which Rummel argues that
democracies are more pacific than authoritarian regimes. Rummel clearly knows and
understands the literatures on nonviolent conflict, which he cites briefly in a footnote
(1997: 102). Yet he totally sidesteps these literatures, seeing nonviolent resistance as
an outcome of democracy rather than a cause of it. There is but onemention of Gandhi
in the book, but only as a passing reference to charismatic leaders existing within
social fields (1997: 156). Nor does Rummel appear to see constructive program (or
parallel-institution-building) as a viable way through which societies can pursue
models of democracy that suit their own interests. Rummel’s volume offers a
people-powered explanation for the functioning of elite politics, yet he misses the
most potent source of change witnessed in recent history: the people power move-
ments that brought down many of the tyrannical governments he so deplored.
At the same time, Rummel underestimates the plural nature of authoritarian
regimes—and the degree to which social fields exist in authoritarian regimes. The
past several decades of scholarship on social capital, civil society, and authoritarian
regimes, reveals that even in authoritarian regimes, people practice everyday forms
of resistance, which can develop into collective outbursts of nonviolent civil dis-
obedience at seemingly a moment’s notice (Scott, 1987; Kuran, 1991). Rummel’s
omission is somewhat ironic, given that he recognizes that democratic governments
are not monoliths either (Rummel, 1997: 17). In fact, in many of the authoritarian
regimes he cites as having anti-field qualities (USSR, Iran, Chile), people power
movements developed and challenged seemingly impenetrable regimes that had,
indeed, ruled with excessive brutality (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). In other
words, social fields may be a cause rather than a consequence of democracy.
11.5 Democracy as the Logical Conclusion?
Onewonders what Rummel would think about democracy’s current challenges. After
the fall of the Soviet Union, many observers averred that humanity had arrived at ‘the
End of History’ (Fukuyama, 1992). Liberal democracy had won the ideological race,
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and all that remained was to transform the last remaining hold-outs of the authori-
tarian class age. This optimism about the pacifying effects of democracy became so
widely accepted among political elites that it was informing nearly every national
security strategy from the early 1990s onward (Miller, 2012). Given the obvious
dividends of democracy, it was only a matter of time before all states voluntarily
accepted its tenets—or, if not voluntarily, succumbed to these tenets by force. The
inevitability of a global system of republics was taken for granted.
However, Freedom House (2015) indicates that 2014 was the 9th year in a row
that aggregate democracy scores have declined. With very few exceptions, 2014
was a year of reversal for democracies, with serious backsliding in major global
payers like Brazil, Turkey, and Russia, in mid-level states like Hungary, Venezuela,
and Azerbaijan, and elsewhere. Given the fact that Rummel saw democracy as
inherently superior—and that he viewed the logic of its pacifying effects as uni-
versally appealing—one wonders how he might explain these trends.
In fact, the future of democracy, justice, and nonviolence may be linked. Stephan
& Burrows (2015) suggest that authoritarian backsliding has been occurring
alongside the closure of space for civil society organizations. As authoritarian
regimes wise up to the disruptive potential of people power, they try to crush such
challenges in their infancy through various forms of smart repression (Chenoweth,
2015). Their attempts to do so are quite revealing about the types of power that truly
threaten them.
Although I never met Rudolph Rummel, my guess is that he would have inter-
preted these trends as deeply troubling because of the constriction of social fields,
and that he would predict war and violence as becoming more likely in the midst of
such reversals. But because he underestimated the potential of people power
movements, his skepticism may have been misplaced. There is a potential solution to
the problem of democratization without bloodshed, and the problem of improving
unfair and unjust practices within democracies as well: nonviolent resistance.
Indeed, the rise of mass nonviolent movements and their effects on systems of
government worldwide may represent one final, unwritten chapter of Rummel’s
book. He might have concluded that while democracy is a method of nonviolence,
it may also be true that ‘Nonviolence is the method of achieving democracy.’
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Chapter 12
The Comparative Analysis of Mass
Atrocities and Genocide
Barbara Harff
Rudolph Rummel and I are both products of Northwestern University’s Ph.D.
program—although I graduated 18 years later.1 Thanks to him, I already knew
something about factor analysis, having read his dissertation. I was equally familiar
with arguments about peace among democratic states, because my major was in
international relations with a minor in jurisprudence (i.e. international law) and
another in comparative studies. The democratic peace argument filtered much later
into comparative studies of civil conflict in democratic societies and made much
sense to me in theory, the way it became a major focus in Rudy’s work on mass
death and genocide.
My task here is to assess Rummel’s contribution to genocide studies, which has
been the focus of my own scholarly career. Twenty years ago, I reviewed Death by
Governments critically (Harff, 1996: 117–119) and I will use this book to answer
some of the criticism he had to deal with after it was published in 1994. Of course,
his work was also hailed at the time as a major contribution because it documented
how many people were killed by authoritarian and communist governments in the
20th century. My focus will be first on his definition of democide in comparison
with the narrower definition of genocide, second on data issues, and third on some
implications of his theoretical focus, mainly his democratic peace argument.
Barbara Harff, b. 1942, is Professor of Political Science Emerita at the US Naval Academy and
has been Distinguished Visiting Professor at Clark University’s Strassler Center for Holocaust
and Genocide Studies. She helped plan the 2004 Stockholm International Forum on the
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and Political Issues (1984) and, with Ted Robert Gurr, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (1994,
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1This chapter is based on a contribution to a panel at the 56th Annual Convention of the
International Studies Association, New Orleans, LA, 18–21 February 2015.
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Rudy devoted five books to the systematic analysis of democide, four of them
published within a span of five years. Lethal Politics (1990) documented Soviet
mass killings after 1917, China’s Bloody Century (1991) was the second, and the
third covered Nazi Genocide and Mass Murder (1992). The capstone was Death by
Government (1994), which summarized the empirical and theoretical basis of his
concept of democide, with documentation of many other cases. The fifth book,
Statistics of Democide (1998) showed just how thoroughly and carefully he com-
piled and analyzed the data he used.
Definitions are crucial to a new and broad concept like democide. Rummel
(1994: 42) summarizes a chapter-long discussion with this: ‘A death constitutes
democide if it is the intentional killing of an unarmed or disarmed person by
government agents acting in their authoritative capacity and pursuant to govern-
ment policy or high command’. He adds that it encompasses reckless and wanton
disregard for the lives of forced labor and concentration camp victims; ‘unofficial’
killings by private groups; extrajudicial summary killings; and mass deaths that
occurred because governments ignored or perpetrated their causes, as in deliberate
famines. Elsewhere (p. 37) he adds that it includes killings by de facto govern-
ments, i.e. rebels or warlords. One major category of intentional killing not counted
as democide consists of the military casualties of international war. His data show
that civilian deaths by government in the 20th century outnumber military deaths by
a ratio of about 6 to 1 (pp. 15, 20).
In my review, I pointed out that ‘clear conceptualization is a prerequisite to sound
explanation’ (Harff, 1996: 118). Rudy’s definition of democide meets this criterion.
Moreover it has both a theoretical and normative basis: he uses it to guide his
cumulation of data on mass killings by totalitarian and autocratic government, which
he systematically contrasts with the much lower incidence of mass killings by
democratic governments. So how does this compare with the concept of genocide
and its theoretical uses? Rummel points out that democide comprises genocides, but
not all genocidal phenomena as detailed by Raphael Lemkin and codified in the
UN’s 1948 Genocide Convention.2 The Convention includes policies whose intent is
to cause mental harm, to inflict conditions of life aimed to bring about the group’s
physical destruction in whole or part, and measures intended to prevent birth.
Specifically, the crime of genocide is the intent to eliminate ‘in whole or part’ a
national, racial, ethnic, or religious group. Insofar as this entails direct killing of
group members, it is included in democide. The data collections created to opera-
tionalize this definition (for example by Harff, 2003 and Fein, 1993) focus on
killings, not on mental or cultural harm. Moreover, the working definitions of
empiricists almost invariably include politicide, the killing of people because of their
political and social affiliations. Indeed, Lemkin included destruction of a people’s
2UN General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
General Assembly Resolution 26, 8 December 1948.
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political and social institutions, but the politics of the UN General Assembly pre-
cluded inclusion of this type of mass killing, now generally called politicide.
There is an obvious normative purpose to the Genocide Convention and the
empirical research carried out in its name: to clarify the causes and manifestations
of genocide (and politicide) so that preventive actions are justified, and required, by
international law. In short, conceptually democide includes all the mass killings
associated with genocide and politicide, but also many others that are not aimed at
the intentional destruction of a particular group. And normatively their objectives
also are somewhat different. The study of democide leads to condemnation of entire
categories of governments because they are at risk of killing large numbers of
citizens; comparative study of genocide aims to help identify specific governments
for specific crimes against humanity.
12.2 Data Questions
Compiling global data is hazardous and will inevitably invite chagrin and criticism
from country experts. Case study people have a problem with systematic data
because they often think they know better what happened in one particular country.
I have sympathized with this view, because my area expertise was the Middle East.
But when empiricists focus on global data, we have to consider 190 countries and
must rely on country experts selectively. When we look for patterns and test
explanations, we cannot expect absolute precision, in fact we do not require it.
In my critical review I said that ‘from an empirical viewpoint, there are problems
with Rummel’s data’, that is, ‘he chooses numbers of death that almost always are
skewed in the direction of the highest guesses’ (Harff, 1996: 118). The most
damaging critique came from an anonymous blogger, who argued that Rummel had
no business writing a book on a subject matter that he did not master. Five books
seem to me sufficient evidence of mastery, if not necessarily total accuracy. That is
in fact an inevitable problem for those seeking reliable data on mass casualties. Few
perpetrators make accurate counts of their victims. Estimates diverge widely, and
Rummel is careful to gather and report multiple estimates for any given event.
Thus, his detailed writings refer to ranges of estimates, but rather than repeat them
at every turn he usually uses average or median numbers. Then he adds them for
total effect: ‘169,198,000 Murdered’ (the title of Chap. 1) globally from 1900 to
1986. Later he enlarged this to 262 million, after increasing the figure for colonial
democide and concluding that the deaths due to the Chinese famine of the Great
Leap Forward in 1959–61 were an intentional consequence of government policy.3
Another reason for being critical about the democide data was that Rummel
could have provided more useful datasets by focusing specifically on more pre-
cisely defined concepts such as geno/politicide, mass atrocities, ethnic wars, or state
3See at: http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/20TH.HTM.
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terrorism. All of these specific types of state-implicated violence have been the
subject of comparative empirical studies aimed at identifying their causes. The
concept of democide is so wide that it is inevitable that Rudy’s numbers of death
are higher than those for genocide specifically.
A third critique comes from case study scholars who may argue that one should
pay attention to additional episodes that did not make a particular list, or that
numbers of people dead were higher, lower or altogether too badly documented to
warrant any reasonable estimates. As someone who had tried to identify all cases of
geno/politicide since World War II,4 I fully understand what it takes to collect
reliable, unimpeachable global data. It is impossible. The best we can do is to seek
advice about additional episodes, and to report ranges of fatality estimates, as
Rummel does.
Over time I have become more critical of country experts who challenge sys-
tematic empirical studies. Case studies are scarce, of dubious accuracy, or
non-existent for some episodes of mass death, and estimates vary greatly. Some
episodes dating back to before say, 1918 happened in countries that no longer exist
or in countries that did not yet exist. Colonial authorities in Africa and Asia kept
scarce or no records of birth or death rates. Perpetrators seldom keep records of
their misdeeds and if they do, as in Nazi Germany, death estimates often are greatly
underestimated or attributed to circumstances rather than deliberate policies.
To make the point clearer, let us take a closer look at two 20th century episodes
of genocide. Who among scholars is correct in estimating the numbers who died
during the Holocaust? If we treat the Shoah as genocide, we count as its victims
about 5.5 million people—Jews, Roma, and others—who were killed because of
their ethnic, racial, religious, or national group affiliation. What happened to the
others who died, because of their political affiliations, or were systematically
starved (see especially Russian prisoners of war) or were victims of what today we
would call crimes against humanity during war, i.e. atrocities? Should we ignore the
deaths of millions because of some arbitrary definition? The concept of democide
avoids this essential problem. By Rummel’s estimates 20,946,000 died at the hands
of Nazi Germany from 1933 to 1945, of whom 16,315,000 were victims of
genocide (Rummel, 1994: 4).
For another more recent example, consider Cambodia (1975–79). Some scholars
argued that under the Genocide Convention it was not a genocide, because the
victims belonged to the same ethnic group as the perpetrators. Senseless as it may
seem today, it became an issue because of the primary focus on the group identity
of victims. This led these scholars to think that victims had to be the ‘OTHER,’
some identifiable group apart from the perpetrators, although the language of the
convention never says that genocide cannot be committed by people who are ethnic,
racial, national, or religious kin of the victims. If we follow that logic, Germans
killing Germans during World War II or Khmers killing Khmers in Cambodia
cannot be counted as victims of genocide. In the case of Cambodia, the concept of
4Harff & Gurr (1988) and many revisions through Harff (2003).
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‘auto-genocide’ became part of some scholars’ definitional arsenal. The concept of
democide avoids this conceptual trap.
Any internal conflict situation carries the seeds of genocide. We know that
typically victims have multiple identities, thus gender, culture, economic and social
status, and political affiliation may play a secondary or close to a primary role in
their victimization. Genocidal patterns often are readily apparent. In the search for
motives and intent we should analyze killing patterns. Thus in the case of Cambodia
intent is not hard to discover. What seemed irrational to outside observers such as
killing loyal cadres, makes sense when one took a close look at the confused
ideology of the Khmer Rouge. This was an ideology reminiscent of Jacobinism, a
revolution that devoured itself. Many victims were simply not wanted by the regime
for diverse reasons that changed over time.
I chose to call this genocidal episode a politicide, having coined the concept to
account for victims who were killed primarily because of their political or social
affiliations. I used estimates from various sources that ranged from 1.9 million to 3
million people killed in four years of Khmer Rouge rule of a population of about 7
million.
Later, I came across a demographic study conducted by the CIA suggesting a
likely death toll of 1.2–1.3 million dead and I lowered my estimates. In general, I
think it is necessary at first look to assume higher death rates, because the perpe-
trators are unlikely to tell and demographic data in poor third-world countries are of
questionable accuracy. When I looked at Rudy’s sources for Cambodia I recognized
all (for example Chandler, 1991, and Kiernan & Boua, 1982). I became cautious
about trusting these sources, especially when I realized that there was an ideological
bent to these scholars who, at least during their early careers, seemed to be apol-
ogists for the Khmer Rouge regime. Rummel, in his analysis of Cambodia, cate-
gorizes deaths from 1967 to 1987 as caused by war and rebellion (514,000), famine
and disease (280,000) and democide (3,186,000). Given that he includes all victims
of government killings, his estimates are consistent with those of others.
Nowhere in Death by Government is it more obvious what drives Rummel to
collect data than in the case of Cambodia. He describes the indescribable with great
passion and revulsion. I share his sorrow and anger about the cruelty and sheer
inhumanity that led to the deaths of the old, the feeble, babies, pregnant women,
and so many others. Cambodia at large was a Nazi type concentration camp for all
but a few—the Hell State as Rummel calls it. In 1981, I was in Thailand to
interview survivors of the Cambodian genocide in a makeshift refugee camp. The
detailed descriptions of unspeakable horrors have never left me. I relived it when
Rummel described the slaughter of a pregnant woman whose fetus was hanged to
wither. For years it haunted me to think that a human being could act as a wild beast
and that observers, near or distant, did nothing. As we know all too well, helpers in
the real world are a rare breed in the face of danger to their own survival, but then
few of us have ever been in such situations. Rummel was enraged by what he heard
and saw. This is what drove him to report how, how many, why, and when the
victims died. This is the kinship I feel, each death that we report prompts us to
mourn a life lost.
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12.3 Discovering Intent
Democide according to Rudy, as noted above, ‘is the murder of any person or
people by a government, including genocide, politicide, and mass murder.’ Given
his definition, he has to deal with all the issues above and add victims killed during
other forms of conflict, such as civil wars and pogroms, in which peoples are
murdered by states for any reason, as in Syria today, or during World War II, as
were Polish civilians and officers. Rummel adds that the killing has to be intentional
not indiscriminate, thus, he is very much in the same position as any genocide
scholar seeking to discover intent.
To reiterate, when we count victims of genocide we need to look for groups that
have a common identity as described in the Genocide Convention. We also rec-
ognize that perpetrators may attribute a collective identity to them of which they
may not be conscious—as ‘enemies of the state’ or ‘old people’ who stand in the
way of social change. By contrast, Rummel includes in democide both geno/
politicide and mass murder, all instances in which governments kill or cause the
death of peoples because of their religion, race, language, ethnicity, national origin,
class, politics, speech, actions construed as opposing the government or wrecking
social policy, or by virtue of their relationship to such people (Rummel, 1994: 36–
37). These categories of peoples go way beyond the official definition of genocide
by the inclusion of class, politics, speech, and kinship. The latter categories could
be construed as part of what I call politicide, but kinship is not part of the definition
either in the Genocide Convention or in the discussion of political groups. By his
definition, victims of massacres include the killings of prisoners of war and cap-
tured rebels, an extension that probably is acceptable to most scholars dealing with
mass violence.
Intent is a necessary condition for identifying genocide and politicide. Rummel
deals with it by arguing that democide includes the targeting of noncombatants
during a war or violent conflict out of hatred or revenge, or to depopulate an enemy
region, or to terrorize civilians into surrender; also included is torture leading to
death. Essentially he includes all intentional killings, but excludes ‘actions taken
against armed civilians during mob actions, executions for capital crimes and death
of noncombatants during attacks where the primary targets are military.’ How to
discover intent in democide is less complicated than in geno/politicide. In
geno/politicide group members are targeted whereas in democide they can be either
members of groups or individuals. Thus, in democide it is not a question whether
group survival is at stake, i.e. how many people need to be killed to destroy the
group in part or whole, because he counts anybody systematically killed by a
government.
In the early days of genocide studies we had difficulties with how best to
discover intent. I argued that we can be confident that the killings are intentional
when we see that a particular group’s members are targeted repeatedly and in a
sustained campaign. Rummel sees as intentional all killings that are premeditated
and carried out by governments or their agents, even if the killings happen through
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malign neglect, such as mass starvation, or through indiscriminate bombings of
settlements, as in Syria now. For him, intent is discovered through looking at
outcomes. Any action by a government or their agents that leads inevitably to death
is likely a case of democide. Today, genocide scholars have less disagreement about
discovering intent. Act and outcome matter most. If ISIL members massacre
Alawites or Yazidis repeatedly, it is a genocide; here we come close to Rummel’s
perspective of what matters most.
The perpetrators of genocide and democide include both governments and de
facto governments. When I first read of de facto governments I was intrigued by the
way Rudy included competing governments, that is rebel organizations that control
part of a country. For me, the category government was also too narrow, because in
some cases genocide was committed by non-governmental groups acting with an
implicit government sanction, as in Sudan and the eastern Congo. I called de facto
governments contending authorities, although this leads to real problems with
statistical analyses that focus on states as the primary actors.
In one other respect, though, the significance of fatality estimates varies between
genocide studies and democide. Genocide by definition is not dependent on
numbers of people killed. The destruction of a group is at stake when the leadership
is annihilated, which takes the life out of the group. Hypothetically, victims could
number in the few hundreds. A case in point is the persecution of Ba’hais by the
revolutionary Iranian regime, with a few thousands killed; or Syria where some
30,000 members of the Muslims Brotherhood and other civilians were murdered by
the Hafez Assad regime in 1981/82. We need to be able to identify victim groups,
and should be able to identify the proportions of people eliminated. But even the
death of 30,000 Muslim Brothers is scarcely a blip in the data on democide.
12.4 Theoretical Issues
Let me now return to the democratic peace argument. Rudy, like many other
scholars, contended that democracies are unlikely to fight each other. Among
democracies, diplomacy replaces bullets. Domestically, the ballot box has the same
moderating effects. He argues that if we check power through democratic freedoms
we would not have democide (Rummel, 1994: 27). Quoting Lord Acton, Rummel
(1994: 19) concludes that ‘power kills, and absolute power kills absolutely’. This is
a categorical statement about a relationship that is in fact probabilistic. A larger
theoretical question it raises is why do some totalitarian and authoritarian regimes
commit megamurders while others do not? Saudi Arabia, for example, is one of the
most authoritarian states in the contemporary world, yet state executions only
number in the hundreds. Uzbekistan is a similar example. And on the democratic
side, Sri Lanka is one clear case of a democratic regime that in 1989–90 authorized
military squads to track down and summarily execute members and suspected
supporters of the JVP (Peoples Liberation Party), which had begun its second
rebellion that threatened to overthrow the state. Between 13,000 and 30,000 were
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killed in this politicide—not a megamurder, of course, but a challenge to Rudy’s
basic argument.
A regime’s power is a permissive condition, not a root cause of mass violence.
Empirical research on causes of genocides and on civil wars has provided much
evidence on the preconditions of mass murder. Krain (1997, 2000) shows that
genocides and politicides often occur in the immediate aftermath of abrupt power
transitions, when new leaders suppress their opposition. Valentino, Huth &
Balch-Lindsay (2004) show that ‘excess casualties’ (including genocidal-like mass
atrocities) are most likely to occur in civil wars in which regimes face major armed
challenges—an explanation that fits the Sri Lanka example. My research on the
preconditions of genocide shows that regimes based on ethnic minorities are par-
ticularly likely to use genocidal strategies against majority ethnicities—as in con-
temporary Syria. My results also show that regimes with exclusionary ideologies
often resort to mass killings of opponents (Harff, 2003). Examination of Rudy’s list
of megamurders shows that the greatest death tolls—notably in Soviet Russia, PRC
China, Nazi Germany, and Cambodia—were the result of deadly social engineering
aimed at implementing an ideological imperative. But where does this leave us? His
data on democide are descriptions in search of multivariate explanation.
In my 1996 review, I characterized Rudy’s argument about power and democ-
racy as a categorical imperative and a case of wishful thinking. The implication for
international policy is that the best (only?) defense against democide is to
encourage democratic transitions. But, then ‘not all authoritarian or traditional
polities are likely to commit genocide, nor are the local traditions and political
cultures of many third-world states necessarily compatible with democratic tradi-
tions’ (Harff, 1996: 119). We also know that failed efforts to democratize countries
have contributed directly to episodes of mass murder and genocide, as in Rwanda
and Burundi. My 2003 article reports a test of a structural model of the antecedents
of geno/politicide, in which political system characteristics was one of six signif-
icant variables. Autocracy and democracy were indexed using the Polity dataset.
I found state failure in states with autocratic regimes to be three and a half times
more likely to lead to geno/politicides than failure in democratic regimes if they
occur in the context of other risk factors identified (Harff, 2003: 66). Rummel was
partially correct, but it needed a more careful analysis to evaluate the claim that
democracy is a sovereign remedy for democide. He could have tested his claim,
recognizing that democracy is a matter of degree, using the Polity data with which
he was familiar. But in none of his work, as far as I know, does he report empirical
tests of his basic thesis. And perhaps that was unnecessary because the enormity of
his democide data collection points unambiguously to the guilt of totalitarian and
(some) authoritarian states.
What are we to remember about Rummel? He was a scholar who did a monu-
mental job in collecting data and information, one of the very few scholars of mass
murder who was systematic and global in his quest to document genocides,
politicides and mass murder, and to identify a root cause. A passionate man, bold
and courageous in stating his ideas. He held that liberalism, unabridged political
participation, freedom of the press, and an independent judiciary were the best
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guarantees to protect individuals from those who preach that the ideal society can
only be achieved through murder, repression, and enslavement. If he were to
chronicle the contemporary rise of ISIL or Syria’s descent into politicide, he would
have thought that humanity had heard nothing.
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The DON Project: a five-year research program (9), 1967.
The patterns of dyadic foreign conflict behavior for 1963 (with Dennis Hall) (12), 1968.
Attribute and behavioral spaces of nations: variables and samples for 1950 (13), 1968.
Estimating missing data (with Charles Wall) (20), 1969.
Foreign conflict patterns and types for 1963 (with Gary Oliva) (22), 1969.
Dynamic patterns of nation’s conflict, 1955 to 1963 (with Willard Keim) (27), 1969.
Field theory and indicators of international behavior (29), 1969.
The DON Project: policy relevance and overview (34), 1969.
Field and attribute theories of nation behavior (31), 1969.
Forecasting international relations: some views on the relevancy of the Dimensionality of
Nations Project to policy planning (with Warren Phillips) (36), 1969.
Testing field theory on the 1963 behavior space of nations (with Richard Van Atta) (43),
1970.
Field theory and the 1963 space of nations (44), 1970.
Status field theory and international relations (50), 1971.
Attributes of nations: data and codes 1950–65 (with Sang-Woo Rhee & George Omen)
(65), 1973.
Behaviors of nation-dyads: data and codes 1950–65 (with Sang-Woo Rhee & George
Omen) (67), 1973.
A summary and annotated bibliography of research by the Dimensionality of Nations
Project, 1967–73 (69), 1975.
13.2.4 Papers (Department of Political Science, University
of Hawaii)
Dynamics of conflict behavior, 1969, 20 pp
International social indicators and linkages, 1974, 45 pp
Conflict watch: a continuous computer monitor of the Asia-Pacific region, 1975, 46 pp
The plight of South Korea, 1975, 9 pp
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1For a reference to Hilton (1973), see the reference section of Chap. 1.
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• The question is war or peace, Honololu Star-Bulletin 1 February 1980: A–19.
• A scenario on unilateral disarmament, Honololu Star-Bulletin 18 November
1981: A–16.
• Arming Japan would foster world peace, Press Telegram 25 May 1984.
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• War isn’t this century’s biggest killer. Wall Street Journal 7 July 1986.
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democracy).” Given the supreme importance of this conclusion published in 1981,
Rummel then spent the next fifteen years refining the underlying theory and testing
it empirically on new data, against the empirical results of others, and on case
studies (as in his Death By Government). All this theoretical, empirical, and
comparative research is documented in his final work, Power Kills, nominated for
the 1998 Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order. Power Kills sums
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improve human affairs extends as well to social and economic development, Not
only is democratic freedom a method of nonviolence, it also is a means to wealth
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to world order by showing empirically, historically, and theoretically that fostering
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About this Book
The book provides a critical and constructive assessment of the many contributions
to social science and politics made by Professor R.J. Rummel. Rummel was a
prolific writer and an important teacher and mentor to a number of people who in
turn have made their mark on the profession. His work has always been contro-
versial. But after the end of the Cold War, his views on genocide and the demo-
cratic peace in particular have gained wide recognition in the profession. He was
also a pioneer in the use of statistical methods in international relations. His work in
not easily classified in the traditional categories of international relations research
(realism, idealism, and constructivism). He was by no means a pacifist and his
views on the US Soviet arms race led him to be classified as a hawk. But his work
on the democratic peace has become extremely influential among liberal IR scholars
and peace researchers. Above all, he was a libertarian.
• Rummel’s work on the democratic peace is key to the understanding of inter-
national relations in the post-Cold War era
• His work on a broad conception of genocide and politicide (which he defined as
democide) is pioneering and remains unrivalled in the comprehensiveness of his
data collection
• The contributions to this volume are by well-known scholars and (except pos-
sibly one) original for this volume.
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